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The purpose of this study is to determine whether the Colombian government's 
coordinated national security strategy, developed under the administration of Alvaro 
Uribe, to enhance security through expanding and strengthening the coercive machinery 
of its security apparatus, has made Afro-Colombians, paradoxically, less secure? 
To address this question, the study explores what is meant by security and 
contrasts traditional understandings of security which are state-centered, with a more 
expansive and holistic, people-centered theoretical orientation such as human security. In 
this study, human security is defined as "a condition or state of being characterized by 
freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety, or even lives." This study 
assesses the broad security environment in Colombia, a country ravaged for decades by 
multiple organized, well-armed and financed armed groups competing for territory, 
1 
resources, strategic corridors, access to structural power and to a lesser degree political 
legitimacy. It also examines the role that the United States plays in influencing national 
and human security in Colombia, with its dominant role in the hemisphere and the world, 
expressing its national power and wealth through foreign policy initiatives from the 
"Cold War," the "War on Drugs," and the "War on Terror." 
The study revealed that while some sectors/spheres of Colombian society have 
become more secure as reflected in a number of significant improvements in a number of 
security indicators, the human security of Afro-Colombians is far more difficult to 
ascertain, and in fact, the findings, extrapolated from the primary research, are 
paradoxical. Afro-Colombians continued to be disproportionately and systematically 
dispossessed from their territories and forcibly displaced, terrorized and targeted for 
violence by all armed actors in the conflict in spite of the unprecedented security 
initiative orchestrated by the administration of President Alvaro Uribe. Examining their 
condition requires an analysis which takes into consideration their position within a 
racialized socioeconomic hierarchy, geographic distribution, proximity to strategic 
resources, critical infrastructure and industry and the intersection between private and 
public forms of discrimination. More specifically, the study demonstrated that Afro- 
caribeiios, particularly in the Montes de Maria region, were susceptible to various 
provocative acts of violence propagated by all armed actors and their sense of security is 
more tenuous than other Afi-o-descendant populations examined. The study suggests that 
Afro-caribeiios, due to their proximity to the armed conflict and the lack of scholarly 
inquiry and production of knowledge on the subject, require increased scholarly 
consideration. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The entrenched intrastate security crisis that has permeated the fabric of the 
Republic of Colombia is a topic both Colombian and non-Colombian scholars have 
written about for decades. In fact, violence as a subject of social analysis has produced 
its own genre of academicians known as violentologists.' Academic publications 
investigating the multidimensional forms of violence arising from the protracted armed 
conflict and the concomitant human suffering perpetrated against the country's Afro- 
descendant2 citizens, however, only began to appear over the last decade or s ~ . ~  Even 
fewer studies have attempted to explore the raciallethnic dimension of this prevailing 
humanitarian crisis within the context of the democratic security policies promulgated 
'~onzalo Sanchez and William Aviles, "The Forgotten War: Introduction", Latin American 
Perspectives, 28, no.. 1 (Jan 200 1); Robin Kirk, Terrible than Death: Violence, Drugs and America S War 
in Colombia (New York: Public Affairs, 2003). 
2 Considering that race in Central and South America is a contested and non-static concept that 
transforms itself dependent upon time, space, context (i..e, class, phenotype, hair texture, education, etc..), 
and place within Afr.0-descendant communities and nation-states, it is employed here as a descriptive 
variable broadly recognizing those Central and South Americans of African descendant. For the purpose 
of'this discussion the term Afro-Colombian will encapsulate Colombians who self-identifl as 
Afiodescendientes, negros, palenqueros de Sun Basilio, Raizales, and mulatos. A more elaborate 
discussion on race and ethnicity in the Americas will be undertaken in Chapter V.. 
'~inifr.ed Tate, Counting the Dead The Culture and Politics of Human Rights Activism in 
Colombia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). 
under the administration of the "Ariel Sharon" of the A n d e ~ , ~  Colombian President 
~ l v a r o  Uribe VClez. Yet, the recent proliferation of scholarship suggests that 
understanding the complex ways in which racialized social hierarchies, aggravated 
poverty, differential allocation of political goods such as security, extreme income 
inequality, intrastate conflict and complex humanitarian disasters serve to situate national 
ethniclracial minorities in situations of generalized insecurity and requires not only 
academic consideration but national and transnational responses from governments and 
intergovernmental organizations. The former governor of the department of Antioquia 
and mayor of Medellin has undertaken an ambitious "anti-terror" campaign, 
predominately concerned with: (1) exercising territorial control throughout the entirety 
of the country's landscape, (2) assuming the state's prerogative as the ultimate progenitor 
of the monopoly of the use of force and (3) delegitimizing, demobilizing, capturing and 
extinguishing nonstate actors operating on the margins of the law. 
On September 1 1,2001, the terrorist attacks on the United States and the 
subsequent military campaigns in Asia triggered a fundamental reorientation of American 
foreign policy. The attacks orchestrated by Al-Qaeda operatives were met with 
remarkable demonstrations of force in Afghanistan and later Iraq by the United States 
military, fundamentally destabilizing an already embattled and volatile region. Yet, the 
promulgation of the 'war on terror' has not been limited in geographical scope to the 
Middle East and countries with significant Muslim populations and engaged in 
perceivedland or real Islamic political activism. According to a Congressional Research 
4 Grace Livingstone, Inside Colombia. Drugs, Democracy and War (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 2004), 69. 
Service (CRS) report "Colombia occupies a unique position in the Administration's 
global war on terror in that its targeted terrorist groups are Marxists as opposed to 
Islamic-based and have no reported links to A1 Qaeda orother Islamic groups."' 
Colombia, in the post-911 1, U.S. contrived security paradigm, constitutes what this 
researcher has christened the proverbial "western front" in the global war on terrorism. 
However, the war being executed now under the guise of the "war on terrorism" in 
Colombia is surely of peripheral concern to most Americans, particularly as tensions in 
the Middle East inten~ify.~ The embattled Republic of Colombia has been engaged in a 
four decade long intrastate conflict with no less than three groups of illegally armed 
actors operating on the right and left, contesting the state's legitimacy and authority while 
nourished by the drug trade and other sources of illegitimate revenue procurement. The 
unrelenting multipolar violence and grave humanitarian crisis remains a source of 
hemispheric volatility. The insecurity that permeates the landscape of the Andean nation 
has instigated the "biggest humanitarian catastrophe of the Western hemisphere" 
according to Jan Egeland, former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief ~oordinator.~ 
5 Congressional Research Service, U..S.. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: 
Afghanistan, Afkica, the Philippines and Colombia (Washington, D..C: 26 August 2005). 
6 Ingrid Vaicius and Adam Isacson, "The 'War on Drugs meets the 'War on Terror: The United 
States military involvement in Colombia climbs to the next level," Center. for International Policy, February 
2003; available £tom http://ciponline..or.g/colombia~ 0302ipr..pdfi Internet; accessed 2 January 2007.. 
7 Jan Egeland, "Press Briefing on Colombia by Emergency Relief'Coordinator7' 
10 October 2004; available fkom http://www .un .org/news/briefings/ docs/2004/0CHABrE,doc .htrn; 
Internet; accessed 2 January 2007. 
The protracted struggle between the state and illegally armed non-state actors, the 
execution of the national security prerogatives of the United States through the war on 
drugs and now, the war on terror, presents considerable human security challenges to 
Colombian's war weary civilian population. Afro-descendant Colombians occupy a 
distinctive and unique position within the prevailing intransigent armed conflict because 
(1) they have been subjected to multiple forms of public and private racial discrimination 
and historically made "invisible" within the national self-imagination, (2) their highly 
regionalized spatial distribution in areas that have historically been neglected by the state, 
specifically as it relates to the provision of security and services, (3) inhabiting territories 
of geopolitical, strategic and commercial importance to groups operating on the margins 
of the law (not to mention domestic and transnational capital), (4) the pronounced 
raciallethnic (and class and gendered) dimension of the human security crisis and 
(5) their disproportionate representation amongst the population displaced and 
dispossessed of land (some of which is collectively owned) and property as a 
consequence of the armed conflict. Eduardo Restrepo and Axel Rojas, editors of Conflict 
and Invisibility affirm that scale of the raciallethnic character of the humanitarian crisis in 
"black communities," when they explain, "The experiences of forced displacement and 
the multiple impact of the anned conflict on black people have increased to such a point, 
that today it constitutes an unavoidable priority on the agendas of academics and 
 activist^."^ Karl Offen, further confirms, in his contribution to the discourse entitled 
8 Eduardo Restrepo and Axel Rojas, eds.. ConJlicto e in(visibi1idad) :. Retos en 10s studios de la 
gente negra en Colombia [Conflict and In (Visibilityl. Challenges in the Studies oj Black People in 
Colombia], (University o f  Cauca: Colombia, 2004), 18- 19 
5 
"The Territorial Turn: Making Black Territories in Pacific Colombia," that the "Relative 
isolation from the wider Colombian civil conflict" enjoyed by for Afro-Colombians 
inhabiting the Pacific basin, "ended indefinitely in 1 996."9 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this investigation is to understand how the propagation of 
President Uribe's "Democratic Security and Defense Policy," coupled with the provision 
of US aid1' to fight a "unified campaign" against domestic terrorism and drugs, has 
affected the human security of Afro-Colombians and more specifically Ape-caribeAos. 
The body of knowledge investigating the raciallethnic and invariably class and 
gender aspects of the human security crisis instigated by the armed conflict and the scale 
of the disaster is in its early stages of development. Afro-Colombian communities have 
been disproportionately afflicted by the armed conflict that has permeated the fabric of 
the Andean republic particularly in the opening years of the 2 lSt century. Alarming 
figures relating to forced displacement and dispossession of territory, disruption of 
traditional cultural practices, dislocation from means of economic production and the 
political implications of shifting demographics of Afro-Colombians warrants fk-ther 
investigation. Land, the geostrategic location and presence of exploitable natural (and 
human) resources accessible in territories occupied by Afro-Colombian communities 
attract and entice actors, legal and illegal, to persecute, induce fear, and forcibly evacuate 
and appropriate the land from an already vulnerable population. These territories provide 
9 Karl Offen, "The Territorial Turn: Making Black Territories in Pacific Colombia," Journal oj  
Latin American Geography, 2, no. 1 (2003): 56.. 
"sources of mineral wealth, close to the oceans (Pacific and Atlantic), and form natural 
barriers which protect them from authorities." l1 While, academic publications have 
demonstrated a remarkable trend towards documenting the multidimensional raciallethnic 
character of the crisis in the last few years, the scholarship largely falls silent on the 
plight of Afro-descendants on the Caribbean coast (or anywhere else outside the Pacific) 
who may similarly be exposed to the violence exacted by state sanctioned and non-state 
violence. This investigation seeks to address this deficit in the existing scholarship. 
Conceptual Framework 
The narrowly defined concept of security, in general and state security (or 
national security) in particular, has come under considerable theoretical assault by 
academics, governments, non-governmental and intergovernmental agencies in the post- 
Cold War era due to its incapacity to capture the multidimensional nature of threats to the 
existence of both the state and the individuals that comprise it. As Anne-Marie Slaughter 
puts it "The Westphalian order is in tran~ition."'~ Thus, a reexamination and arguably a 
rearticulation of the concept of security, the principal political good provided by the state 
to its citizens, similarly are in influx. Human security, as a conceptual framework, serves 
as a critical lens by which to analyze and interpret the humanitarian dimension of 
intrastate conflicts. Moreover, within Colombia, national ethniclracial minorities' 
invariably confront existential threats exacted by state sponsored violence and nonstate 
"united Nations Development Program, "The Victims: An Unjust War" in A Cul-de-Sac with 
Ways Out, National Human Development Report, 2003" (Bogota: United National Development Program, 
2003), 14. 
1 2 ~ n n  Marie Slaughter, Carl Bildt and Kazuo Ogura, eds ., The New Challenges to International, 
National and Human Security Policy (Washington, Paris, Tokyo: The Trilateral Commission, 2004), 1 
actors with state like capacity and propensity for violence as an instrument of conflict 
resolution, resource extraction and access to power structures. Human security and state 
(or national) security are not mutually exclusive modes of analysis but conceptually 
integrated and mutually reinforcing. Thus, the flux in the Westphalian order requires a 
reevaluation of the state centric notion of security that undergirds it. The Commission on 
Human Security provides this justification for broadening and, in deed, bifurcating the 
conceptual rigidity of a state centered model of security: 
The international community urgently needs a new paradigm of security. 
Why? Because the security debate has changed dramatically since the 
inception of state security advocated in the 1 7th century . . . The state 
remains the fundamental purveyor of security. Yet it often fails to fulfill 
its security obligations-and at times has even become a source of threat 
to its own people. That is why attention must now shift from the security 
of the state to the security of the people-to human security.13 
Human security is a conceptual framework that threatens to "revolutionize society in the 
21 century," according to the 1994 Human Development ~ e ~ 0 r t . l '  The model has the 
potential to usher in a much more sophisticated and theoretically relevant 
conceptualization of security (particularly for people living in the Global South where 
intrastate conflicts proliferate and the state itself is one of the principal perpetrators of 
human rights violations) that advances equal consideration to the human dimension of 
security. Security, while not static conceptually, is generally defined within the orthodox 
discourse in international relations theory as "the basic survival, welfare and protection of 
'3~ommission on Human Security, Human Security Now (New York: Commission on Human 
Security, 2003) 
14 United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Report 1994;" 
available ftom http:/lhdr .undp .org/reports/global/l994/en/; Internet; accessed 1 March 2006 
the state."15 However, the conventional model fails to adequately address the "basic 
survival, welfare and protection" of those who inhabit the territorial confines of the state. 
Thus, the theoretical and practical chasm that exists between the security of the state and 
human security cannot be adequately addressed within the conventional, disarticulated 
definition of the security. The transformation of the conceptual foundation of security 
under the rubric devised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
consists of seven interlocking values: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, 
community and political security.16 While, numerous definitions of human security 
abound, for the purpose of this study, the researcher will employ the working definition, 
devised by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: "A 
condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people's 
rights, their safety, or even lives."17 An elaborate analysis of the multiple values, 
economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security, which 
comprise the human security paradigm posited by the United Nations Development 
Programme is beyond the scope of this particular investigation. The UNDP report states 
that "human security is more easily identified through its absence than its presence," and 
while there has been no consensus among scholars concerning the definition of human 
security, the investigator will employ human security as a conceptual framework for 
understanding the presence or absence of "critical and pervasive threats" to the Afro- 
15 Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, Internatronal Relations and World Politics Security, 
Economy, Identity (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), 8 
1 %nited Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Report 1994." 
17 Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Human Security: Safety for 
People in a Changing World" (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs, 1999) 
Colombian population. This study is based on data gathered through an analysis of 
secondary literature and the collection of primary data through focus group interviews, 
unstructured interviews and surveys with Afro-Colombians inhabiting specific 
municipalities located on the Caribbean Coast and other relevant actors in the United 
States and Colombia. Scholars, think tanks and governments routinely conduct various 
risk assessments within the interstate system to determine "critical and pervasive threats" 
posed by other state actors and more recently those generated by non-state actors that 
operate clandestinely within states, vulnerable populations have justifiably become 
subjects of analysis in the post-Cold War era. The researcher will employ an admittedly 
rigorous definition of human security in order to elicit quantifiable results in order to 
evaluate the human dimension of the Colombian security dilemma. If one were to 
employ the framework under different circumstances, such as advocacy or capacity 
building initiatives within humanitarian agencies, a more ambiguous conceptualization 
would not render it inoperable but within academia, the concept requires precision to 
enable one to measure it. Subsequently, the use of the former must surrender to a more 
concise, analytical device of the latter. 
Statement of the Problem 
Negotiating the Security Paradox. Colombian Intrastate Security and U.S. National 
Security 
The terrorist attacks perpetrated against the United States on September 1 1 th 
transformed the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy in general and initiated a concomitant 
(philosophical) transition in U.S.-Colombian bilateral relations in particular.18 These 
highly orchestrated attacks, as we now know, instigated the genesis and the justification 
for a "war without quarter," popularly known as the 'war on terrorism.' However, other 
pivotal events were unfolding in Colombia just six months after the attacks on New York 
and Washington D.C. While, Americans came to know "tenor" on September 1 lth, the 
civilian population in Colombia has been acquainted with "terror" exacted by legal and 
illegal armed actors for decades. Civilians, particularly in areas where the state has failed 
to monopolize force and institutionalize itself as the principal purveyor of security and 
supplier of goods and services, have endured multiple forms of violence perpetrated by 
illegally armed groups (and state security forces) operating with impunity for decades. 
Further compounding the intrastate security crisis is the state's complicity in 
coordinating, legitimizing and arming counterinsurgent groups who have committed 
grave human rights violations, blurring the lines between state and non-state military 
actors. Moreover, the indisputable infiltration of right-wing illegally armed groups into 
all levels of governmental institutions has further undermined the state's legitimacy and 
has eroded its authority. The termination of peace talks between the Colombian 
government and the "largest guerilla army in Latin America," the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia-Eje'rcito del Pueblo (FARC-EP, Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia-Peoples Army) and the initiation of the reclamation of territory in 
l8 It should be noted that evidence supports the supposition that while the rhetorical justification 
for U .S . intervention in the intrastate security crisis in Colombia may have transformed itself to correspond 
with the proliferation of U.S. military force in the aftermath 911 1, the fundamental trajectory of American 
foreign policy in Colombia is largely a holdover from the Cold War that reflects the Washington's 
preoccupation with its counterinsurgency strategy. See: Doug Stokes, America's Other War: Terrorizing 
Colombia (New York: Zed Books, 2005). 
early 2002, fermented further discontent and frustration from a population fatigued by an 
intractable armed conflict. That same year, the Bush administration proposed a 
fundamental shift in the allocation of U.S. military aid to Colombia. The anti-terror 
supplemental bill, passed in August 2002, would permit, for the first time, utilizing 
(present, past and future) US military and police assistance to engage in a "counter- 
terrrorism" campaign against armed actors, identified as foreign terrorist organizations 
(FTOs) in ~01ombia.l~ The previous trepidation on the part of the U.S. government 
against becoming embroiled in Colombia's internal armed conflict dissipated with Bush's 
signature. This event constituted a new stage in US-Colombia bilateral relations as it 
concerns the US sponsored "war on drugs" and its successor (in Colombia), the global 
war on terror. Another decisive episode that prevailed shortly thereafter was the 
overwhelming electoral victory, in the first round of the presidential elections, by 
"dissident liberal party candidatem2' ~ l v a r o  ~ r i b e . ~ l  A fatigued electorate decidedly 
elected the man who would become known as the "law and order" president. Uribe was 
unambiguously more provocative in his militaristic approach to extinguishing the armed 
conflict than his predecessor Andrks Pastrana and vowed to take the war to the guerillas 
and force them into submission. Uribe's political strategy to secure peace was 
19 Ingrid Vaicius and Adam Isacson, "'The War on Drugs' meets the 'War on Terror': The United 
States military involvement in Colombia climbs to the next level.. Center for International Policy. 
February 2003; available fiom http://www.ciponline..orglcolombid0302ipr.pdfj Internet; accessed 7 
January 2003. 
2 %rancisco Leal Bultrago, "La Politica de Seguridad Democratica: 2002-2005" Andisis Politico 
no. 57, Bogota (Mayo-Agosto, 2006): 5.. 
21~r.ibe was also a senator and received numerous accolades for his contribution and service, while 
holding office in Antioquia. 
promulgated through the "Democratic Security and Defense Policy." Securing the state 
was the first goal and other strategic priorities such as securing peace, quashing illegally 
armed groups and economic development were to flow from the narrowing of the 
security deficit. Within the course of one year, the war on drugs paradigm became 
collapsed within the framework of the global war on terrorism. Invariably, this paradigm 
emerged as the unequivocal prevailing discursive framework for reconstructing the 
Colombian intrastate security crisis in the eyes of influential policymakers in Bogota, and 
Washington D . c . ~ ~  Doug Stokes in America's Other War. Terrorizing Colombia 
reminds us that "The primary threat to US interests during the Cold War was seen as 
communist insurgents; drugs and terrorism are the new post-Cold War threats."23 
Colombia, along with Afghanistan, unfortunately, has both. Uribe, upon assuming the 
presidency of the republic, duly obliged this reconceptualized U.S. national security 
prerogative. Colombian President Alvaro Uribe and United States President George W. 
Bush possess what Menjivar and Rodriguez characterize as a "coincidence of interests 
and  objective^."^^ Uribe, politically astute, reflects this sentiment when he states "The 
great enemy of Colombian democracy is terrorism. And our great partner in defeating 
terrorism has been the government and the people of the United ~tates."~' Consequently, 
22~r lene  B.. Tickner; "Colombia and the United States: From Counternar.cotics to 
Counterterrorism" Current History (February, 2003). 
23 Doug Stokes, America S Other War: Terrorizing Colombia (New York: Zed Books, 2005), 7 
24~ecilia Menjivm and Nestor Rodriguez, eds, When States Kill: Latin America, the U S ,  and 
Technologies oj'Terror (University of Texas, Austin, 2005), 5 .  
2 5 ~ h e  White House, "President Bush, President Uribe of Colombia Discuss Terrorism and 
Security," August 2005, available Gem http://www ,whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050804- 
2 .html; Internet; accessed 1 December 2005. 
the "war on terrorismm has created a convenient ideological framework for the Colombian 
president to reconstitute the nature of the intrastate security crisis that has plagued the 
nation within the prevailing security paradigm, articulated by the United States in the 
post-91 1 era. 
Negotiating the Security Paradox: The Human Security ofAJ2.o-Colombians within the 
Colombian Intrastate Security Crisis 
The promulgation of the Colombian Political Constitution of 199 1 effectively 
raised the institutional and structural veil of "invisibility" that characterized the nation's 
relegation of its African descendant population's presence, status and contribution to the 
periphery of the nation-building project.26 The edifice of the mestizo framework 
ensconced within Colombian society could no longer be sustained and would be forced to 
deconstruct its Andean character and incorporate its multiethnic composition. While, the 
consolidation of the nationai identity has historically permitted, to a degree, for its 
indigenous population to be included in the character of the nation, descendants of 
enslaved Africans have always been perceived as the other, "invisible," incompatible 
with the nation's aspirations for "order and progress." Since the formal abolition of 
slavery in 185 1, African descendants (along with the indigenous population) have 
occupied the lowest stratum of the socioeconomic hierarchy27 reflecting a racialized caste 
26 Jaime Arocha, "Inclusion of A£i-o-Colombians: Unreachable National Goal?" 
Latin American Perspectives, 25, no. 3, Race and National Identity in the Americas (May 1998): 70-89 
27 Peter Wade more specifically characterizes this racialized hierarchical system as a triangle in 
which the majority of the Afro-Colombians masses occupy one corner and the indigenous population 
inhabits the other while mestizos occupy the tip of the triangle.. For Wade's commentary on this racial in 
Colombia, See: Peter Wade, Blackness and Race Mixture: The Dynamics ojRacial Identity in Colombia. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). For a broader discourse on race and ethnicity 
system privileging mestizos over negros, valorizing whiteness while marginalizing 
blackness. The post-abolition period offered the masses of African descendants little in 
the form of fundamental transformations in the socioeconomic conditions managed and 
monopolized nearly exclusively by blancos and mestizos. Nearly a century and half after 
the abolition of slavery, the Republic of Colombia has conceded that the constitutional 
reformation initiated for the first time the state's obligation to recognize the social, 
economic, cultural and political aspirations and rights of Afro-Colombians and provides 
mechanisms, both constitutional and statutory, to protect the integrity and interests of 
these communities. Law 70, the statute born from Transitory Article 55 of the Political 
Constitution of 199 1, provided black communities or comunidades negras, a number of 
statutory guarantees including collective territorial rights (for those who met certain 
conditions), empowered the state to prosecute and deter racial discrimination, establishes 
the framework for the provision of affirmative approaches to strengthening the 
educational capacity of black communities, the incorporation of Afro-Colombian studies 
into the educational curriculum (referred to as ethno-education), a measure of political 
autonomy as exercised through community councils, and establishes the perfunctory 
obligation to provide two seats in the lower house designated specifically for Afro- 
~ o l o m b i a n s . ~ ~  However, the institutionalization of a progressive constitution, that 
advances the "pluriethnic and multicultural" character of the state, does not render 
articulated by Wade, See: Peter Wade, Race and Ethnicity in Latin America. (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 
1997). 
2 8 ~ ~ l i o  E,, Gallardo Archbold, "Colombian Legislation: Regulations Governing Afio-Colombian 
Communities" in "Race and Poverty: Interagency Consultation on Atlo-Latin Americans." Inter-American 
Dialogue, Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank, Washington DC, 19 July 2000. 
centuries of racism and social exclusion immaterial nor does it as Aline Helg so 
eloquently declares "challenge the image of Colombia as a patriarchial mestizo (of mixed 
European and indigenous ancestry) nation."29 Statistics derived from a myriad of 
governmental, non-governmental and academic publications have reached a veritable 
consensus concerning the deplorable socioeconomic conditions, political 
underrepresentation, racial discrimination and cultural marginalization accorded the 
country's Afro-descendant population.30 
Afi-o-Colombians have disproportionately been concentrated in the regions that 
correspond with the panorama of natural resources and strategic corridors (for oil, arms 
and drugs, for example) contested by legal and illegal armed actors. The department of 
Choco, considered one of the most biodiverse territories in the world, has the largest 
percentage of African descendants in the country. Conflating the problems associated 
with the protracted intrastate security crisis, state sanctioned economic development 
projects like the cultivation of African palm for the production of much coveted biofuels 
in black territories. The cultivation of licit (e.g., Afi-ican palm) and illicit (e.g., coca) 
crops alongside the profitable enterprise of extraction and exploitation of natural 
resources including timber, platinum, oil and gold illustrate conspire to create situations 
29 Aline Helg, Liberty & Equality in Caribbean Columbia, 1770-18.3.5 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2004). 
3 0 ~ h i l e ,  only little more than a half-million African descendant Colombians identified themselves 
as such in the 1993 Colombian census and only 10.6% proclaimed to be Afrocolombiano (raizales, 
palenquero, negro, mulato, AfroColombiano, Afiodescendiente) in the 2005 census, the population is 
considered significantly higher The 2003 Inter-American Dialogue's Race Report: "Afro-Descendants in 
Latin America: How Many?'estimates the population is 26% of the population. In fact, the Republic of' 
Colombia, possess' the third largest population of African descendants in the Americas after Brazil and the 
United States according to Aline Helg. 
of generalized insecurity for the region's predominantly African descendant  inhabitant^.^^ 
Afro-Colombian and indigenous civil society organizations have vigorously contested the 
proliferation of the destabilizing and destructive forces instigated by the armed conflict 
and the disruption of their cultural integrity. In addition, development projects and 
access to illegal contraband trafficking routes contribute to the value of the territory and 
intensity of competition for geostrategic corridors that provide access to international 
markets.32 The plight of Afro-descendants trapped within the nexus of the violent 
projects propagated by illegally armed actors is compounded by a political system 
corrupted and security forces compromised by the infiltration of its institutions by right 
wing illegally armed groups. Perhaps, there is no more clear indication of the human 
suffering and continuing tragedy within the Colombian theater than the appalling levels 
of conflict induced internal displacement. The Colombian non-profit Consultoria para 
10s Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES) tasked with collecting data 
concerning internal displacement approximates that black communities, while comprising 
between 10-26% of the Colombian population, constituted at least one-third of 
Colombia's internally displaced population in 2 0 0 2 . ~ ~  
31~duardo Restrepo and Axel Rojas, eds, Conflicto e in(visibilida4 Retos en 10s studios de la 
gente negra en Colombia (Columbia: University of'cauca, 2004).. 
32 Ulrich Oslender, "Geografias de terror y desplazamiento forzado en el Pacifico 
Colombiano: Conceptualizando el problema y buscando respuestas" in Conflicto e in(visibi1idad). Retos en 
10s estudios de la gente negra en Colombia (Colombia: University of'cauca, 2004). 
33 U..S. Office on Colombia, "Understanding Colombia Series: Afro-Colombians under 
Fire" June 2004; available from http://usofficeoncolombia.org/insidecolombia/afcol,,htm; Internet; accessed 
3 1 October 2005.. 
Significance of the Study 
The study is significant for two principal reasons: (1) this is an effort to 
understand the proliferation of the conflict on the Caribbean coast and the raciallethnic 
dimension of the intrastate security crisis in this region and (2) an examination of the 
extent to which the promulgation of the democratic security initiatives has affected the 
state of human security of Afro-Colombians. How has the policy affected the condition 
of human security for Afro-descendants in Colombia? Afro-Colombians by some 
measures constitute one-quarter of (although the 2005 census puts the number closer to 
eleven percent) Colombia's forty-three million citizens. The disruption, dispossession, 
terror and displacement levied against the largest Spanish speaking (if one accepts the 
postulation that Afro-Colombians constitute an approximately one-quarter of the 
population), Afro-descendant population in the Americas, propagated by illegally armed 
actors (and at times in collusion with state security forces), and warrants continued 
scholarly reflection and international attention. Thus, this study seeks to determine the 
extent to which a paradox has revealed itself in the Andean nation: as the state becomes 
more secure through strengthening the coercive machinery and capacity of the agents of 
force, the security forces, have AJi.0-Colombians, paradoxically, become less secure? 
This investigation, driven by the desire of the investigator to develop policy relevant 
research, is potentially significant for several reasons. Academic literature on the 
raciallethnic multidimensional humanitarian crisis and the efficacy of the democratic 
security policy in advancing the human security of Afro-Colombians is inadequate. 
Moreover, the existing literature that does prevail examines the plight of Afro- 
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Colombians victimized by the armed conflict on the Pacific Coast, thereby marginalizing 
other segments of the Afro-descendant population who may be similarly spatially situated 
in strategic zones, exposed to the violence propagated by a myriad of legal and illegal 
actors, displacement, and the long term implications of exposure to generalized 
insecurity, residing outside the Pacific. This investigation is a modest attempt to add 
value to these existing publications. 
Literature from a number of different disciplines has been consulted. Political 
science literature was examined especially from the subfields of International Relations 
in particular security studies, American foreign policy, Latin American politics, 
comparative politics and is inherently multidisciplinary in its approach. This study, due 
to the nature of the discourse on raciallethnic identity, nation-building, marginalization, 
conflict and development in Latin America, the study must also necessarily draw upon 
the relevant literature and invaluable contributions of other disciplines within the social 
sciences including Anthropology, Sociology and History. Furthermore, the scholarship 
developed by geographers concerning the intersection between culture, conflict and 
territory was also extensively consulted. 
Research Question 
The Embassy of Colombia to the United States released a statement entitled "The 
Uribe Administration's Democratic Security and Defense Policy" which contends that 
there is a "qualitative and quantitative" improvement in the security Colombian security 
environment which has "been achieved through close collaboration with the United 
States." Moreover, the "pillar of this close collaboration is Plan ~ o l o m b i a . " ~ ~  The report 
cites these notable improvements in human security indicators such as kidnappings, 
homicides and conflict induced internal displacement and marked decreases in terrorist 
activities instigated by subnational actors on critical government infrastructure. 
It is within the context of this professed "qualitative and quantitative" security 
environment, Uribe's unapologetically and unambiguously militaristic approach to 
neutralizing armed groups, that the research question is derived. Disaggregated human 
security indicator data (like sociopolitical homicides, massacres, threats, kidnappings, 
etc.) on raciallethnic groups concerning the conflict is not available, outside of the scope 
of data on internal displacement, therefore the researcher will employ a two-pronged 
strategy (qualitative and quantitative improvement) by utilizing survey data, focus 
groups, interviews, and examinations of relevant secondary sources along with other 
relevant information in order to compensate for the paucity of disaggregated data based 
on racelethnicity. Consequently, the primary research question that guides this 
exploratory investigation is: 
As the state becomes theoretically more secure as it consolidates control 
over the national landscape, strengthens the security apparatus of the 
state of the country and aggressively seeks to neutralize illegally armed 
groups, have Afio-Colombians, paradoxically, become less secure? 
34 Embassy of Colombia, "The Uribe Administration's Democratic Security and Defense Policy" 
Government of Colombia; available fiom http://www .colombiaemb ,org/opencms/opencms/system/ 
galleries1 download/defense/Colombia~en~cifkas..doc; Internet; accessed 1 March 2006. 
Major Variables 
The independent variable are the security policies articulated within the 
"Democratic Security and Defense Policy" issued by the administration of President 
Uribe. The moderator variable is American military and police assistance through the 
Andean Counterdrug Initiative and other related military programs. Since the 
Government of Colombia considers the United States its most powerful ally in their 
intrastate security crisis, it was imperative to incorporate U.S. military and political 
assistance within the theoretical calculus. The dependent variable is the impact of these 
national security convergences on the human security of Afro-Colombians. The principal 
armed actors operating in the Colombian theater examined within this study are left wing 
(FARC and ELN) and right wing (AUC and second generation paramilitaries) armed 
actors and state security forces. The "accumulated disadvantages" suffered by Afro- 
descendants in conjunction with the multidimensional armed conflict serves as the 
foundation for the investigation and analytical measurement of the efficacy of 
"democratic security." The armed conflict that has endured for more than forty years, 
referred to by Gonzalo SClnchez refers to as the "permanent and endemic warfare,"35 will 
subsequently be held as an intervening variable within this investigation. 
Organization of the Study 
This investigation is organized into eight chapters. Chapter I includes: (1) an 
introduction to the study, (2) the purpose of the investigation, (3) the statement of the 
35 Gonzalo Sanchez, "La Violencia in Colombia: New Research, New Questions," trans. Peter 
Bakewell, Hispanic American Historical Review 65,  no.4, (1985): 789.. 
problem, (4) the research questions guiding the study, (5) the major concepts and 
variables and finally (6) a brief introduction to the conceptual framework that will direct 
the research. Chapter I1 consists of the literature review which has been designed to 
examine publications concerned with the genesis, impact, and implications of the armed 
conflict on Afro-descendant Colombians. The literature review will also provide a 
synopsis of the prevailing themes, how they diverge, complement one another or 
illustrate the prevailing chasms within certain areas within the breadth of the literature. 
Chapter I11 consists of the research design including: a reexamination and 
operationalization of the variables, research methodology and conceptual framework 
employed in the study and its utility. Chapter IV is designed to introduce the intrastate 
security crisis in Colombia, the emergence of the man who would become the "law and 
order" president and an examination of his political prerogatives, complementarities with 
the administration of George W. Bush and an examination of the efficacy of the 
democratic security policies. Chapter V examines the historical and contemporary plight 
of Afro-Latinos within the pre and post-colonial republics, examining the regions' legacy 
of racial discrimination and concomitant socioeconomic marginality and political 
exclusion of its African descendant population. Chapter VI briefly discusses the social, 
economic and political situation of Afro-descendant Colombians since the abolition of 
slavery; it looks at how the reconfiguration of the Colombian Constitution of 199 1 has 
sewed as a vehicle to advance their political and raciallethnic-territorial prerogatives and 
the practical implementation of these legal mechanisms over the last fifteen years. 
Finally, the chapter will explore the implications of the implementation of Uribe 
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administration's democratic security policies on Afro-Colombian populations. Chapter 
VII, Data Analysis, is devoted to analyzing the primary data collected during the 
investigation. The author will present the findings of the survey, "Afro-Colombian 
Perceptions Concerning the State of Security and the Armed Conflict." Chapter VIII, the 
concluding chapter, synthesizes the information produced in the first seven chapters and 
incorporates an analysis of the primary data and a summary of the findings. It further 
seeks to determine whether the transformation in the security environment in Colombia 
has or has not benefited the Afro-descendant population. Finally, the author discusses the 
potential implications of the study, opportunities for future investigations and finally an 
explanation of how the findings may add value to the existing literature. 
CHAPTER I1 
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
THE INTRASTATE SECURITY CRISIS AND AFRO-COLOMBIANS 
Introduction 
This literature review is designed to identify and evaluate relevant academic, non- 
governmental and popular publications concerned with the politically and economically 
motivated terror, displacement, disruption of familial, cultural and social networks and 
dispossession of territories perpetrated against Afro-descendant communities by all 
armed actors, legal and illegal, in Colombia. The author has purposefully and with careful 
consideration elected not to incorporate publications concerning the broad range of 
literature expounding upon the historical and contemporary social, cultural, political and 
economic landscape of Afi-o-descendant Colombians.' 
1 For a discussion on these broad ranges of themes on Afro-Colombians, See: Mauricio Pardo 
Rojas, Claudia Mosquera, Maria Clemencia Ramirez, eds., Panoramica AfroColombzana Estudzos soczales 
en el Pac$co (Institute Colombiano de Antropologia e Historia Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 
Bogota, 2004), Nina S de Friedemann and Jaime Arocha, "Colombia" in No Longer Inviszble Afro-Latin 
Americans Today, eds Minority Rights Group (London: Minority Rights Publications, 1995) and De sol a 
sol Gknesis, transforrnacidnes y presencia de 10s negros en Colombia (Bogota, Planeta, 1986); Peter 
Wade, "The Cultural Politics of Blackness" American Ethnologist, Vol 22, No. 2. (May, 1995), pp 341- 
357; Juan de Dios Mosquera Mosquera, Las cornunzdades negras de Colornbza pasado, presente y future 
(Pereira, Colombia: Movimiento Nacional por 10s Derechos Humanos de las Comunidades Negras de 
Colombia, 1995) For a discussion on race and ethnicity on the Caribbean Coast, See: Elisabeth Cunin, 
"De la esclaviud a1 multicultralismo: el antropologo entre identidad rechazada e identidad 
instrumentalizada" in Conflict0 e in(viszbi1idad) Retos en 10s studios de la gente negra en Colombia, eds. 
Eduardo Restrepo and Axel Rojas (University of Cauca: Colombia, 2004) and Identidades a Flor de Pzel 
Lo "negro" entre aparzencias y pertenenczas categorzs raczales y mestizaje en Cartagena (Bogota, 
This measure was taken because these broad ranges of topics, while not 
exhaustive, have received significantly more consideration by scholars in a number of 
different disciplines than the topic under deliberation in this re vie^.^ Secondary sources 
consulted include literature published in peer reviewed academic journals, books, 
conference papers and relevant print media publications, governmental and 
nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations. The researcher has consulted 
literature from a number of disciplines including Anthropology, Sociology, History, 
Political Science, and Geography for this literature review. 
This chapter is tasked with identifying the scope, trends, deviations and 
limitations in the prevailing literature on the affect of the armed conflict on Afro- 
Colombians. While, one is able to compile an extensive bibliography on the 
contemporary intrastate security crisis in Colombia, the roots of the crisis, the cyclical 
Colombia: Instituto Colombiano de Antropologia e Historia Colombia: Instituto Colombiano de 
Antropologia e Historia (ICANH), 2003); Arturo Rodriguez-Bobb, Exclusidn e integracidn del sujeto 
negro en Cartagena de Indias en perspectiva histdrica (Madrid: Iberoamericana; Frankfurt am Main: 
Vervuert, 2002); Joel Streicker, "Policing Boundaries: Race, Class and Gender in Cartagena, Colombia" 
American Ethnologist, Vol.. 22, No. 1 (February 1995): 54-74 and Aline Helg, Liberty & Equality in 
Caribbean Colombia, 1770-18.3.5 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004) .. Peter Wade, 
Blackness and Race Mixture: The Dynamics ojRacial Identity in Colombia (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1993) also incorporates a chapter on African descendants on the Caribbean cast. 
2 For an insightful discussion on the impact of'the multicultural constitutional reforms in Latin 
America, in general, and in particular on Afro-Colombians, the implications for political mobilization and 
the "danger"' of narrowly defined ethnicity within this context, See: Juliet Hooker, "Indigenous 
Inclusion/Black Exclusion: Race, Ethnicity and Multicultural Citizenship in Latin America" Journal o j  
Latin American Studies, no.. 37 (200.5): 1-26. For further discussion on the implications of the 
promulgation of the 199 1 Constitution and subsequent legislation targeting black communities and Af?o- 
Colombians in the Pacific, See: Jaime Arocha, "Inclusion of' Affo-Colombians: Unreachable National 
Goal?'Latin American Perspectives, Vol.. 25, No. 3, Race and National Identiq in the Americas (May 
1998): 70-89; Libia Grueso, Carlos Rosero and Artwo Escobar, "The Process of Black Corrmunity 
Organizing in the Southern Pacific Coast Region of Colombia" in Cultures ojPolitics/Politics o j  Cultures 
Re- Visioning Latin American Social Movements, eds. Alvarez, Sonia E.., Evelina Dagnino and Arturo 
Escobar (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998) and Karl Offen, "The Territorial Turn: Making Black 
Territories in Pacific Colombia," Journal ofLatin American Geography, 2, no. 1, (2003). 
nature of violence in Colombia, U.S.-Colombia bilateral relations, studies concerning 
Afio-Colombian "invisibility," socioeconomic marginality within the Colombian nation- 
building project, investigations examining the proliferation of the conflict and the 
implications for Afro-descendant groups are only beginning to emerge. The investigator 
has undertaken a great effort to acquire and examine literature in Spanish and English 
published in the United States and Colombia and other relevant countries, in order to 
assemble the broadest array of materials relating to the stated objectives of the study. 
The vast majority of the scholarship produced on the topic has been written by a small 
cadre of academics, specifically anthropologists, which skillfully articulate the 
intersection between the social, political, economic and geographic marginalization of the 
black population, identity, culture and the entrenched intrastate security crisis that 
eclipses all areas of public and private life in Colombia. Relevant publications produced 
on the topic have also been undertaken by Afro-Colombian civil society groups such as 
the National Movement for the Human Rights of Afro-Colombian Communities 
(Movimiento Nacional por 10s Derechos Humanos de las Comunidades AJFocolombianos, 
Cimarron), the Association of Displaced Afro-Colombians (Asociacidn de Afro- 
Colombianos Desplazados, AFRODES) and the Black Communities Process (Proceso 
Comunidades de Negras, PCN).~ The contribution made by these organizations in the 
3 For a concise treatment discussing the role of Afro-Colombian civil society groups, such as 
AFRODES and the PCN, in developing transnational alliances with academics, non-governmental and 
inter-governmental organizations, See: Urich Oslender, "Geografias de terror y desplazamiento forzado en 
el Pacifico Colombiano: Conceptualizando el problema y buscando respuestas" in Conjlicto e 
in(visibilida4: Retos en 10s studios de la gente negra en Colombia (Universidad del Cauca: Colombia, 
2004); Also See: Peter Wade, "The Production of Knowledge and the Changing Definitions of'Blackness 
in Colombia," Beyond Visibilty. Rethinking the Aj?ican Diaspora in Latin America, University of' 
California, Berkeley, 1-2 March 2007 and Winifred Tate in Counting the Dead The Culture and Politics of 
Human Rights Activism in Colombia (Berkeley: University of' California Press, 2007). 
academic sphere, domestic social movements and literature, and broader political 
discourse in Colombia, and in the capitals of the United States and Europe, warrants 
further examination and represents a critical supplement to this project. 
Afro-Colombian Civil Society Groups 
A number of Afro-Colombian domestic advocacy groups (with transnational institutional 
alliances) have captured in multiple media and venues including print, radio, internet in 
both domestic and international arenas, the selective killings and massacres, displacement 
from collectively held territories and disruption of the cultural fabric of black 
communities as a consequence of contestation between regular and irregular armies over 
human and natural resources. Moreover, these grassroots self-acknowledged black 
organizations have chided the government for failing to equitably extend protection to 
Afro-descendants, their role in perpetuating and/ or tacitly permitting the violence 
propagated against them, as security forces conspire with paramilitary forces, in the 
illegal appropriation of land, cultivating African palm absent consultation with 
community councils, and in the execution of a neo-liberal agenda that threatens the 
constitutional and statutory guarantees afforded their communities. Groups explicitly 
devoted to addressing the socioeconomic and political marginalization and discriminatory 
practices, explicitly and implicitly exercised in both public and private spheres, against 
Afro-descendants, have grown since the 1980s. The preliminary discussions, 
deliberations and organizational developments coupled with threats to the cultural 
tapestry, territory and environment within Afro-descendant (and indigenous 
communities) committed by the state and other actors in the department of Choco, in 
particular, instigated considerable domestic social and political mobilization. The 1991 
Constitution and the subsequent promulgation of Law 70, further, served as a catalyst for 
the expansion of these raciallethnic based mobilization efforts. Aggravating and 
undermining the capacity for many black communities in the Pacific to realize their 
ethnic, territorial and environmental rights has been the explosion of violence and 
displacement in their collectively held territories. Some of the most prominent domestic 
Afro-Colombian civil society groups with access to strategically important international 
actors, including the United Nations and sympathetic NGOs and parliamentarians in 
Europe and the United States, are Cimarron, the PCN and AFRODES. These explicitly 
Afro-descendant organizations have mobilized their domestic constituents and 
international allies and advocates in an effort to seek relief and reparation from the 
violence, make visible the disparate impact of the conflict, exact intense pressure on the 
state, horizontally and vertically, while demanding that all armed actors and transnational 
corporations respect for international human rights and humanitarian law. Afro- 
Colombian civil society groups such as the PCN and AFRODES, with members and 
associates in major European and American capitals, have been particularly successful in 
leveraging their international relationships to heighten the consciousness of relevant 
international actors including elected officials in the United States and Europe, the United 
Nations, transnational NGOs, churches, student and labor groups and environmental 
organizations. Their efforts have served to render greater visibility to deleterious 
implications of the conflict unfolding in their communities, how the state and nonstate 
actors that have contributed to it, while demonstrating the inextricable relationship 
between territory, culture and ethnicity. 
Principal investigator for Cimarrhn, Leonardo Reales Jimenez, in a report entitled 
"Report on the Human Rights Situation of Afro-Colombians (1 994-2004)," indicates that 
there is a relationship between the myriad of human rights violations suffered by Afro- 
Colombians and the government's negligence in creating the conditions for the 
enjoyment of these rights and more specifically, their right to security. He insinuates that 
this phenomenon reflects the historical marginalization and discrimination experienced 
by blacks and the manifold indignities levied against them by legal and illegal armed 
groups. As Afro-Colombians continue to occupy the lowest rungs of the socio-economic 
hierarchy, suffer both public and private discrimination, the armed conflict and the 
usurpation and illegal appropriation of territory by armed actors has served to exacerbate 
the prevailing the material conditions of Afro-descendants living in territories of strategic 
concern. The report offers this stark concession "The control of the illegal groups over 
the lands of Afro-Colombians also makes worse the violations of the political and civil 
rights of communities that are frequently victims of blockages, restrictions to people's 
mobilizations and access to medicines and food.4 While, estimates concerning the 
proportion of the ethniclracial identity of internally displaced persons are inherently 
problematic, (for a number of reasons) there is a general consensus that Afro-descendants 
4 Leonardo Reales Jimenez, Afro-Colombian National Movement, Cimarron, "Report on the 
Human Rights Situation of Afro-Colombians (1 994-2004)," Cimanon, July 2004; available fiom 
http://www.mnacimarron orglindex php?option=com-content&task=view&id= 17& Itemid=28; Internet; ; 
accessed 2 January 2007 
generally comprise a disproportionate percentage of this vulnerable population relative to 
the general population. Reales postulates "Regions in Colombia with large populations of 
Afro-Colombians have been the most affected by war and, subsequently, most of the 
internally displaced people in Colombia are ~ f i o -~o lomb ian . "~  Moreover, the report 
offers a unique approach to examining the implications of the armed conflict on Afro- 
Colombians because its discussion is under girded and firmly entrenched its analysis 
within international humanitarian and human rights law and standards and an assessment 
of the Colombian government's compliance with their treaty obligations. 
The Black Communities Process in Colombia (also referred to by their Spanish 
acronym as the PCN) provide a brief but consequential and well-articulated examination 
of the armed conflict within the context of the promulgation of the Uribe administration's 
democratic security policy and the detrimental psychosocial, economic and political 
implication for Afro-Colombian non-combatants in "A Forgotten World: Rights of Afro- 
Colombian ~ommunities."~ As with other academic investigations, the article indicates 
that the violence and contestation over resources and territories has disproportionately 
affected Afro-Colombians and generated wide-ranging displacement amongst the 
country's Afro-descendant population. Furthermore, the PCN maintains that the group 
rights provided by the 1991 Constitution and the subsequent legislation born from it, 
whereby Afro-Colombians in the Pacific were afforded collective land titles and a myriad 
5~bid.  Also see: Leonardo Reales, "Racismo y politicas publicas en Colombia. El caso 
afrocolombiano" (1 99 1 -2005);.available fkom: http:l/www eip-cifedhop .org/EIPColombia/2005/afro0 
colombiens/Racismo.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 January 2007 
6~roceso Comunidades de Negras en Colombia, PCN, "Un mundo olvidado: Derechos de las 
comunidades afrocolombianas" en Reeleccidn el embrujo contiha: Segundo ano de gobierno de Alvaro 
Uribe Velez eds. Plataforma Colombiana de Derechos Humanos, Democracia y Desarrollo (Bogota: 
Colombia, 2004). 
of other social guarantees relating to their status as an ethnic group, have been 
undermined by the presence of illegally armed groups contesting their resources and 
territories because of the exploitable and extractable natural resources that exists within 
(collective) territories that black community's occupy. This essay represents one of the 
few publications that discussed and directly challenges the tactics and strategies, such as 
civilian informants program, employed under the guise of the Democratic Security and 
Defense Policy initiated under the administration of Alvaro Uribe ~ e l e z . '  
Academic Publications: A Multidisciplinary Perspective 
While sociologists, anthropologists, historians and political scientists have made 
significant contributions to the discourse on Afro-descendants in Central and South 
Americans within their respective disciplines, the literature composed by geographers in 
this study proffers a distinct perspective on the literal mapping of political violence, 
forced deterritorialization and the implications of shifting human populations.8 
Geographer Ulrich Oslender has produced two publications concerning the topography of 
violence, the confluence between territory, conflict, identity and the economic interests of 
state, nonstate and extrastate actors (in this case, Afro-Colombians situated on the Pacific 
Coast) which constitute notable contributions to the existing literature and necessitate 
further analysis. Two articles penned by Ulrich Oslender entitled "Geographies of terror 
and forced displacement in the Colombian Pacific: Conceptualizing the problem and 
looking for answers" ("Geografias de terror y desplazamiento forzado en el Pacifico 
8 However, it should be noted that extensive multidisciplinary, cross-fertilization takes place within 
the social sciences 
Colombiano: Conceptualizando el problema y buscando respuestas) and "Spaces of 
Terror and Fear on Colombia's Pacific Coast: The Armed Conflict and Forced 
Displacement Among Black Communities" offers not only a cartographic evaluation of 
the violence but analyzes the deleterious consequences on the material condition and 
cultural fabric of black communities, spatial reconfiguration of territory, methods of 
survival and resistance, along with analyses of local, national and transnational advocacy 
agendas. Oslender spatial analysis of the terror campaign waged against vulnerable and 
marginalized Afro-Colombian communities in "Geografias de tenor y desplazamiento 
forzado en el Pacifico Colombiano" expounds upon the concept of "geographies of 
t e r r~ r . "~  The author argues that these "geographies of terror" are manifested in 
"landscapes of fear," strategic instruments of terror devised to create a profound sense of 
fear and anxiety amongst the local population, sudden and disruptive transformations in 
the senses of space and place, and processes of usurpation and appropriation of territory, 
orchestrated by armed groups, legal and illegal, in order to pave the way for what the 
author calls the "great neoliberal nightmare."10 However, even amongst such daunting 
and dangerous conditions, Afro-Colombian civil society groups specifically concerned 
with addressing and seeking redress have emerged and challenged all armed actors and 
other culpable parties. Detailing the agency of one of these organizations, Oslender notes 
that "AFRODES, for example, recently opened an office with a representative in 
9 Oslender, "Geographies of'terror and forced displacement in the Colombian Pacific," 37 
10 Ibid. 
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Washington who functions as a source of information for U.S. senators."" The author 
demonstrates his intellectual dexterity as he links the transnational implications of the 
global war on terror, the intrastate security crisis in the Andean nation as well as the 
geopolitical and economic interests that serve to undermine the collective security of 
African descendants on the Pacific Coast. In "Spaces of Terror and Fear on Colombia's 
Pacific Coast: The Armed Conflict and Forced Displacement among Black 
Communities," Oslender examines the "cartography of violence" and explains how the 
shifting landscape of the armed conflict has enveloped an entire region historically 
neglected by the state and impervious to the entrenched armed conflict that encompassed 
other regions of the Andean nation for decades.12 Oslender provides a skilled 
articulation of the application of tenor as a instrument employed by nonstate actors (and 
at times, in connivance with state security forces) in order to seize control over resource 
rich territories occupied and demarcated by the state for the collective use and 
administration by Afro-Colombians. Oslender proffers this insightful and critical 
assessment of the psychosocial implications for vulnerable populations of the armed 
conflict, when he opines ". . . The systematic application of terror by armed actors 
produces a generalized sense of fear among local populations and becomes a weapon and 
a local strategy in the struggle for territorial contro~."'~ Armed actors, discriminately 
violating the human rights of groups, constitutional & statutory individual and group 
12 Urich Oslender, "Spaces of'Terror and Fear on Colombia's Pacific Coast: The Armed 
Conflict and Forced Displacement among Black Communities," in Violent Geographies: Fear, Terror, and 
Political Violence, eds Derek Gregory and Allan Pred (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
rights accorded to Afro-descendants inhabiting zones of contestation, within the 
Colombian low intensity civil war, cannot be solely ascribed to those groups operating on 
the margins of the law, but in certain instances also encompass state security forces in 
collusion with paramilitaries and transnational ~o r~o ra t i ons . ' ~  The author, in this essay, 
reinforces the PCN's argument that the complicity between the paramilitaries and the 
state security agents fundamentally undermines the security of Afro-Colombians and 
serves to thwart their ability to remain neutral actors within the armed conflict and 
capacity to engage in a sustainable, culturally relevant ways of life free from violence and 
intimidation. Oslender suggests situating the security crisis in Colombia within the 
framework of the larger global war on terror propagated under the Bush regime and the 
complementary security policy promulgated by Alvaro Uribe has grave consequences for 
local populations in target countries, like Colombia. The author's capacity to link the 
terror model devised by the United States to the local and national circumstances of the 
intrastate security crisis in Colombia transecting the ethnicIracia1 dimension of the 
humanitarian crisis, warrants further consideration by academics, particularly since the 
United States has a broad range of political and economic interests in the Andean 
country. 
Eduardo Restrepo in "De 'refugio de paz' a la pesadilla de la guerra: implicaciones 
del conflict0 armado en el proceso organizativo de 'comunidades negras' del Pacifico 
narifiense (From 'refuge of peace; to the nightmare of war: implications of the armed 
14 At the time of this writing, for example, U.S. based Chiquita Brands has conceded that its 
subsidiary in Colombia channeled nearly two million dollars to paramilitary forces in order to provide 
security for its operation.. 
3 4 
conflict on the organizational process of 'black communities' of the Pacific narifiense")15 
provides a thorough and succinct analysis of the transformation of the Colombian Pacific 
basin from an area that had escaped the ravages of the armed conflict, to a region that is 
today firmly centered in the ongoing hostilities. The article is tasked with revealing the 
extent to which the burgeoning black mobilization and organizational processes in the 
Pacific nariiiense have been affected by the infiltration of all armed actors into their 
communities. His article further situates these processes within the context of their 
collective efforts towards the realization of the constitutional and statutory guarantees 
accorded to them as members of culturally distinct ethnic groups in the Pacific narifiense. 
The broad range of actors, state, non-state and civil society, legal and illegal, operating in 
the region devoted to divergent and antagonistic political projects has served to make the 
area one of contestation and terror. Restrepo, explains quite poignantly, that while the 
armed conflict has had a deleterious impact on the Pacifico narifiense, much as it has in the 
broader region, the area requires a differential analysis that takes into consideration its 
particular economic-social-spatial characteristics and its relation to the political economy of 
the country. 
Carlos Rosero in "Los afrodescendientes y el conflict armado en Colombia: La 
insistencia en lo propio como alternative" claims "displaced Afro-Colombians are today 
15 Eduardo Restrepo in "De 'refugio de paz' a la pesadilla de la guerra: implicaciones del conflict0 
armado en el proceso organizativo de 'comunidades negras' del Pacifico narifiense" in Conflicto e 
in(visibi1idad) Retos en 10s studios de la gente negra en Colombia, eds. Eduardo Restrepo and Axel Rojas 
(Colombia: University of Cauca, 2004) 
the most impoverished of the impoverished."'6 Afro-Colombians must confront four 
overwhelming challenges that confound their capacity to fully realize the broad range of 
human, constitutional and statutory rights accorded to them, according to Rosero. These 
challenges include (1) their proximity to zones of concern to all armed actors, and 
(2) conflict and the concomitant displacement and novel forms of discrimination 
premised on violence and exploitation that have tremendous catastrophic implications for 
the realization of their individual and collective rights and identities according to the 
author.17 Rosero further notes that the geography of the violence has permeated all 
regions with significant Afi-o-descendant populations from Uraba to Cauca to the south of 
Bolivar. Moreover, the correlation between the provision of collective land titles and 
territorial expulsion of black communities has been one of the unique attributes of the 
proliferation of the armed conflict in the Pacific Basin. He cites examples from the 
collective territories ascribed to black communities in the lower Atratro and the Baudo 
river areas as unfortunate illustrations of the relationship between state delineated 
territorial reordering and parastate evacuation of these same communities. In addition, 
according to the author, the state has failed to conceive policies that reflect the 
differential and disparate impact of the armed conflict on black communities. 
Confounding and aggravating the security of this vulnerable population, is the U.S. 
government sponsored aerial fumigation efforts which constitutes an "environmental 
16 Carlos Rosero, "Los afrodescendientes y el conflict armado en Colombia: La insistencia en lo 
propio como alternativa" en Trayectorias Sociales e identitarias 1.50 aAos de la abolicidn de la esclavitud 
en Colombia, eds.., Claudia Mosquera, Mauricio Pardo y Odile Hoffman (Bogota: Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia, Icanh, Ird, Ilsa, 2002), 553 
17carlos Rosero, "Los afrodescendientes y el conflict armado en Colombia: La insistencia en lo 
propio como alternative." 
catastrophe," the broader execution of Plan Colombia and the cultivation of African 
palm. 
The perpetuation of violence against descendant peoples in the former colonial 
societies and the subsequent republics of the Americas has been an integral part of the 
historical legacy of forced migration, enslavement and continued economic exploitation 
and marginalization in the antebellum period. Forced displacement through violent 
means is an unfortunate but complementary part of this process. The history of the 
descendant in Colombia is no different than their brethren in other American republics, 
however the unique dimensions of the low intensity civil war that has engulfed all regions 
of the country, necessitates differential scrutiny and analysis. Aviva Chomsky argues in 
"The Logic of Displacement: Afro-Colombians and the War in Colombia," to many 
observers the intrastate conflict that has traversed the landscape of the Andean country 
"may seem anarchic and incomprehensible," it is in fact part of a broader process that is 
calculated, systematic and logical. ls  In Law affected territories, black communities, as 
Chomsky describes, have simultaneously experienced the euphoria of the constitutional 
and statutory achievements of state recognition of their indigenous like ethnic status 
along with the protections of their cultural identity, provision of collective land tenure 
and other affirmations of their individual and collective rights while "they found 
themselves confronted by two forces operating outside the Colombian state, but with its 
18 Aviva Chomsky, "The Logic of Displacement: Afro-Colombians and the War in Colombia" in 
Beyond Slavery The Multilayered Legacy ojAfrzcans in Latzn America and the Caribbean, ed Darien J 
Davis (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc , 
2007). 
tacit collaboration: the multinationals and the paramilitaries."'9 Chomsky further 
explains that the paradoxical nature of the state's administration of the realization of 
Afro-Colombian statutory and constitutional guarantees and their pursuit of economic 
development policies which are, according to some activists and academics, antithetical 
to the black community's enjoyment of those rights. She postulates "While the state 
recognized and promoted the rights of Afi-o-Colombian communities with one hand, it 
was undermining them in a devastating way with the other."20 Violence has been the 
principal method of population control executed by all actors (legal and illegal) in order 
to secure their economic and political aspirations as is evidenced in the contestation over 
land and the forced displacement of populations from collectively held territories. 
Chomsky adds that there should be some differentiation between the motivations of 
armed actors in order to appreciate the varied realities and processes underway in these 
vulnerable communities. She suggests that while the guerillas operating in the region 
constitute an armed presence and are involved with illicit activities, their strategic 
objectives are antithetical to the state's transnational corporations and right wing armed 
groups. However, they too, are dangerous and problematic, as the presence of the state 
and paramilitaries present an existential threat to the realization of their political and 
economic prerogatives. 
Mieke Wouters in her contribution entitled "Ethnic Rights Under Threat: The 
Black Peasant Movement Against Armed Groups Pressure in the Choc6, Colombia" 
argues that the disproportionate and destructive levels of violence perpetrated against 
Afro-Colombian communities in the Pacific theater instigated by state and substate actors 
is not coincidental and in fact, serves the economic interests of transnational actors like 
multinational corporations and the economic prerogatives of the state.21 She explains 
violence propagated against black communities is not fortuitous but calculated and 
deliberate acts that invariably circumscribe the capacity of black communities in the 
fulfillment a broad range of rights and reflects a greater commitment by the state to 
pursuing its economic agenda than the provision of protection to a vulnerable population. 
Wouters declares ". . . in the Choco the arrival of violence is not seen as something 
fortuitous, or as the simple extension of the armed conflict on the national level. Many 
people ... maintain that the rise of violence in this part of Colombia has to do with 
economic interests and the resource and development potential of the region.22 
Wouters, along with geographer Karl Offen, suggest that the infiltration of illegally 
armed groups and the proliferation of the armed conflict exploded in 1996 in the Pacific 
basin.23 Furthermore, the author argues that this particular feature of the multipolar 
violence has been neglected to a significant degree by academics however the statutes 
born from the 1991 Constitution engendered considerable scholarly studies in its wake. 
Wouters argues that the establishment of non-liberal land tenure system, one which 
21 Mieke Wouters, "Ethnic Rights Under. Threat: The Black Peasant Movement Against 
Armed Groups Pressure in the Choco, Colombia," Bulletin of la t in  American Research 4, no.. 4 (October 
2001).. 
22 Wouters, 5 10 
23 Karl Offen, "The Territorial Turn: Making Black Territories in Pacific Colombia," Journal o j  
Latin American Geography, 2, no. 1 (2003): 56 
affords collective territorial rights to black communities, has been the critical factor in 
explaining the rapid transformation of the region from one of tranquility (absent the 
violence engendered by the armed conflict) to a major theater of war. She explains 
"Although Law 70 of 1993 has provided more territorial security to the local population, 
this at the same time has been making actual or potential interested parties aware of the 
possibility that the land was going to be the legal and permanent property of the local 
black c~mrnunit ies.~~ ur ther  exacerbating the security dilemma met by Afro- 
Colombians within the legally demarcated and collectively owned black communities, 
according to Wouters, is the failure of the state to provide security. The ethnicIracia1 
dimension of the humanitarian crisis in concert with the demarcation and titling of land to 
black communities and the subsequent forced displacement and illegal usurpation of the 
territory by illegally armed groups, demonstrate a remarkable "paradox," according to the 
author. 
Summary 
The literature review undertaken has revealed a number of themes that have met a 
veritable consensus among scholars yet, the investigator suggests, also warrants 
additional analyses. The intent of the literature review was to examine the existing body 
or work that has undertaken the daunting task of investigating the emergence and 
implications of the prevailing intrastate security crisis on Afro-descendant Colombians. 
Over the last ten years or so, numerous scholars from different disciplines, mostly 
anthropologists, have published literature that is specifically concerned with the 
24 Wouters, 5 1 1 
manifestation of the conflict in the Pacific basin and in particular, the Choc6. The 
literature has largely been focused on topics such as displacement, dispossession of 
territory, disruption of land tenure and cultural practices, and the politically and 
economically motivated terror inflicted on these communities. Today, the Pacific Coast 
no longer constitutes a "refuge of peace," evading the violence, political terror and 
spatial-economic-social transformation that has accompanied the peripheral rural regions 
of the country for more than four decades. Eduardo Restrepo confirms that the refbge has 
transformed, as the violence as escalated, into a major theater in the Colombian 
"nightmare of war." Afro-Colombians throughout the Pacific littoral "are now," as 
Ulrich Oslender opines, "fully integrated in the internal Colombian ~on f l i c t . "~~  
Academics, studying the phenomenon, have generally conceded that the violence that has 
engulfed the peripheral regions of the country had begun to percolate in the rural 
communities of the Pacific region in the mid-90s. In addition, there is a further 
agreement that the collusion of national and transnational economic interests coupled 
with the intrusion of illegally armed groups have served to create a situation of 
generalized insecurity in the Pacific region as the contestation and extraction of natural 
resources has intensified. This situation has engendered a real sense of generalized 
insecurity for black communities threatening collectively owned territories, disrupting the 
social and cultural networks, displacing and "trapping" vulnerable populations all while 
threatening the integrity and capacity of the burgeoning black social movement working 
towards capitalizing on the group rights afforded by the constitution and subsequent 
25 Oslender, 36 
statutes. Moreover, the literature examines suggests that the state lacks either the 
institutional will and/or capabilities to provide adequate protection to its citizens and, 
under some circumstances, have conspired with right wing groups to create conditions of 
insecurity in areas with strong black presence where strategic resources exist that are of 
concern to all actors. Chomsky, Oslender and others would argue that, in fact, the state's 
devotion to pursuing neoliberal economic policies and its continued adherence to the 
economic orthodoxy of the international financial institutions like the International 
Monetary Fund has undermined the capacity of Afro-Colombians to realize their newly 
acquired "ethnic rights." Wouters proffers this "paradoxical" conclusion in order to 
illustrate the unfortunate conspiracy between ethnicity, territory, culture and the armed 
conflict: "Just when the black communities had become the legitimate owners of their 
lands, an illegitimate war placed the newly acquired rights in jeopardy."26 Jhon Shnchez, 
similarly, posits that the escalation of violence in the Pacific basin and the subsequent 
disruption, dislocation and displacement of ethnic groups from legally demarcated 
ancestral territory constitutes a "counter-ethnic revo~ution."~~ Restrepo also expounds 
upon this analysis in "From 'refuge of peace; to the nightmare of war: implications of the 
armed conflict on the organizational process of 'black communities' of the Pacific 
nariiiense." Authors, activists, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations 
agree that the intensification of the conflict in regions densely populated by Afro- 
26 Wouters, 5 17 
27 Laura Zapata, "El conflict0 esta generando una contrarrevolucion etnica," Entrevista con el 
antropologo colombiano Jhon Anton Sanchez, Semana, 2000 
descendants has disproportionately created a raciallethnic dimension to the prevailing 
humanitarian crisis in Colombia that requires a differential analysis and response that 
considers the particular attributes and vulnerabilities of these communities. Accordingly, 
Afro-Colombians continue to comprise a disproportionate number of the internally 
displaced population. Geographers, specifically Ulrich Oslender, has christened the 
landscape of this phenomenon, the "geographies of terror" and challenges the discourse 
to broaden its conceptualization of terror in order to encapsulate its diverse and mutually 
incapacitating manifestations of violence perpetrated by the state, in collusion with 
transnational state actors like the United States and domestic sub-state actors (those 
created and/or supported by the state or in opposition to it) throughout the country's 
geographical spaces. This analysis offered by Oslender is particularly germane to our 
understanding in a country where no less than three sub-state actors are challenging the 
state's legitimacy and employing orchestrated violence as an instrument to advance their 
political and economic objectives. Contributing to and at times in collusion with the 
violence perpetrated by illegally armed groups is the convergence of state and 
transnational financial interests which are attracted to the resource abundant region of the 
Pacific basin (particularly the Choco) and the capacity for exploitation, mineral extraction 
and historic marginalization and underinvestment by the state.28 Moreover, other 
geostrategic regional access routes for illegal profiteering such as narcotrafficking, 
significantly increases the value of ports and highways, enticing and instigating 
28 Transnational corporations such as Chiquita Brands International and Germany's Mannesmann 
Anlagbau AG have all been found to be complicit in financing illegally armed goups in order to secure 
their operations. Chiquita Brands International was fined $25 million dollars by the United States 
Department of Justice for funding the AUC, considered foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the 
United States Government. 
contestation amongst multiple armed actors. In addition, market driven development 
projects (many times without consultation with ethnic groups that have a statutory right 
to be consulted and participatory actor in the development of their territories) that serve 
the interests of the national government and transnational corporations, are fundamentally 
antithetical to the traditional cultural practices of the indigenous and Afro-descendant 
population and threaten to undermine the thread that ties territory, culture and ethnicity 
together. 
The discourse, academic and advocacy efforts, concerning the ethnicIracia1 
dimension to the humanitarian crisis has captured the attention, cooperation and resources 
of intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies, religious groups, scholars and 
policymakers (in and outside of Colombia) as it exposes the gravity of the humanitarian 
crisis that has become an integral part of the everyday lived experiences of black 
communities. While, the literature published has contributed markedly to our 
understanding of the armed conflict and the implications on a broad range of issues 
affecting Afro-Colombian communities in the Pacific basin, particularly the Choc6, there 
has been general neglect concerning investigating the conflict, its manifestations, 
historical underpinnings, and the economic prerogatives of the armed actors in areas 
inhabited by black communities outside the Pacific region. This detail has proven to be 
the most challenging part; however consistent theme, of this study. While, Mieke 
Wouters proffers ". . . there are few studies dedicated to estimating the effect and 
the consequences of the presence of armed actors in the various regions in which the 
process of Law 70 is being carried out," this investigation contends that the relevant 
literature that does exist disproportionately concentrates on Law 70 affected territories 
and subsequently black communities within those areas. Thus, there are even fewer 
studies "dedicated to estimating the effect and the consequences of the presence of armed 
actors" in communities with significant black populations outside the Pacific. The 
overwhelming scope of the secondary data available consulted and studies undertaken 
regarding the affect of the armed conflict is concerned with black communities in the 
Pacific basin, particularly in the department of Chocci. The deficit in the literature further 
limits the capacity of potential investigations examining the course of the conflict, the 
behavior and strategic motivations of all armed actors, including state security forces, and 
the implications for Afro-Colombians that do not reside in areas that fall within the 
parameters of those delineated under the rubric of AT 55 and Law 70. As Eduardo 
Restrepo conveys in his analysis of the Pacific nariiiense that while there are similarities 
that undergird our understanding of the violence that permeated and disrupted the fabric 
black communities and their organizing efforts in the region, the department of Narifio is 
blessed and cursed with particular attributes which requires scholars, government 
functionaries and other stakeholders to engage in a differential analysis. According to the 
Departarnento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE), Afio-Chocoanos 
constitute less than seven percent of the national black population in Colombia yet the 
vast majority of the literature on the armed conflict narrowly concentrates on this 
department.29 Peter Wade provides an explanation which can be applied under these 
circumstances, when he suggests ". . . the Pacific region receives ever more attention in 
29 Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadisticas (DANE), "Colombia una nacion 
multicultural: su diversidad etnica.." 
45 
the wake of 1993 legislation directed mainly at it;" however literature concerning Afro- 
descendants outside the constitutional bounds of 'blackness' is slight thus investigations 
"outside the region becomes doubly important."30 While, one would agree with 
Oslender's proposition that "There is a danger that the "invisibility" of black populations 
in Colombia.. .to the studies of displacement, in spite of recent inclusionary official 
discourses of multiculturalism and pluriethnicity."31 The researcher postulates that there 
is also a "danger" in academe's limited and concerted research efforts in one region while 
neglecting others with considerable Afro-Colombian populations who also reside within 
the boundaries of contested zones where natural resources of strategic concern to state, 
non-state and transnational actors exist.32 This study conducted on the Caribbean coast 
and in consultation with a very narrow collection of literature on the conflict in that 
region demonstrates that the armed conflict may also create untenable conditions that 
serve to the confound Afro-Colombians capacity to realize their basic human and 
constitutional rights. While, published outside the small pool of academics that have 
written on this topic and examined within this literature review, Afro-Colombian 
investigator for a regional NGO, Mauricio Esquivia Zapata, in his analysis of the 
raciallethnic dimensions of the conflict in municipalities in the Montes de Maria region, 
clearly identifies the myriad of social, economic and psychological tribulations associated 
with the infiltration of the all armed actors on black (and indigenous) communities, 
30~ete r  Wade,"The Colombian Pacific in Perspective," Journal oJ Latin American Anthropolo,gy 7, 
no. 2, (2002): 6 
31 Oslender, "Spaces of Terror and Fear on Colombia's Pacific Coast." 
32 Oslender, "Spaces of Terror and Fear on Colombia's Pacific Coast," 1 13 
armed actors military configurations, areas of control and methods of terror and strategic 
resources indigenous to the region.33 The invasion of illegally armed actors, the 
proliferation of the conflict and escalation in intraurban displacement in municipalities, 
such as Cartagena, also warrant further scholarly investigation that reflects the nuisances 
of the urban aspect of the violence. While mayor of Cartagena Nicolas Curi proclaims 
". . . Cartagena is the most secure city in Colombia and historically has been," Defensoria 
del Pueblo or the local Ombudson Arturo Zea provides a much more stark depiction of 
the conflict and the intersection between race and class that persists in ~ a r t a ~ e n a . ~ ~  Zea 
proffers "roughly every tenth was uprooted by Colombia's conflict" and "Cartagena has 
more than 70 youth gangs, some now being challenged by budding protection rackets 
formed by demobilized paramilitary fighters."35 The absence of literature is particularly 
confounding given that the strategic resources of the Caribbean coast and the fact that the 
region gave birth to paramilitary umbrella group that have historically been one of the 
most prolific authors of human rights violations in Colombia, before their demobilization. 
Furthermore, as Winifred Tate reveals "Although systematic demographic surveys do not 
exist, Afro-Colombians appear to be well represented among paramilitary combat troops 
(but not the command structure) because of their extensive recruitment along the Atlantic 
33 Mauricio Esquivia Zapata, "Final Report: Experiences of' Learnings of' survival and solidarity of 
campesino communities, indigenas and Afkodescendientes in the Montes de Maria, Caribbean region.." 
Colombia. December 2005. Sincelejo, Sucre. Translation by author.. 
34 Cartagena Losing the Battle Against Poverty," Boston Globe, 25 March 2007. 
35~bid. 
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The paucity of literature is indicative of the broader concentration of scholarship 
produced by anthropologists and sociologists on black communities in the Pacific basin. 
Eduardo Restrepo affirms that approximately 75% of the academic literature produced on 
Afro-descendants concentrates on black communities in the Pacific. He further notes that 
this pattern of academic production has become more pronounced since the 1 9 9 0 s . ~ ~  
Restrepo refers to this prevailing academic preoccupation with Afro-descendants in the 
Pacific region as the "pacrficalizacion' of blacks in ~olombia ."~ While Juliet Hooker in 
"Indigenous Inclusion/Black Exclusion: Race, Ethnicity and Multicultural Citizenship in 
Latin America" is principally concerned with analyzing the differential allocation of 
constitutional and statutory guarantees to the indigenous population vis-a-vis Afro- 
descendants in Latin America within the multicultural constitutional reformation in 
Central and South America over the last two decades, the article is instructive within the 
context of this investigation, as Hooker concludes that the "main cause of the 
disparity is the fact that collective rights are adjudicated on the basis of possessing a 
distinct group identity defined in cultural or ethnic terms," rather than collective 
mobilization based on historical racially discriminatory practices and patterns inherent in 
the customs and practices in public and private spheres against subordinated population.40 
37 Eduardo Restrepo, "Hacia 10s studios de las Colombias negras" in Panorarnica afrocolombiana 
Estudios sociales en el Pac@co, eds.., Mauricio Pardo Rojas, Claudia Mosquera and Maria Clemencia 
Ramirez (Bogota: Instituto Colombiano de Anthropologia e Historia-Icanh, 2004), 132 
38 Ibid.., 132. 
39 Juliet Hooker, "Indigenous Inclusion/Black Exclusion: Race, Ethnicity and 
Multicultural Citizenship in Latin America," Journal oJLatin American Studzes, no. 37 (2005): 1.  
She conceptualizes this situation within the context of Colombia, when she asserts "The 
construction of this Afro-Colombian identity that privileges cultural and ethnic difference 
rather than racial discrimination as the basis of black political projects in the 1990s was, 
in part, forged based on a partial appropriation of the indigenous frame for demanding 
collective rights from the state."41 Hooker contends that the utilization of a discourse 
that "privileges" ethnic based mobilization within an indigenous like framework could 
pose tremendous challenges to Afro-descendant mobilization efforts for those who reside 
outside the boundaries of "blackness" contrived, negotiated and reinforced to varying 
degrees by the regime, black organizations, activists, academics and other relevant 
42 actors. Hooker states "The problem is that as a result Afro-Latinos who are unable to 
assert an 'ethnic7 identity lack a solid claim to collective land rights even though they 
may also suffer from political exclusion and racial di~crimination.""~ Aline Helg offers 
an analogous assessment, more specifically in reference to Law 70, when she argues ". . . 
by stressing "Afrocolombian ascendency," cultural homogeneity, and distinctiveness, as 
well as location in a specific riverine region, the law de facto excludes blacks in other 
areas as well as zambos (of mixed African and indian ancestry) and mulattoes from 
"bla~kness."~~ ~ rench  sociologist Elisabeth Cunin, one of the foremost scholars on 
41 Ibid, 18. 
42 Ibid.. 
43 Ibid., 23. 
4 4 ~ l i n e  Helg, Liberty & Equality in Caribbean Colombia, 1770-18.35, (Chapel Hill: University of' 
North Carolina Press, 2004): 1. 
racial identity, multicultural constitutional reforms and  fro-caribe~os,~~ maintains that 
the construction of blackness within a sharply demarcated ethnic versus racial 
categorization, presents considerable challenges to Afro-descendants who do not possess 
the prescribed characteristics constituted in the juridical classification of "comunidades 
negras" as delineated in Law 7 0 . ~ ~  Cunin goes still further to note that the burgeoning 
"visibility" accorded to black communities since the promulgation of the 1991 
Constitution and the subsequent legislation borne from it must be contextualized. 
According to Cunin's analysis of the discourse, post-1 991 publications produced on 
Afro-Colombians have primarily concerned themselves with the black communities in 
the Pacific. Cunin affirms: 
The visibilization of "blacks" is relative: if the inhabitants of the Pacific 
were left forgotten, the numerous settlers of the Atlantic or the large cities, 
as well as those present in the rest of the Colombian territory, sink into 
still greater invisibility, accentuated by the sudden publicity that is made 
of the Pacific. From the first works.. . to the more recent works.. .all have 
been interested in some way exclusively by the 'black communities' of the 
45 For studies concerning the intersection between race, class, and invisibility of Afro-caribefios, 
Please see: Elisabeth Cunin, "De la esclavitud a1 multiculturalismo: el antropologo entre identidad 
rechazada e identidad instrumentalizada" in Conflicto e zn(visibi1idad): Retos en 10s studios de la gente 
negra en Colombia (University of Cauca: Colombia, 2004) and Identidades a Flor de Pie1 Lo "negro" 
entre apariencias y pertenencias, categorias raciales y mestizaje en Cartagena (Bogota, Colombia: 
Instituto Colombiano de Antropologia e Historia (ICANH), 2003); Aline Helg, Liberty & Equality in 
Caribbean Colombia, 1770-18.35 ( Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Alfonso 
Mhera, Elfracaso de la nacidn: regidn clase y raza en el Caribe colombiano (1771-1 821), (Bogota: 
Banco de Republica, 1998) and Fronteras imaginadas: La construccidn de las razas y de la geografia en el 
siglo XIX colombiano (Bogota: Planeta, 2005); Arwo  Rodriguez-Bobb, Exclusidn e integracidn del sujeto 
negro en Cartagena de Indias en perspective histdrica (Madrid: Iberoamericana; Frankfurt am Main: 
Vervuert, 2002); Joel Streicker,''Policing Boundaries: Race, Class and Gender in Cartagena, Colombia" 
American Ethnologist 22, no. 1 (February 1995) : 54-74 and "Spatial Reconfigurations, Imagined 
Geographies, and Social Conflicts in Cartagena, Colombia." Cultural Anthropology 12, no. 1 (February 
1997): 109-128.. 
46~lisabeth Cunin, El mestizaje como competencla Construccidn y gestidn de categoria raciales 
en Cartagena 
47 Ibid., 35. 
The general pattern Cunin refers to is similarly evident in the literature published 
on intersection between the armed conflict and Afro-Colombians as confirmed by the 
works produced by Oslender, 2004 and 2007; Almario, 2004; Arboleda, 2004; Escobar, 
2004; Wouters, 2004 as well as the perspectives articulated by prominent Afro- 
Colombian civil society groups such as the PCN and AfroDes. Whether by design or 
coincidence, the researcher suggests that this "problem" that Hooker referenced and Helg 
and Cunin affirm explicitly within the Colombian context also has significant 
implications for the discourse on the intrastate security crisis and the affect on black 
communities in regions outside the Pacific basin situated in zones of contestation. Thus, 
one witness' a convergence by academics (activists, environmentalists, policymakers 
from Colombian and other interested countries such as the United States and 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations) on the Pacific Coast and 
subsequently the proliferation of literature reflecting the preoccupation with black 
communities that are narrowly defined within the ethnic formulation required for the 
procurement of collective land rights promulgated via Law 70. Subsequently, one of the 
fundamental issues that have evaded scholars is: What is the scope of the 
multidimensional intrastate security crisis in Colombia in regions with significant 
minority or majority Afro-Colombian populations beyond the Pacific, like the Montes de 
Maria region? Nonetheless, the literature published examining the convergence between 
the armed conflict, ethno-territorial claims and Afro-Colombian political mobilization are 
remarkable contributions to the broader scholarship on the conflict in Colombia and the 
burgeoning discourse on the African Diaspora in Latin America. 
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As Colombian anthropologist Nina S. Friedmann initiated the "visibilization" of 
Afro-Colombians within the Colombian national imagination, along with a host of other 
Colombian and non-Colombian scholars, we are now witnessing a tremendous growth in 
the production of work concerning the particular ethnicIracia1 dimension of the latest 
phase of the violence that has engulfed the state and its citizens for more than four 
decades. This study seeks to contribute to the existing literature by producing an analysis 
that is devoted to understanding the particular, and possibly unique, implications of the 
armed conflict on Afro-Caribefios and their perceptions of security in a region of the 
country that has been neglected by scholars. 
CHAPTER I11 
THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a contextual understanding of the 
conceptual framework and methodology designed for undertaking this investigation. 
This study will employ a case study design to investigate the relationship between the 
implementation of the democratic security policies and the presumed implications on the 
state of human security of A-Fro-Colombians. More specifically, the chapter reexamines 
the research question, defines and operationalizes the major variables, presents the 
methodology and data collection procedures and finally evaluates human security as a 
viable conceptual model for analysis. 
Research Question Revisited 
The principal research question that directs this investigation is: 
As the state becomes theoretically more secure as it consolidates control 
over the national landscape, strengthens the security apparatus of the state 
of the country and aggressively seeks to neutralize illegally armed groups, 
have Afro-Colombians, paradoxically, become less secure? 
Major Variables 
The independent variable is the "Democratic Security & Defense Policy" initiated 
under the administration of ~ l v a r o  Uribe Vklez. The moderator variable is U.S. military 
and police assistance authorized through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and other 
related programs. The dependent variable is the affect of this coordinated strategy on the 
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human security of Afro-Colombians. The intervening variable adopted for this 
investigation will be the prevailing intrastate security crisis in Colombia. 
Operationalization of the Variables 
The independent variable, the "Democratic Security and Defense Policy," will be 
measured by examining security indicators which the author has identified as significant 
indications of strengthening the security apparatus of the state. These indicators include: 
1. Defense spending 
2. Number of security forces 
3. The consolidation of state control (presence of security forces throughout the 
country's municipalities) 
4. Demobilization of groups operating on the margins of the law 
Moderator variables, according to Schwab, "influence the relationship between the 
dependent and some other independent variables."' Thus, the moderator variable is the 
military and police assistance provided through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. The 
financing and training of personnel (and provision of military equipment) that contribute 
to the strengthening of the security apparatus of the Colombian state constitutes an 
essential part of this investigation. The dependent variable is the state of "human 
security" of Afro-Colombians. The efficacy of the "Democratic Security and Defense 
Policy" in creating a greater state of human security will be ascertained through an 
examination of qualitative indications of the dependent variable. The principal 
' ~ o n a l d  P.. Schwab, Research Methods for Organizational Studies (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 2005): 66. 
mechanism designed to measure the qualitative efficacy of the security policies on the 
human security of Afro-Colombians was assessed through the discriminate distribution of 
surveys to members of Afro-Colombian civil society in the Caribbean coast departments 
of Bolivar, Atlantico and c6rdobab2 The survey instrument developed for this study was 
"Afro-Colombian Perception Concerning the State of Security and the Armed Conflict" 
(see Appendix A). The instrument was designed to measure the perceptions of Afro- 
Colombians concerning the nature of their security environments immediately preceding 
(Andres Pastrana administration, 1998-2002) and during the period of the first term 
(2002-2006) of the administration ~ l v a r o  Uribe. The survey incorporates questions 
related to the abuses, if any, previously instigated by illegally armed groups against the 
informants who participated in the study. The information gleaned by Afro-Colombians 
concerning the state of security was an important indication of the efficacy of the Uribe's 
security policies. A qualitative assessment was also derived from semi-structured 
interviews with individuals and focus groups conducted in the capitals of the departments 
of Bolivar (Cartagena), Atlantico (Barranquilla), C6rdoba (Monteria) and an unspecified 
municipality3 in the conflict ridden Montes de Maria region of the Caribbean coast. 
Fifteen municipalities comprise the Montes de Maria region, shared between the 
departments of Sucre which possesses eight municipalities and seven in neighboring 
department of Bolivar. The municipalities in Montes de Maria in the department of 
2 The five remaining provinces that constitute the Caribbean coast are Sucre, Cesar; La Guajira, 
Magdalena and the archipelago of' San Andres y Providencia. 
3 ~ u e  to the nature of'the conflict in the Montes de Maria area, the author has withheld the name of 
the municipality in which she distributed surveys and interviewed informants. 
Bolivar are Carmen de Bolivar, Marialabaja, San Juan Nepomuceno, San Jacinto, 
Cordoba, El Guamo, and Zambrano. In the department of Sucre it includes the 
municipalities of Ovejas, Chalan, Colos6, Morroa, Los Palmitos, San Onofre, San 
Antonio de Palmito, and ~ o l 6 v i ~ j o . ~  According to the Departamento Administrative 
Nacional de Estadistica, (DANE),  Marialabaja and San Onofre have Afro-Colombian 
populations well over 80%. The following map provides a visual depiction of the 
topography and subregions of the Montes de Maria. 
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Figure 1. Map of the Subregions of the Montes de Maria. 
Source: http://www.fmontesdemaria.org/nregion.asp 
4 Fundacion Red Desarollo y Paz de 10s Montes de Maria, "Ubicacion Geografica;" available from 
http:l/www fmontesdemaria.orglnregion.asp; Internet; accessed 12 April 2006 
Research Methodology 
The following section constitutes the research methodology employed to 
undertake this investigation. The section includes (1) instrumentation, (2) reliability and 
validity of the instrument, including triangulation, (3) research sample and setting of the 
investigation, (4) data collections procedures and (5) research delimitations. 
Instrumentation 
The instrument designed for this case study was devised by the researcher in 
consultation with two Afro-Colombian activists. These informants provided a great deal 
of support in ensuring that the questions were clear, concise, and culturally, regionally 
and historically relevant and would elicit the desired information. Each participant was 
provided a letter introducing the investigator, the purpose of the investigation and request 
to participate. Upon agreement from the informants, a survey was provided. The "Afro- 
Colombian Perception Concerning the State of Security and the Armed Conflict," is an 
eleven-item, self-administered, two page survey.j The survey was designed to capture 
information from respondents regarding their exposure to the violence propagated by the 
armed conflict, tangible changes, if any, in the nature of their security environments since 
the demobilization of the paramilitaries, their perceptions concerning their security under 
the Uribe administration (as opposed to his immediate predecessor, Andrks Pastrana) and 
5 For those participants who were unable to read or. understand the survey, the investigator or 
others assisted the informant. 
the emergence of new belligerent armed actors since dem~bilization.~ A question 
concerning the identity of the armed actors (FARC, AUC, ELN) was also adopted in 
order to determine which illegally armed groups were operating in their communities and 
the authorship of human rights abuses. Nearly eighty surveys (79) surveys were 
administered: thirty-two in Membrillal, a small settlement on the periphery of the 
municipality of Cartagena (Bolivar), thirteen in Barranquilla (Atlintico), twenty-one in 
Monteria (Cordoba), and thirteen in an undisclosed municipality in the Montes de Maria 
region. The instrument was composed of seven items utilizing dichotomous (yes or no) 
and tripartite (yes, no or no response) scales, a raciallethnic demographic question,7 and 
three open-ended questions with contingency questions. Since secondary sources 
maintain that Afro-Colombians are disproportionately reflected in the displaced 
population, a question relating to internal displacement was included. If the informant 
answered in the affirmative to that question, they would be asked to answer a subset of 
five auxiliary questions. Since, the author was unable to acquire many studies explicitly 
devoted to understanding Afro-Colombian's perception of the efficacy of the Uribe 
6 Due to the delicate nature of the discussion, the investigator intentionally developed an 
instrument that was short, concise and would elicit the most relevant information within the brevity of the 
survey.. 
7 The demographic question was designed to elicit information concerning how the informant 
ethnically identified their selves. In the Afi-o-Colombian Security Perception Survey the question on 
ethnicity was written in a way that was largely consistent with the configuration of the question in the 2005 
Colombian census undertaken by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadisticas (DANE). The 
question in the ACSPS stated: ~tnicamente jcomo se autorreconoce usted? Indio, Mestizo, Blanco, 
AiYocolombiano (Negro, Moreno, Palenquero, Afrodescendiente); The question on ethnicity in the DANE 
survey stated: "jDe acuerdo con su cultura, pueblo o rasgos fisicos, . .,. es o se reconoce como: indigena, 
rom, raizales, palenquero, negro, mulato, AiYoColombiano, Afrodescendiente, o ninguno de 10s anteriores?; 
For 2005 census data on ethnicity in Colombia, See: http://www.dane .gov, co/files/censo2005/etnias/ 
presentetnicos .pdf: 
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administration's democratic security policy; a question on this topic was included in this 
questionnaire. The survey also sought to determine whether the respondents perceived a 
relative change in their security environment since ~ l v a r o  Uribe was elected to the 
presidency and the security policies were implemented. The author included a question 
on the paramilitary demobilization process, one of the major pillars and indicators of 
success within the president's democratic security policy. 
Reliability and Validity of the Survey Instrument 
A survey instrument was intrinsically important to the acquisition of data 
concerning the perceptions of Afro-Colombians concerning the nature of security in areas 
which they reside, their experience with multiple legally and illegally armed actors 
operating, their migration status (whether they are internally displaced or not), and their 
perception of the efficacy of Uribe's security policies on the intrastate security crisis. 
Ensuring the reliability and validity of the survey instrument is integral to the success of 
the design, eliciting relevant data and potential for replication. According to Leedy and 
Ormrod, "Validity of a measurement instrument is the extent to which the instrument 
measures what it is supposed to measure" while conversely "reliability is the consistency 
with which a measuring instrument yields a certain result when the entity measured 
hasn't changed."8 Validity was a challenge since it is extremely difficult to understand 
the psychosocial affect of the conflict and a perceived change or absence of change by 
eliciting a binary response (yeslno dichotomy) derived from the survey. Out of concern 
8 Paul D Leedy and Jeanne Ellis Ormrod, "Practical Research: Planning and Design," 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill Prentice Hall, 2001): 3 1 
for the privacy and respect for the informant's experiences and the desire of the 
investigator to gather relevant data that could be empirically analyzed; a survey 
instrument was one of the most viable data collection instruments. Moreover, the 
researcher believed that an anonymous and confidential questionnaire would elicit greater 
validity since the informants understood that the information that provided would not be 
made available to anyone other than the investigator. Moreover, the author clearly 
expressed, in written and oral form, that the interviews and surveys were both 
confidential and anonymous and data would only be analyzed by the investigator. In 
order to ensure reliability, the investigator provided the same questionnaire to each 
informant after an introduction, advised the participants about the purpose of the study to 
the informants and assured their anonymity and confidentiality of responses. However, 
it should be noted that a challenge to the validity of the survey process was some 
informants may have been illiterate. In those situations, if the informants requested 
assistance, the researcher or another informant would assist the participant. The 
interview process and survey completion in each case took between forty-five minutes to 
an hour and half. 
In order to achieve greater validity and reliability efficacy in the data collection 
and analysis processes, the author has employed triangulation as a methodological 
approach to enhance the legitimacy of study.9 Making use of multiple data sources and 
methods, including surveys and interviews, utilizing the triangulation approach should 
9 Kathleen M Blee and Verta Taylor, "The Uses of Semi-structured Interviewing in Social 
Movement Research," in Methods ojSocial Movement Research, eds. Bert Klandermans and Suzanne 
Staggenborg (Minneapolis: University of' Minnesota Press, 2002) 
permit the author to garner a broader and more sophisticated understanding of the 
implications of the democratic security policies on Afro-descendant communities. This 
process is inherently important because most human security indicator data is not 
disaggregated by ethnicitylrace which makes understanding that dimension of the 
humanitarian crisis much more difficult to ascertain and by extension the implications of 
Uribe's security policies on national raciallethnic minorities. Thus, triangulation permits 
the author to employ a multidimensional strategy in an effort to analyze an exceedingly 
complex phenomenon where a number of different data sources and/or methods have not, 
thus far, elicited the desired information. 
Research Sample and Setting of the Investigation 
The investigator surveyed black communities within municipalities with a 
significant minority or majority Afro-descendant  population^.^^ The intewiewees were 
members of community organizations with an explicit orientation towards Afro- 
descendant activism and organizing. A purposive sample, in concert with an expert 
choice sample, was undertaken in order to identify respondents for this survey. The 
author employed a purposive or non random sample because this method is one of the 
most appropriate sampling techniques for an investigation where the investigator has 
10 For the purposes of this investigation, majority Afi-o-descendant populations will be defined as 
municipalities with populations with 50% or more persons self-identified as Afro-descendants. 
Furthermore, significant minority Afro-descendant population will be identified as a municipality where at 
least 10% of the population self-identified as Affo-descendants While, the census data is problematic, for 
a number of'reasons discussed in a later chapter, demographic statistics from the raciallethnic data from the 
2005 census will be employed. 
clearly identified the relevant attributes required to participate in the study.l Expert 
choice sampling, a type of purposive sample, was instrumental in achieving the research 
objectives. Michael Young in Dictionary of Polling. The Language of Contemporary 
Opinion Research notes "Expert choice sampling uses well-informed contacts to provide 
the sampling frame from some populations. The judgment of these experts determines 
who is interviewed."12 Thus, the potential sample of participants was identified with the 
assistance of a prominent Afro-caribeAo civil society leader. The author determined that 
the principal characteristics of the sample should include: (I) those Colombians who 
were willing to participate in a study concerning the nature of security in Colombia and 
finally (2) those that possessed some measure of civic activism, as evidenced in their 
participation in explicitly Afro-Colombian self-identified civil society groups. The Afro- 
caribeAos civil society leader initially contacted these groups via phone, email and/or 
personal communication to solicit their interest in participating in the project. Upon 
agreement of these organizations to meet with the investigator and participate in the 
project, a meeting time and place were agreed to. The sample populations were "self- 
identified" Afro-Colombian civil society groups that inhabited areas of expulsion and 
areas of reception.13 An area of expulsion is defined as a municipality exposed to 
violence perpetrated by (or between) state and non-state actors which forces the civilian 
11 Michael Young, Dzctionary oj Polling The Language oj Contemporary Opinzon Research 
(Greenwood Press, 1992) 
12 Ibid.., 214.. 
13 It should be noted that while a city such as Cartagena has been one of the principal receptor 
communities for internally displaced persons, there is evidence that the contemporary political violence, 
attributed to the anned actors examined in this study, that has historically taken place in rural area and 
population to vacate their communities of origin. An area of reception is a municipality 
that receives those who have been displaced, known as internally displaced persons or 
IDPs, due to the actions of illegally armed actors and/or security forces from their 
communities of origin. "The principal provinces which act as receivers of immigrants 
fleeing in 2000 are Antioquia, Bolivar, Bogota and Choco where arrived 5 1 % of the 
d i~~ l aced . " ' ~  The undisclosed rural municipality in the Montes de Maria is the most 
conflict ridden area investigated in this study. The other three municipalities are 
predominately receptor communities however a greater incidence of intraurban 
displacement has manifested itself as armed groups have infiltrated urban spaces and co- 
opted idle, unemployed or underemployed youth and penetrated urban gangs. The 
settings of the investigation were urban municipalities in departments on the Caribbean 
coast of Colombia. The municipality of Monteria, founded in 1777, is the capital of the 
department of Cordoba, located along the country's Caribbean coast was also another site 
of investigation. Thirteen percent of the population of Cordoba is Afro-descendant. 
Membrillal, a impoverished settlement located on the periphery of the municipality of 
Cartagena in the department capital of Bolivar was also an investigation site. Founded in 
1533, Cartagena was one of two major ports of the Spanish Empire's slave trade in the 
Americas. More than three quarters (28%) of the residents of Bolivar, according to 
DANE, are Afro-descendant. The final site for the investigation was the municipality of 
marginal territorial spaces has now infiltrated urban spaces and instigated intraurban displacement.. Thus, 
the categories delineated, areas of expulsion and areas of'reception, are not inflexible terms as the evolving 
nature of the conflict does not permit these static, finely tuned and articulated distinctions. 
14 United Nations Development Programme, "Colombia: Human Development Progress towards 
the Millennium Development Goals," 5 
Barranquilla, capital of Atlantico, major port city and the industrial capital of the country. 
Afro-Colombians constitute 1 1 % of the department's population. 
Methodology and Data Collection Procedures 
The principal methodological approach employed, within this examination, is the 
case study design. The author consulted secondary sources including books, journal 
articles, magazine articles, publications from nongovernmental and nonprofit 
organizations, and relevant documents from the governments of Colombia and the United 
States, in Spanish and English. Primary data were collected from interviews, surveys, 
speeches and statements from relevant actors and informants. Qualitative methods were 
the predominant methods employed in this investigation. The study also integrates other 
methods of analysis' including elements of historical research, field research and content 
analysis. The case study is the most applicable approach to examining a phenomenon as 
context specific, non-generalizeable, dynamic and continuously evolving as this subject. 
The thrust and exclusivity of the study requires a methodological approach that reflects 
the necessity of employing a design that favors "an in-depth, multifaceted investigation, 
using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon. The study is 
conducted in great detail and often relies on the use of several data  source^."'^ 
The preliminary phase of data collection was undertaken in Colombia from June 
2006 through August 2006. The author conducted the majority of the primary and 
secondary research in the capital cities of Cartagena, Barranquilla, Sincelejo, Monteria 
15 Joe R.  Feagin, Anthony M.. Orum and Gideon Sjoberg, A Case for the Case Study (Chapel Hill 
and London: Nor.th Carolina Press, 199 I), 2 
and an unspecified town and municipality in the Montes de Maria region. The researcher 
conducted secondary research in the library at the Universidad de Santiago de Cali 
(University of Santiago de Cali) in the municipality of Cali, department of Valle del 
Cauca, Colombia. The researcher selected these municipalities because they possess 
majority or significant minority populations16 of Afro-descendants and are located on the 
Caribbean coast, except for the municipality of Cali. 
The second phase of the investigation was conducted in the United States between 
September 2006 and April 2007, This aspect of the investigation was undertaken to 
garner a greater understanding of the role of the United States government in the 
domestic affairs of the Republic of Colombia concerning the armed conflict and Afro- 
Colombians. The author interviewed Afro-Colombian civil society activists living in the 
United States, NGO workers, government organizations and Congressional staffers. l7 
Delimitations 
Admittedly, a number of limitations and challenges exist but none undermine its 
integrity or potential contribution. One of the limitations of this study's investigation is 
that it offers only a fleeting glimpse into a long history of state and non-state sponsored 
violence complicated and conflated by advancing US foreign policy objectives in the 
Andean nation. The studies that have been conducted on the affect of the armed conflict 
1 6 ~ o r  the purpose of this investigation, significant minority populations constitute at least 10-25% 
of'the population identi@ as Afro-descendant. 
'7Congressional staffers who are currently or who formerly worked on issues 
concerning the intersection between U.S.-Colombia bilateral relations, the conflict and 
the concomitant impact and future implications of U.S. and Colombian policies on Afro- 
Colombians were consulted. 
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in black communities have predominately been undertaken on the Pacific Coast and more 
specifically in the department of Choco. Furthermore, the absence of substantial 
secondary literature concerning the plight of Afio-Colombian inhabitants of the 
Caribbean within the intrastate security crisis serves as a considerable shortcoming in the 
broader discourse. In order to mitigate these circumstances, the investigator gathered 
literature and data that focused on region rather race, when appropriate since there is 
considerable correlation between the spatial distribution of Afro-descendants and 
particular regions in Colombia. In addition, the study employed interviews and surveys, 
in an effort to deductively construct a broader understanding of the origins, consequences 
and plight of black communities in departments situated on the Caribbean coast. Yet, due 
to the absence of a statistically significant, random sampling of the black population, one 
cannot generalize this study beyond the particularities of the geographical space under 
which the study was taken or the particular character of the witnesses employed. 
Moreover, the sample size differed from municipality to municipality. The survey 
instrument was very narrowly devised to elicit information regarding the implications of 
the conflict on the state of human security. Therefore, the study only attempted to 
measure indicators relating to security, to the neglect of other UNDP identified human 
security indicators recognized by other institutions or academics such as food, 
environmental, health security. Finally, the study only investigated the first Uribe 
administration (2002), subsequently; events after 2006 are not provided an elaborate 
analysis. 
Conceptual Framework 
Negotiating Human Security within the Realist Tradition 
Security for Whom? State Centric Security versus Human Security 
Human security provides a compelling conceptual framework for 
confronting the global challenge of internal displacement.. .it offers a 
means of creating opportunities in crises by exploring remedies to the 
deep-seated structural problems of political, economic, social and cultural 
disparities that generate tensions and violent conflicts.18 
Francis Deng, Former United Nations Secretary-General Special 
Representative on Internal Displaced Persons 
The concept of 'security' is a central pillar in international relations theory and it 
has subsequently begotten its own niche within the discourse, security studies. Scholars, 
human rights advocates, nongovernmental agencies and intergovernmental organizations 
have pondered the continued utility of its meaning; some calling for a strict interpretation 
while others have favored a broader, more inclusive interpretation. The traditional 
conceptualization of security is principally preoccupied with the security of the state writ 
large, while threats perpetrated against individuals who reside within the territorial 
confines of the state are peripheral to the state's primary concern: protection against 
external aggression, monopolizing force, exercising authority and the maintenance of its 
territorial integrity. Del Rosso explains: 
For most of the past four hundred years, security has been intimately 
associated with the state. It has long (though not exclusively) meant 
"protection from organized violence caused by armed foreigners." Since 
18 Francis M Deng, "Human Security and the Global Challenge of Internal Displacement," The 
Ministerial Meeting on Human Security, May 11, 2000 available fiom http://www brookings edu/ 
printrne wbs?page=/pagedefs/9fl637f4 1 e09ff3d1add83080a1415cbxm1; Internet; accessed 22 January 
2006 
"foreign" implies a person who is "not like us," and since tenitorially- 
based states (or nation-states) emerged in Europe after 1648 as the 
dominant organizing principle for separating "us from them," security's 
identification with the state is not surprising. Throughout history, it was 
the consolidation of the state's military capabilities, and the 
bureaucratization this engendered, that accelerated the consolidation of the 
state itself. As its violence capability (both defensive and offensive) 
developed in tandem, that state became not only the chief provider of 
security, but also its chief interpreter; for much of history, "security" 
simply meant what the rulers said it meant.19 
Subsequently, the welfare of individuals (or the collective) has received much less 
attention than the security prerogatives of the states which they inhabit within 
international relations theory and subfields such as security studies. However, in the late 
1980s and the subsequent post-Cold War era, the changing global environment 
engendered a proliferation of scholarship that began to challenge the static, immutable, 
Westphalian conceptualization of security. Jessica Mathews in a Foreign Affairs article 
entitled "Redefining Security" opines "The 1990s will demand a redefinition of what 
constitutes national security.. .The assumptions and institutions that have governed 
international relations in the postwar era are a poor fit with these new realitie~."~' While, 
numerous theoretical paradigms flourish within international relations theory, the realist 
tradition has been the prevailing paradigm for interpreting relations amongst  state^.^' 
Subsequently, the fundamental objective of the state is the realization of security. 
I9stephen J .  Del Rosso Jr., "The Insecure State," Daedalus 124, no. 2 (1995) 
20 Jessica Mathews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs (Spring 1989). 
2 1 Paul R Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations and World Politics Security, 
Economy, Identity (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997) 
The primary metaphor utilized within the realist paradigm to describe the 
security problematic of nation-states is the "security dilemma" (per Jervis, 
1978). Operating in conditions of anarchy, states, by seeking to advance 
their individual national securities (through policies of arming, deterrence, 
and alliance), create and sustain an international environment of decreased 
relative security for themselves and for the collective of states. The 
security dilemma, therefore, hinges on the external threat conditions that 
states experience and on the results of their efforts, as unitary state actors, 
to meet these threats.22 
However, as Job further indicates that this principle, accepted as a paradigmatic axiom 
for realists, fails to capture the essence of the (intrastate) security dilemma for post- 
colonial Third World states. Since, internal threats and non-state actors competing for 
control of the state have constituted a greater threat to the integrity of Third World 
regimes than external, competing states; many post-colonial states are much more 
concerned with endogenous non-state actors challenging their security rather than other 
states. Thus, a differential analysis of Third World states has always been required even 
whilst the prevailing literature has been beholden to a discourse privileging interstate 
conflict, premised on the European model of interstate relations. Within the developing 
world, 'the security dilemma,' presents additional challenges beyond those elaborated 
within realist political thought. According to Job, the intrastate security dilemma in 
Third World states "violates" four fundamental suppositions of the realist model: 
(1) internal fragmentation within the state, (2) the regime's authority and legitimacy is 
contested, (3) the absence or incapacity of the state to extend security to its citizens, and 
(4) finally, threats principally emanate from within.23 K. J. Holsti's treatment of the 
22 Job, 17. 
23~bid, 18-19, 
utility of employing a Eurocentric model governing our understanding of the functioning 
of the international order, in "International Theory and War in the Third World" is 
inherently problematic. Furthermore, if one is concerned with understanding security in 
the post-World War I1 and Cold War eras, a different, more sophisticated approach is 
required.24 Holsti declares "Our organizing concepts, theories of international relations, 
strategic analyses, and explorations of systemic change and of the role of war in those 
dynamics are based, explicitly or implicitly, on the patterns of European and Cold War 
history."25 
The end of the Cold War and the disproportionate number of intrastate, rather 
than interstate, conflicts has encouraged a reassessment of the unilateral focus on national 
security by policymakers, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and 
academics. As intrastate conflicts proliferate, the state and intrastate agents, not external 
state actors, have served as the prevailing "critical and pervasive threat" to its own 
citizen's security. P.H. Liotti in his article entitled "Europe Takes on Human Security" 
clearly articulates this point. He contends "National Security remains important, but in a 
world in which war between states is the rare exception, and many more people are killed 
by their own governments than by foreign armies, the concept of "human security" has 
24 K.J Holsti, "International Theory and War in the Third World," in The Insecurzty Dilemma 
National Securzty o j  Third World States, ed , Brian L Job (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1992). 
251bid., 37-38 
been gaining greater recognition."26 The Human Security Centre extends this argument 
in their annual Human  Security Report, "Human security and national security should 
be-and often are-mutually reinforcing. But secure states do not automatically mean 
secure Therefore, greater consideration provided to human security does 
necessitate the exclusion of the orthodox analysis of the state centric model of security 
proffered by the realist tradition, The Table 1 provides an illustrative depiction of the 
different conceptualizations of security, ranging from the state centric, traditional 
(national security) model to the human security approach. 
Table 1. National Security Model As Opposed to Human Security 
Traditions and Security Concerns 
Analytic Bases Security Type Security Focus and Threats 




Threats: States and 
stateless actors 
Non-traditional, Human Security Individuals, Mankind, Concerns: Survival, 
LiberallMarxist Human Rights Human Progress 
Based 




Source: This table was adapted from its original form from P.H. Liotta, "Through the Looking 
Glass: Creeping Vulnerabilities and the Reordering of Security" Security Dialogue, vol. 36, no. 1, 
March 2005. 
26 P H.  Liotti and Taylor Owen, "Sense and Sensibilities: Europe Takes on Human Security," 
Parameters 36, 2006. 
27~uman  Security Centre, "Human Security Report" University of British Human Security Centre. 
2005 Available from http://www.humansecurityrepor~t. infoMSR2005-PDFI What-is-HS.pdfj Internet; 
accessed 11 November 2006 
Human security as a conceptual framework of analysis garnered substantial 
consideration after the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published its 
annual human development report sub-titled "New Dimensions of Human Security" in 
1 994.28 The report contends: 
. . . It will not be possible for the community of nations to achieve any of its major 
goals-not peace, not environmental protection, not human rights or 
democratization, not fertility reduction, not social integration-except in the 
context of sustainable development that leads to human security.29 
The fundamental values, identified by the UNDP report, which constitute human security, 
include economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political 
security.30 These tenets represent a broadening or widening of the scope of security as 
articulated in realist orthodoxy. Human security, according to Dan Henk, has "unleashed 
a debate that had been growing for years, provoked by scholars and practitioners 
increasingly dissatisfied with traditional conceptions of security."31 Those scholars and 
activists that challenge the conventional security model argue that the concept largely 
fails to recognize the multiple sources of belligerence that originate within the state 
(perpetrated from below, by non-state actors) and by the state (perpetrated in a more 
horizontal fashion) against its own citizens. Human rights activists, scholars, 
intergovernmental agencies and non-governmental organizations have incorporated 
28 United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Report: New Dimensions of 
Human Security" (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Available fkom http://hdr.undp.org/ 
repor~ts/globaV1994/en/; Internet; accessed 22 January 2006 
human security as a viable and complementary model to their state centric orthodox 
security concerns. A coalition of governments including Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa 
(observer status), Switzerland and Thailand have developed a transnational forum that 
situates human security as a principle prerogative in meeting their foreign policy 
objectives. This intergovernmental initiative is referred to as the Human Security 
~ e t w o r k . ~ ~  Former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy affirms: 
Canada began using the language of human security when it became clear 
that, in the aftermath of the cold war, a new foreign policy paradigm was 
needed.. .it has become clear that in today's conflicts civilians are most 
often the victims, if not the primary targets of violence. It was obvious to 
us then that protecting individuals should be a major focus of our foreign 
While, multiple definitions of human security abound, the author has determined the most 
efficacious characterization is offered by the Canadian government. The Canadian model 
narrowly defines human security as "a condition or state of being characterized by 
freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety, or even lives."34 critical 
and pervasive threats are the cornerstone of discourses concerning human security 
particularly as it relates to an ongoing intrastate conflict like Colombia. Sabina Alkire 
offers this illustrative explanation of "critical and pervasive threats:" 
32 For further inquiry into the Human Security Network, Please See: http://www .humanse 
curitynehvork .org/network-e.php 
3 3 ~ l o y d  Axworthy, "Introduction" in Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, 
Promoting Peace," eds. Rob McRae and Don Hubert (Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 3. 
34 Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Human Security: Safety for 
People in a Changing World" (Ottawa: Department of'Foreign Affairs, 1999), 5 .  
The focus of human security is squarely on human lives. But in order to 
protect human lives effectively, actors must deliberately identify and 
prepare for distinct threats. Threats to human security are critical-that is, 
they threaten to cut into the core activities and functions of human lives. 
Such threats may be sudden-as in economic collapse-but they need not 
be, for what defines a threat as critical is its tragic depth rather than its 
suddenness. Furthermore, the threats are pervasive-meaning (i) the 
threat is large scale (within the population under consideration; what is 
large scale will differ for local vs. international institutions); and or (ii) the 
threat may come again and again over time; it is not an anomalous event 
for which strategic preparation is impossible.35 
The working definition devised by the Canadians will serve as the premise for 
understanding the ethnicIracia1 dimension of the humanitarian crisis in Colombia. 
While states such as Japan and Canada have incorporated the bifurcated 
rationalization of security within their foreign policy regimes and interstate governmental 
organizations like the United Nations and non-governmental groups have embraced the 
model, human security confronts considerable challenges to garnering broad endorsement 
within political science discourse (and more specifically by American political scientists). 
Critiques of human security include the absence of significant consensus on its definition 
by scholars and subsequently the representation that the concept is too ill-defined to be 
empirically relevant to social scientist research. Roland Paris pontificates, this particular 
concern, in his article entitled "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" that: 
For those who study, rather than practice, international politics, the task of 
transforming the idea of human security into a useful analytical tool for 
scholarly research is also problematic. Given the hodgepodge of 
principles and objectives associated with the concept, it is far from clear 
what academics should even be studying. Human security seems capable 
%abina Alkire, "Conceptual Framework for Human Security," Centre for Research on Inequality, 
Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE Working Paper. Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford. 
2003. Available from http://www crise .ox.ac .uWpubslworkingpaper2 .pdf; Internet; accessed 15 March 
2006. 
of supporting virtually any hypothesis-along with its opposite- 
depending on the prejudices and interests of the particular re~earcher .~~  
In fact, a frequent contributor to the discourse on human security, Sabina Alkire concedes 
that more than thirty operational definitions of human security proliferate and the concept 
is further complicated by the multidimensional sources of security threats such as 
intrastate conflict, the environment, poverty, etc that further confound its potential 
empirical precision.37 Stephen M. Walt, in his article entitled "Renaissance of Security 
Studies," which evaluates the origins, state and agenda of security studies, acknowledges 
the relevance of intellectual investigations of the aforementioned threats, however, he 
warns against this ~rientation.'~ Walt declares "Defining the field in this way would 
destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of 
these important problems."39 However, as discussed earlier, the orthodox 
conceptualization of "security" is under philosophical and practical duress particularly in 
its applicability to states whose history and development are dissimilar to Western states. 
Moreover, states, including those in the West, are being challenged by the proliferation of 
a myriad of non-state actors that have emerged to challenge the state's capacity to protect 
its institutions, people and interests from within and without. While, there is no 
consensus on the definition and the operationalization of human security, its utility is of 
36 Roland Paris, "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?" International Security 26, no. 2 
(Fall 2001). 
37 Sabina Alkire, "A Vital Core That Must Be Treated with the Same Gravitas as Traditional 
Security Threats" Securzty Dzalogue 3 5,  no. 3 (September 2004). 
38 Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of' Security Studies," International Studies Quarterly, 3.5, 
no. 2 (June 199 1). 
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great consequence for scholars as they attempt to construct a definition that attempts to 
fashion a more sophisticated, less static and relevant concept that speaks to the exigent 
circumstances that challenges states and populations which comprise them. The state of 
Colombia, its multidimensional intrastate conflict instigated by non-state actors and the 
"critical and pervasive threats" created by decades of intrastate conflict and the grave 
humanitarian consequences that it has engendered, obliges one to engage in a differential 
analysis that considers the welfare of both the regime and its population. 
There are considerable variances in the definition of human security. 
Subsequently, empirically measuring human security, too, becomes problematic. 
Definitions range, from the quite narrow articulation of protection against "critical and 
pervasive threats" to the much broader designation of threats, which include food and 
environmental security, for example. As previously mentioned, this study endeavors to 
explore the "first front" in the human security calculus, "freedom from fear.." Developing 
a viable conceptual model designed to understand the human dimension of the intrastate 
security crisis in Colombia is critical to undertaking this investigation. Human security 
as a conceptual model explicitly and implicitly acknowledges the necessity of bifurcating 
security and, in deed, provides a viable instrument of analysis. The use of human 
security within this study is intended to qualitatively examine the efficacy of the 
promulgation of the approach designed by the state to ameliorate (the independent 
variable) the ongoing intrastate security crisis in Colombia on the state of human security 
of its Afro-descendant population (dependent variable). As the government lauds the 
achievements produced by the measures undertaken through the rubric of democratic 
76 
security policy, literature examining the impact of these policies on the human security 
concerns of a historically marginalized population, with prevailing vulnerabilities, such 
as Afro-Colombians is only beginning to emerge. While, human security indicators are 
not disaggregated by racelethicity (except for internal displacement), this study attempts 
to fill the gap in the data by employing survey research and interviews and analysis of the 
secondary literature to ascertain the state of human security of Afro-Colombian 
populations during the Uribe administration. 
CHAPTER IV 
NEGOTIATING THE SECURITY PARADOX, PART I: 
COLOMBIA AND THE UNITED STATES 
We have to be aware that we're fighting I think the largest criminal and 
business organization in the world. After oil, drugs is the second largest 
business, $500 billion dollars a year. 
Former Colombian President and Colombian Ambassador to the United 
States Andrds Pastranal 
Introduction 
There are three main objectives of this chapter. The first task is to provide a brief 
historical examination of the contemporary manifestations of Colombia's intrastate 
security crisis. Next, a portrayal of the role of the United States within the context of this 
prevailing crisis will be undertaken. Finally, the chapter undertakes an analysis of the 
state's efforts to monopolize force and extinguish the threat posed by sub-state actors 
through the promulgation of the "Democratic Security and Defense Policy" initiated 
under the Uribe administration. 
The United States of America and the Republic of Colombia, under the 
administrations of President George W. Bush and his staunchest political ally in Latin 
America, President ~ l v a r o  Uribe Vdlez have demonstrated remarkable rhetorical, 
financial and military commitment to waging the U.S. sponsored "global war on 
1 Andres Pastrana, interview by Fareed Zakaria, 9 June 2006, Transcript 223, Foreign Exchange 
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terrorism" in Colombia. Uribe and Bush are ideologically committed to advancing a 
neo-liberal agenda which is largely predicated on the capacity of the Colombian state to 
create the conditions for the infiltration of foreign capital and investment. Moreover, the 
two executives have demonstrated a resilient commitment to employing "the specialists 
of vio~ence,"~ the military, as the principal agents in their quest to create those favorable 
conditions and extinguish the political threat posed by groups operating on the margins of 
the law in Colombia, particularly FARC. The "war on terrorism" has created a 
convenient ideological framework for the Colombian president to philosophically 
reconceptualize the nature of the intrastate security crisis within the prevailing the post- 
91 1 paradigm articulated by the United States. The war on drugs paradigm which gained 
saliency in the aftermath of the Cold War has been transformed into the war on t e r r ~ r . ~  
Guerrillas become characterized as terrorists and conveniently fall within the rubric of the 
global war on terror. Characterization of guerillas as terrorists has broad ranging 
implications both in theory and practice within the Colombian context. Uribe, politically 
astute, reflects this sentiment when he opines "The great enemy of Colombian democracy 
is terrorism. And our great partner in defeating terrorism has been the government and 
2 Claude Ake, "Democracy and Development" (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1996), 6. 
3 ~ o r  an analysis on the U.S, backed war on drugs in Colombia, See: Russell Crandall, Driven by 
Drugs U S .  Policy Toward Colombia (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2002); Ted Galen 
Carpenter, BadNeighbor Policy Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin (America. New York: 
Palgrave, 2003); Harvey F. Kline and Vanessa Gray, "Colombia: Drugs, Guerillas, Death Squads, and U.S.. 
Aid" in Howard J .  Wiarda and Harvey F.  Kline, eds.., Latin American Politics and Development (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 2000); Arlene B. Tickner, "Tensions and Undesirable Consequences of'U.S.. Foreign 
Policy in Colombia" in Colombia: Civil Conflict, State Weakness, and (In)Security, ed.. Myhre, David John 
(Princeton, NJ: Program in Latin American Studies, 2003); and Livingstone, Grace. Inside Colombia: 
Drugs, Democracy and War (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2004); For an examination of the 
'reorientation' of'the US pretext for intervention in Colombia, within the "war on terror" paradigm, See: 
Doug Stokes, America's Other War Terrorizing Colombia (New York: Zed Books, 2005) and Forrest 
Hylton, Evil Hour in Colombia (London: Verso, 2006). 
the people of the United ~ t a t e s . "~  o t  only has Uribe, by reconstituting the guerilla as a 
terrorist organizationlentity insinuated that the armed insurgency had no political 
objectives for which they werelare attempting to achieve but that the state should be 
under no obligation to reconcile the problems that gave rise and fueled the armed conflict 
that has persisted over the last four decades.' Forrest Hylton explains the relevance of 
this strategic calculation by Uribe, "If the problem could be redefined as "terrorism" it 
would mean the end of pressure for a negotiated-that is, political-solution to armed 
conflict with the FARC."~ As the United States government and its military is consumed 
with the conflict in Iraq, confronting terror in the broader Middle East and other 
geopolitically strategic regions with pronounced "Islamic activism," Uribe has declared, 
"that the Colombian conflict is a more serious terrorist threat than ~ r a ~ . " ~  Not only are 
these nonstate actors, in large part financed by revenue generated by the illegal drug 
trade, but their activities, according to Bogota and Washington, represent formidable (and 
in the case of Colombia, an existential) transnational threats to hemispheric security. 
"Therefore," according to Mario Murillo in Colombia and the US. War, Unrest and 
Destabilization, "terrorism becomes very narrowly defined in the Colombian context, a 
4 ~ h e  White House, "President Bush, President Uribe of. Colombia Discuss Terrorism and 
Security" August 2005. (Accessed 1 March 2005) http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2OO5/ 
08/20050804-2 .html; Internet 
 orre rest Hylton, Evil Hour in Colombia" (Verso: London &New York) 2006.. 
7 As cited in Francisco Gutierrez, "Institutionalizing Global Wars: State Transformations in 
Colombia, 1978-2002 Colombian Policy Directed at Its Wars, Paradoxically, Narrows the Government's 
Margin of'Maneuver Even as It Tries to Expand It," Journal ojInternationa1 Affairs 57, no. 1 (2003) 
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definition that suits perfectly the military and political objectives of both governments."8 
Yet, the human costs associated with the armed conflict tend to be lost in the 
sensationalism of the destructive forces of war, the financial burden of waging it, and the 
desire to predict and invariably spurn its conclusion. 
The Nation Uribe Inherited: A Pithy Analysis of the Crisis 
In order to appreciate the multifaceted and complicated internal armed conflict 
(alongside generalized violence and criminal activity) that permeates the Colombian 
landscape today, between guerrillas, the state and (and recently demobilized) 
paramilitaries (and other ancillary belligerents and common criminals), one must 
examine the seeds that were sown which gave birth to the crisis in its contemporary form. 
The proverbial seeds that instigated the gravest human induced human rights and 
humanitarian disaster in the Western Hemisphere are rooted in the convergence of 
multiple dynamic and historically entrenched factors. These factors include persistent 
civil wars instigated by intractable interparty rivalry between the Conservative and 
Liberal parties, the inability of political elites to manage, ameliorate and defuse conflict 
through non-violent mechanisms, an oligarchical democracy that severely constricted the 
exercise of citizen participation in the political process accompanied by political 
repression of popular dissent, deplorable socioeconomic conditions clearly manifested in 
gross inequalities in the distribution of wealth, slight regard for the rule of law and the 
failure to develop a security apparatus necessary to provide the most fundamental 
8 Mario Murillo, Colombia and the United States War, Unrest and Destabilization 
(New York: Seven Stories, 2004), p. 152. 
political good to all its citizens, security.9 In addition, the Colombian state has, in fact, 
been duplicitous in the violation of its own citizen's human rights in a myriad of ways. 
Colombian philosopher Luis Alberto Restrepo firmly places the blame for the entrenched 
multipolar violence manifest on the nation's political elites. He declares: 
In all societies, the majority is always profoundly influenced by the 
mentality and behavior of elites. Accordingly, even though the immediate 
agents of human rights violations are frequently humble people, they do 
not bear the greatest responsibility. There is a diffuse complicity on the 
part of elites in human rights violations. In not a few instances, concrete 
intellectual authorship of violent acts emanates from powerful, 
enlightened, and influential sectors. These sectors, due to their principal 
role in society, should be considered the central focus of the ethical 
decomposition of the country. The problem of respect for fundamental 
human rights is, for this reason, first a problem of elites. Any search for a 
solution should begin with this ackn~wledgement.'~ 
In the discourse concerning weak or failing states, particularly in the post-Cold War era, 
scholars, as they should, tend focus on the usual host of beleaguered African and Asian 
nations or former Soviet republics and more recently Iraq and Afghanistan; however 
Colombia and Haiti consistently represent the Western Hemisphere in this unenviable 
category." In 2006, Colombia was ranked 26th in the world on the "Failed State Index" 
"or a discussion concerning the protracted civil conflict and its antecedents in Colombia, See: 
Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2002); Forrest Hylton, Evil Hour zn Colombzu (London: Verso, 2006); 
Doug Stokes, America's Other War Terrorizzng Colombza (New York: Zed Books, 2005); Robin Kirk, 
More Terrzble than Death Vzolence, Drugs and America S War in Colombia (New York: Public Affairs, 
2003); David Bushnell, The Making ojModern Colombia A Nation m Spzte ojItselJ (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1993). 
'O~uis Alberto Restrepo, "The Equivocal Dimensions of'Human Rights in Colombia." in Violence 
in Colombia, 1990-2000 Waging War andNegotiating Peace, eds Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Penaranda 
and Gonzalo Sanchez G .  (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc ), 97. 
"~ober t  I .  Rotberg, ed., State Failure and State Weakness in a Time oj  Terror (Washington D.C : 
Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 
82 
behind ~ t h i 0 ~ i a . l ~  While, ethnic andlor religious schisms represented the vast majority 
of intrastate crises in the post World War I1 era,13 Colombia is an anomaly within the 
discourse because not only is it considered a "lower middle-income" country as opposed 
to the cadre of beleaguered, impoverished failing or weak states that emerged after World 
War I1 but the intrastate conflict in the Andean nation is not premised on the ethnic or 
religious fault lines that have fragmented so many nation-states in the Global South. 
Failing or weak states can and have presented considerable challenges not only for their 
neighbors but remain a source of insecurity for their citizens, as well. Rob McRae notes 
in "Human Security in a Globalized world"l4 that "While failed states were occasional 
during the cold war, they have come to plague the post cold war world, often with deadly 
consequences for their citizens."15 Due to its distinctiveness as a weak state absent 
cataclysmic ethnic or religious fragmentation, Colombia requires a different analysis. 
Harvey F. Kline opines it was not so much that Colombia fit the traditional model of a 
post-Cold War failing state; the Colombian state, in fact, had never been strong, its 
12There are twelve "indicators of instability" which would constitute classification as a failed 
states, according to the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy Magazine, including: demographic pressures, 
refugees and displaced persons, group grievance, human flight, uneven development, delegitimization of 
state, public services, human rights, security apparatus, factionalized elites and external intervention. It 
should be noted that in 2007, Colombia dropped from 27 to 33 and in 2008; it was not ranked at all 
amongst the "60 most vulnerable" states. Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy, "The Failed States Index 
2007" JulyIAugust 2007, http://www.foreignpolicy comistory/cms..php?stor~id=3865&print=l 
13 Rotberg. 
14 Rob McRae, "Human Security in a Globalized World," In Human Security and the New 
Diplomacy Protecting People, Promoting Peace, eds Robert Grant McRae and Don Hubert, eds, (McGill- 
Queen's University Press, 200 I), 15 
sovereignty had not been consolidated and had "it always been weak."16 Stuart E. 
Eizenstat, John Edward Porter and Jeremy M. Weinstein, in their article entitled 
"Rebuilding Weak States" provide an elaborate articulation of the attributes that 
characterize "weak states," like Colombia. The authors affirm: 
A state's most basic task is to provide security by maintaining a monopoly 
of the use of force, protecting against internal and external threats, and 
preserving sovereignty over territory. If a government cannot ensure 
security, rebellious armed groups or criminal nonstate actors may use 
violence to exploit this "security gap." 
A government must also provide basic services such as education 
and health care to its citizens. An inability to do so creates a "capacity 
gap," which can lead to a loss of public confidence and then perhaps 
political upheaval. In most environments, a capacity gap coexists with- 
or even grows out of-a security gap. 
Finally, to foster its legitimacy a government needs to protect the 
basic rights and freedoms of its peoples, enforce the rule of law, and allow 
broad-based participation in the political process." 
Colombia, unfortunately, has historically been plagued by chasms in security, legitimacy 
and capacity which have served to justify and facilitate the emergence and maintenance 
of illegally armed groups as the state did not have the capacity, lacked the political will or 
was in complicit in denying its citizens freedom from violence or opportunity to 
participate fully in the political project. Their participation had always been conditional 
and constrained within a system that served the interests of the ruling class under the 
guise of democracy. Moreover, the state's incapacity to extend security coupled with 
16~arvey F. Kline, "Colombia: Lawlessness, Drug Trafficking and Carving Up the State" In State 
Failure andstate Weakness in a Time ojTerror, ed Robert I .  Rotberg (Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2003), 16 1 .. 
17 Stuart E.  Eizenstat, John Edward Porter and Jeremy M.  Weinstein, "Rebuilding Weak States," 
Foreign Affairs, Volume 84, Number 1 (JanuaryRebruary 2005): 136. 
their sanctioning of the establishment of right wing counterinsurgents has exacerbated the 
legitimacy crisis as state institutions have been compromised and infiltrated. 
In the aptly titled, The Making ofModern Colombia,, A Nation in Spite ofltself; 
David Bushnell declares: 
For better or worse, Colombia does exist as a nation in the world today. The 
people and territory known as Colombian have not arrived at this status by an 
easy path; they have been tom by social, cultural, political, and regional 
antagonisms and misunderstandings. l8 
Consequently, Colombia is a land of extreme paradoxes. The nation that delivered to the 
world, renowned artist Fernando Botero and Nobel Prize winning novelist Gabriel Garcia 
Mirquez has also produced a "stable and pluralist democracy alongside a violent and 
persistent c~nflict." '~ The Andean nation's geography is one of the central features of 
any discourse on the republic, its strong regional contrasts, its tremendous biodiversity, 
densely populated Andean highlands, coasts on both the Atlantic and Pacific, and not the 
least, a topography of violence that has come to infiltrate all of these territorial spaces. 
Nazih Richani, in Systems of Violence. The Political Economy of' War and Peace in 
Colombia, argues that the geography of the country is a critical feature of the nation's 
political economy, both its gift and its affliction as is illustrated by its "geographic 
position at the gate of South America" strategically positioning it as the epicenter of the 
Spanish slave trade during the colonial period to its position as the principal cultivator, 
"David Bushnell, The Making ojModern Colombia A Nation in Splte o j  ItselJ 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), viii 
19 United Nations Human Development Programme, "Origins of the War" in A Cul-de-sac with 
Ways Out, National Human Development Report, 2003" (Bogota: United National Development Program, 
2003), 4. 
producer and transit station for illicit While, the Colombian democracy is touted 
as the "oldest in Latin America," with a two party system that has nearly survived the 
duration of the republic, it is sharply contrasted with its political exclusivity, oligarchic 
and clientelistic nature of its political system and protracted civil conflict. The jubilation 
in connection with the ratification of the 1991 Political Constitution which established a 
more open and participatory democracy including amongst its National Constituent 
Assembly, demobilized guerillas, religious minorities, academics, indigenous 
representatives, alongside the traditional party elites, was also confronting an unfortunate 
reality: a state on the "brink of failure." Michael Shifter and Vinay Jawahar in "State 
Building in Colombia: Getting Priorities Straight" provides this discerning critique: 
. . . Beginning in the late 1990s, Colombians were forced to confront the 
hard reality that, despite some impressive achievements, their state had 
great difficulty carrying out perhaps its most basic function: protecting its 
citizens. The statistics on homicides, kidnappings and violence in general 
were staggering. The slide into rampant lawlessness and insecurity was no 
doubt related to the state's weakness, inefficacy and, in some cases, even 
absence. The deterioration in law and order was compounded by and 
reinforced notable economic decline-uncharacteristic for Colombia-and 
social disintegration. Colombia's high level of violence had long been one 
of its unhappy distinctions in the Latin American con te~ t .~ '  
It is an empirically indisputable reality that Colombia continues to be one of the most 
violent and subsequently dangerous countries in the Western Hemisphere, particularly for 
those who threaten the status quo and challenge the economic projects of state and non- 
state actors. Violence or more specifically the armed actors who employ violence as a 
2%azih Richani, Systems of Violence The Political Economy oj  War and Peace In 
Colombia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 93 
21~ichae l  Shifter. Michael and Vinay Jawahar. "State Building in Colombia: Getting Priorities 
Straight" Journal of International Affairs, Fall 2004, vol. 58, no. 1 
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method of terror and population control, in Colombia, possess the extraordinary ability to 
assume multiple forms, transform geographies, incorporate new actors and communities, 
and like a virus, displays tremendous resiliency and resistance to treatment. The 
remarkable absence and/or negligence of the state vis-a-vis the equitable provision of 
political goods such as security and services in several marginal territorial spaces and the 
cooptation of those privileges generally reserved for the state by competing non-state 
actors such as: the Fuerzas Armadas Revolutionarias Colombia- Qkrcito del Pueblo 
(FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army), pseudo state 
agents, the veritable "cousins"22 of the Colombian security forces, the Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia (AUC, United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia) and to a lesser 
degree, the Ejkrcito de Liberacidn Nacional (ELN, the National Liberation Army) 
exemplify the historical incapacity and/or deficiency of political will of the Republic to 
exert its sovereign right and responsibility as the legitimate authority and arbiter of the 
use of force throughout the landscape of the country and protection of the public welfare. 
"Unlike other Latin American countries," Harvey F. Kline contends "violence did not 
originate from the government, but rather from the lack of government. These decisions 
eventually resulted in powerful 'self-defense' or 'paramilitary' groups."23 The FARC, 
executing the longest guerilla insurgency in Latin America during a time when most have 
receded, founded a peasant self-defense force in the mid-1 960s (however their origins as 
cadres of peasant self-defense forces can be traced back to the 1930s and 1940s) in the 
22 Robin Kirk, Terrzble than Death Violence, Drugs and America's War in Colombza (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2003) 
23 Kline, 163. 
uncolonized geographical margins of southern Colombia. Grace Livingstone explains 
"Its philosophy is a mixture of radical agrarianism and anti-imperialism, rather than 
Communism, and many of its members probably did not have global-or even-national 
political vision, but joined to defend or improve conditions in their immediate locality."24 
Four decades after their initial conception, the FARC continue to pose a formidable threat 
to the state's security as they have transcended the margins of their southern stronghold 
and moved into areas previously outside their zones of influence, such as urban spaces 
and other geostrategically important regions. Prior to the military offensive initiated by 
the Uribe administration, FARC forces numbered approximately 18,000 and possessed de 
facto control over large swathes over the Colombian national territory.25 The following 
table illustrates the growth of the FARC since 1986. 
Table 2. The Evolution of the FARC (1986-1999) 




Source: Ricardo Vargas Meza, "The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 
and the Illicit Drug Trade" (Cochabamba, Bolivia: Accion Andina, 1999). 
24 . . Livingstone, 48 
25~bid, 22. 
The other competing guerilla army, the ELN, founded in 1964, had a considerably less 
menacing 3500 person army.26 Unlike the FARC, the founders of the ELN were 
predominately urban based student activists and a small cadre of Catholic priests 
ideologically wedded to "Guevara's foquista theory."2" Historically relegated to the 
northeastern party of the country, the ELN is notorious for its bombing of the state's 
energy infrastructure and securing bribes from transnational companies operating in the 
region. Founded in 1997, a disparate decentralized conglomerate of counterinsurgent 
forces consolidated under the aegis of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) in 
order to thwart what they considered subversive left wing elements and insurgents in 
society and protect the property and lives of the political and economic elites.28 The 
"paracos" or "paras" as they are commonly referred to were the most egregious 
perpetrators of human rights violations in the country prior to demobilization. There is a 
considerable history of counterinsurgent group activism, subsidized and legitimated by 
the state, prior to the founding of the AUC. Perhaps, the two most well-known groups 
that preceded the AUC were Muerte a Secuestadores, MAS (Death to Kidnappers) and 
the Autodefensas Campesinas de Cdrdoba y Uraba (ACCU) .~~  The AUC are, as Ann C. 
Mason affirms is: 
. . . A self-proclaimed counter-insurgency organization justified by the 
state's incapacity to control the guerilla threat, the 12,000 person-strong 
28 The FARC, AUC and the ELN have been classified as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by 
the State Department 
paramilitary movement's modus operandi is terrorizing and eliminating 
anyone suspected of collaborating, or even sympathizing, with a leftist 
agenda.30 
The commodification of security and subsequently state sanctioned pararnilitarianism is a 
firmly entrenched feature within the Colombian national security apparatus and 
subsequently the provision of security as a public good. As Harvey Kline notes, the 
provision of security was more contingent on one's capacity to pay and provide for 
oneself than a function of the responsibility of the state.31 Local and regional economic 
elites and the state have historically conspired to subsidize a shadow private security 
apparatus in Colombia to confront the military threat and political challenges posed by 
guerilla groups. Nazih Richani notes that the privatization of security and the 
incorporation of civilians into the business of security provision were also instigated by 
the United States as a part of their broader counterinsurgency strategy in Latin ~ m e r i c a . ~ ~  
Colombia's conflict ridden history and protracted civil war is reflective of the state's 
incapacity to assert its most fundamental obligation to its citizens as a sovereign state, the 
provision of security. Elites preferred, according to Kline, to "let those who needed a 
police force (the large landowners) do it themselves and pay a sort of 'users fee."'33 
Subsequently, right wing paramilitaries have actively sought to eradicate the guerillas, 
those they perceived as collaborators/sympathizers and political dissidents (and even non- 
3 0 ~ n n  C. Mason, Colombia's Democratic Security Agenda: Public Order in the Security Tripod" 
Security Dialogue, vol 34, no 4, December 2003,394 
3 1 Harvey F Kline, "Colombia: Lawlessness, Drug Trafficking and Carving Up the State" In State 
Fazlure andstate Weakness m a Time oJ Terror, ed Robert I Rotberg (Washington D C : Brookings 
Institution Press, 2003) 
32 Richani. 
combatants) that challenged the state or its political and economic policies from the 
Colombian Paramilitarism has oscillated between legality and illegality 
over the past forty years. State sanctioned paramilitarism, distorting the line between the 
civilian and state security forces, was initially promulgated by presidential decree in 1965 
and consolidated by legal statute in 1968.'~ The collusion between self-defense groups 
and the military is clearly articulated by William Aviles in Global Capitalism, 
Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in Colombia. He affirms the legitimacy of 
paramilitaries accorded by the state, when he states: 
The organization of self-defense groups was incorporated into army 
manuals that emphasized the importance of a "self-defense network" and 
utilizing these groups in "search, control and destructive operations." 
Army training manuals of 1 969, 1 979, 1 982, and 1 987 emphasized the 
importance of organizing the civilian population. These self-defense 
groups would support military combat operations against "subversion" 
through the collection of intelligence, the conduction of military 
operations against insurgency, andlor acting as guides for military 
a s s a u ~ t s . ~ ~  
The strength of paramilitary groups reached its apex during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
legal establishment, arming, training and explicit support of paramilitary groups in 
military operations was not formally abolished until 1989. While, the development of 
paramilitaries was sanctioned and even encouraged by the state as a counterinsurgency 
strategy, there has always been an economic dimension strongly allied with their political 
project. The proliferation of human rights abuses authored from various non-state actors 
3 5 ~ o r  a discussion of the U.S.. counterinsurgency strategy in Colombia, See: William Aviles, 
Global Capitalism, Democracy and Civil-Military Relations in Colombia (New York: State University of 
New York Press, 2006); Richani (2002) and Kirk (2003). 
within the state and by the state itself is an endemic attribute of the modern Colombian 
state. Forced removal of the population, illegal appropriation of peasant land and 
cooptation by the agrarian elite, money laundering, drug trafficking and national and 
transnational corporate interests have also been an explicit orientation of these right wing 
groups.37 A counter land reform strategy has proliferated in the wake of paramilitary 
ascendancy further exacerbating the concentration of land in the hands of a few powerful 
economic elites, many whom have explicit or implicit ties with right wing 
counterinsurgent groups. "Paramilitaries were estimated to have expropriated some 5 
million hectares between 1997 and 2003-the largest land grab in Colombian history."38 
The paramilitary penetration of political institutions and connivance with security forces, 
led to this characterization by former Colombian President AndrCs Pastrana to describe 
them as "a veritable cancer in our body politic."39 However, AvilCs reveals the 
hypocrisy of Pastrana's assertion, when he affirms ". . . paramilitary groups were met 
with little resistance by the Pastrana administration as his government maintained the 
decade-long trend of rhetorically condemning paramilitary groups while tolerating and/or 
facilitating their actions.40 Uribe, Pastrana's successor, permitted and even encouraged 
the development of private security forces, referred to then as "Convivir" groups, when 
17 John C. Dugas, "The Colombian Nightmare: Human Rights Abuses and the Contradictory 
Effects of U S. Foreign Policy," In When States kill Latin Amerzca, the U S  and Terror Technologies 
Menjivar, Cecilia and Nestor Rodriguez (Austin: University of Texas, 2005) 
38 Hylton, 1 18 
39 Amaud de Borchgrave, "Pastrana Sees 'Commitment' of Rebel Units to Peace Talks," 
Washington Times, February 10, 200 1 
40 Aviles, 129.. 
he was governor of ~ n t i o ~ u i a . ~ ~  Thus, security in Colombia could be bought and sold, 
like a commodity, those who could afford it, benefited from it, those who could not, were 
vulnerable to the transgressions against them from state and nonstate agents, alike. 
Sovereignty, explains Forrest Hylton, was parcellized.42 The intractable violence 
propagated between the state and substate actors over resources and territory and to a 
lesser degree over legitimacy and authority has instigated the forced migration of millions 
of civilians seeking refuge elsewhere and generally terrorizing the Colombian people. 
John C. Dugas explains that while "human rights have historically been conceived in 
relation to the state . . . the majority of political homicides, massacres, kidnappings, and 
other grave violations of fundamental human rights are committed by nonstate actors, 
primarily the right-wing paramilitaries and the leftist g~er i l l as . "~~  Such a precarious 
situation where violence emanates from multiple, competing armed actors, including the 
state, situates citizens at the nexus of warfare state. Guerillas, paramilitaries, and state 
security forces have employed a strategy of terror utilizing a wide variety of instruments 
of violence to achieve their political and economic objectives including threats, 
massacres, sociopolitical homicides, extrajudicial executions, kidnappings, landmine 
attacks, economic blockades and forced displacement. See Table 3 for authors of 
political homicides. 
41 . Livingstone, 33; See also Winified Tate, Counting the Dead The Culture and Politzcs ojHuman 
Rights Activism in Colombia (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007) 
43 Robert C. Dugas, "The Colombian Nightmare: Human Rights Abuses and the Contradictory 
Effects of U S Foreign Policy" in Cecilia Menjivar and Nestor Rodriguez, eds When States Kill Latin 
America, the U S ,  and Technologies o j  Terror (University of Texas, Austin, 2005) 
Table 3. Authors of Political Homicides Committed Outside of Combat (1 997-2001) 







Source: John C. Dugas, "The Colombian Nightmare: Human Rights Abuses and the 
Contradictory Effects of U.S. Foreign Policy," In When States kill: Latin America, the 
U,S,, and Terror Technologies Menjivar, Cecilia and Nestor Rodriguez (Austin: 
University of Texas, 2005). 
All illegal armed actors, to varying degrees, have garnered a greater share of illegitimate 
revenue from illegal drug trafficking as a result of the dismantling of the Medellin and 
Cali cartels and the vacuum left after their dissolution. Ann C. Mason confirms "By the 
1990s, drugs had become the new fuel for the war in Colombia, forming the most 
important source of income for both paramilitaries and the FARC, who control nearly all 
areas of the country with coca and poppy cultivation." 
Trade unionists, human rights defenders, Afro-Colombian and indigenous civil 
society leaders, peasant groups, academics and journalists, leftist politicians and domestic 
and international agents of social, economic and political transformation that threaten to 
compromise the (a) political and economic projects of illegally armed groups (IAGs) (and 
the state and under some circumstances transnational corporations") are selectively 
targeted for the most brutal acts of intimidation, persecution, repression and 
assassination. Adam Isacson and Jorge Rojas present this grim appraisal of the security 
concerns of human rights defenders in one of the most violent countries in the world, 
when they affirm "In a country where more than 95 percent of crimes go unpunished and 
the powerful go to great lengths to protect their impunity, this is challenging and often 
dangerous work."" The International News Safety Institute into the Protection of 
Journalists in their report entitled "Killing the Messenger," concedes Colombia is the 
third deadliest country in the world for journalists with seventy-two assassinations over a 
ten year period (1996-2006), outpaced only by Russia and Iraq." Trade unionists fair 
even worse in Colombia. "According to Escuela Nacional Sindical, a national labor 
rights research group, the number of Colombian trade unionists killed annually exceeds 
the total for the rest of the world combined."47 
The proliferation of coca cultivation and the production and transit of cocaine 
through Colombia has only served to further worsen the prevailing the socioeconomic 
cleavages that have plagued the nation and has subsidized all the belligerents in the 
44 In 2007, Chiquita Brands International was fmed $25 million dollars by the Justice Department 
as a penalty for paying substate actors, considered foreign terrorist organizations, to protect its banana 
business. While, Chiquita asserts that its payments to illegally armed groups were made in order. secure 
protection for their workers, there is evidence to support the supposition that transnational corporations 
have summarily paid armed groups to protect their economic interests.. 
45 Adam Isacson and Jorge Rojas, "Firm Hand, Large Heart " Human Rzghts Dzalogue 2 8 (Fall 
2002) 
46~nternational News Safety Institute into the Protection of Journalists, "Killing the Messenger," 
March 2007 
47~er.gio De Leon, "Anti-Labor violence in Colombia imperils U.S. free trade pact," Niagara 
Gazette, 7 March 2007 
conflict. In a country where a low grade civil war has become an institutionalized feature 
of the county's social, economic and political fabric, the entry of the drug trade into the 
fray has only served as a conduit to provide groups operating on the margins of the law a 
sustainable resource for advancing their political and economic prerogatives. According 
to the Congressional Research Service, the Republic of Colombia possesses a monopoly 
on the production of cocaine, generating "between 56% and 80% of the world's supply of 
cocaine and increasing amounts of high-quality heroin."48 The market for 90% of the 
cocaine produced or transited through Colombia is the United Therefore, the 
nature of the triangular relationship between the "hegemon," its South American 
neighbor and sub-state actors is that the United States is the principal consumer of the 
cocaine cultivated (coca), produced or transported through the Andean country while the 
Government of Colombia is one of the largest beneficiaries of U.S. foreign aid and as a 
consequence, illegally armed groups largely finance their operations with the profits 
reaped by the drug trade. These groups use the money to purchase military equipment, 
train and compensate soldiers, subsidize their incursions against the state, launder money, 
corrupt already weak political institutions, evade prosecution and terrorize the civilian 
population. This mutually reinforcing triangulation thus serves to maintain and in fact 
feed the 'war system750 and concomitantly serves the interests of illegally armed groups 
48~ongressional Research Service, "Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues for the 109" 
Congress.." Congressional Research Service. The Library of'Congress. Washington D.C.. 29 March 2006. 
50 For a detailed discussion of the Colombian theortical foundations of the 'war system' analogy, 
See Nazih Richani, Systems o j  Violence The Political Economy o j  War and Peace zn Colombza (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2002) 
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while the human rights of the civilian population are routinely violated and the American 
market continues to be flooded with cocaine. The FARC continues to pose considerable 
challenges; the demobilization talks with the ELN are precarious and while a 
controversial demobilization process with the AUC has been undertaken, smaller, more 
decentralized paramilitaries and criminal gangs have emerged to terrorize the civilian 
population and fill the vacuum left after the disintegration of the umbrella organization. 
One of the most conspicuous tragedies that have generated extensive domestic 
and international attention is the internal displacement crisis that prevails in the Andean 
nation. As conflict induced displaced persons abound on the African continent and 
receive considerable international attention, the displacement crisis in Colombia rivals all 
except the Sudan. Individuals who are displaced, by either human made (e.g., war, 
development projects) or environmentally induced disaster (e.g. hurricanes, floods, 
earthquakes, tsunamis), but remain within the territorial confines of their own states, are 
referred to as internally displaced persons (IDPs). The Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre (IDMC) of the Norwegian Refugee Council, a non-governmental agency that 
monitors the global conflict induced internal displacement crisis, affirms that more than 
23 million people have been displaced due to intrastate conflict. While, the deplorable 
socioeconomic conditions and human rights violations suffered by internally displaced 
persons are perceived by international experts as analogous to that of refugees, there is no 
international legal regime or intergovernmental agency that exists which is equivalent to 
that constructed for refugees. This situation prevails even though internally displaced 
persons far outnumber refugees and have for decades. Table 4 delineates the disparity 
between refugees as opposed to internally displaced persons. 
Table 4. Internally Displaced Persons As Opposed to Refugees 









Sources: UNHCR website for refugee figures and the Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre of Norwegian Refugee Council for IDP figures 
In the face of the burgeoning humanitarian crises' and the concomitant 
displacement that accompanies intrastate conflicts, international human rights scholars 
developed a set of standards for state and non-state actors as it relates to addressing the 
human rights of internally displaced persons known as the "Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement." These thirty principles established in 1998 served as the 
framework for the development of Colombia's internal displacement law (Law 387, 
passed in 1997), considered one of the most progressive legislative responses to an 
existing displacement crisis in the world.51 Colombia's displacement law clearly 
articulates the responsibilities of the state to protect and provide assistance to internally 
displaced persons. The fundamental distinction between the principles set forth by the 
5 1 United National High Commissioner for Refugees, The State ofthe World S Refugees 2006 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 
United Nations standards concerning displacement and the law developed in Colombia is 
that the state only recognizes those persons displaced by conflict-induced displacement 
and not other forms of displacement such as development projects and natural disasters. 
Thus, those persons displaced by U.S. sponsored fumigation campaigns or other natural 
disasters that plague the topography such as floods, are not considered internally 
displaced persons under Law 387 and subsequently are not entitled to its protective and 
assistance provisions. Nonetheless, while the statute may be theoretically progressive, 
the execution of the law has been the subject of much domestic and international 
criticism. Most notably, in 2004 the Colombian Constitutional Court charged the 
government's execution of the law and lack of clearly articulated bureaucratic 
responsibilities represented "an unconstitutional state of affairs."j2 According to the 
IDMC, the internally displaced population in Colombia constitute between 1.8-3.8 
million persons, representing approximately 5% of the total population.53 These 
statistics are even worse when an examination of the impact on the indigenous population 
is undertaken. While, constituting less than 3% of the general population, they represent 
nearly 10% of the total IDP population according to the same organization. Moreover, 
the conflict threatens to liquidate some of the smaller indigenous groups constituting 
what some would classify as deliberate acts of genocide by armed actors. As the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Rehgee notes, the Colombian displacement crisis is 
52 Human Rights Watch, "Colombia: Displaced and Discarded, The Plight of' Internally Displaced 
Persons in Bogota and Cartagena" October 2005, Vol. 17, No 4 (48). 
53~nternal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Colombia" Available from: http://www. internal- 
displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsfl(httpEnvelopes)/ CC05B3OC4C94 
EC96802570B8005A7090?OpenDocument (accessed December 1,2007). 
unique because "Displacement has often been an end in itself rather than just a by- 
product of Colombia's conflict. For many years, both guerillas and paramilitaries have 
depopulated rural areas and appropriated the land for political, economic and strategic 
gain."54 There are few of the country's territorial spaces that have not been afflicted by 
the armed conflict that has traversed the country's landscape. Table 5 provides figures on 
internal displacement derived from the Government of Colombia and Consultoria para 
10s Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (CODHES) and illustrates the escalation of 
the IDP crisis in Colombia over the last twenty years. 
Table 5.  Internally Displaced Persons in Columbia by Year 
Consultancy for Para 10s Derechos 
Year Humanos y el Desplazamiento 
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13 1,716 (March 2006) 
1,706,459 
Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
54 United National High Commissioner for Refugees, The State ojthe World's Refugees 2006 
Figure 2 illustrates the landscape of the violence perpetrated by the three principal 
nonstate actors operating on the margins of the law and the corollary spatial distribution 
of the internally displaced population. The nature of displacement, like the conflict itself, 
is dynamic and in constant flux depending upon the relevant circumstances and armed 
actors operating in communities of expulsion. 
Figure 2. The Landscape of Violence in Colombia 
Source: Reuters Foundation 
From the Cold War to the War on Terror: The Promulgation of U.S. 
National Security Interests in Colombia 
In the post-Cold War era, the military, political and economic strategic 
imperatives of the United States, the only remaining superpower, are intrinsically 
important to the (disruption of andlor) maintenance and stability of the existing global 
order in an increasingly economically and politically interdependent international 
community. According to conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer, the world is 
witnessing for the first time in history of the Westphalian configuration, a "unipolar 
He declared in his 1991 Foreign Affairs article entitled "The Unipolar 
Moment" that "The most striking feature of the post-Cold War world is its unipolarity 
No doubt, multipolarity will come in time . . . But we are not there yet, nor will we be for 
decades. Now is the unipolar moment." For better or for worse, whether one agrees 
with Krauthamrner or not, the strategic interests of the United States and the execution of 
its foreign policy objectives, particularly the expansion of its market oriented economic 
development model, coupled with exporting democracy and at times accompanied by the 
deployment of its unparalleled military power designed to achieve its strategic objectives, 
have the potential to trigger wide-ranging reverberations throughout the globe and 
countries situated in geostrategically important regions of the world, particularly in the 
Global South. Charles Kegley, Jr. and Gregory Raymond in Exorcising the Ghost of 
Westphalia , Building World Order in the New Millennium provide this pointed analysis, 
"While Washington, infatuated with the Hobbesian assumption that global stability is 
55 Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar. Moment" Foreign Affairs, America and the World 
1990191. 
contingent upon hegemony, many regard its current privileged position of global 
preeminence as benign, others disagree."j6 The authors further elaborate the challenges 
and opportunities presented by American hegemony for the international community, 
when they declare "As the world's paramount power, the United States inspires awe as 
well as anxiety, respect as well as rebuke."j7 With such disparate military, technological 
and economic power, the implications and means by which, American interests are 
projected and executed can pose tremendous challenges (and opportunities) for its allies 
and enemies. 
The dismantling and subsequent collapse of communism in Eastern Europe 
fundamentally altered the national security strategy of the United States and left 
policymakers scrambling to formulate a new "grand strategy." Thus, the post-Cold War 
policy debates and strategies that dominated the discourse between foreign policy 
managers in Washington could no longer rely on the strategy of containment devised by 
George Kennan to counter communist expansionism since communism dissipated with 
the crumbling of the Berlin Wall. The threat, posed by the Soviet Union, had been 
diffused by its disintegration and the principal lens by which Cold War foreign policy 
was devised became outmoded overnight. Accordingly, the government of the United 
States was compelled to reevaluate its new found, unparalleled hegemonic position 
within the international community and reconstitute the trajectory of its national security 
prerogatives and implement policies that reflected both its political and economic 
aspirations for itself and the world. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and thus the 
56 Kegley and Raymond, 1 86. 
57~bid. 
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Cold War ideological paradigm by which the United States formulated its foreign policy 
and engaged the world forced foreign policy managers to decipher which prevailing 
challenges would invariably pose the greatest threats to the United States' global 
hegemony and the propagation of its transnational economic and political interests. In 
the interim, some argued that the "war on drugs" filled the vacuum that resulted from the 
demise of the international communist struggle championed by the Soviet Union. Ted 
Galen Carpenter, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato 
Institute and author of Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington S Futile War on Drugs in Latin 
America, insists that "A striking correlation existed between the demise of the Cold War 
and the military's willingness to participate in the drug war . . . To at least a limited 
extent, a heightened role in attacking Latin American drug trafficking could fill a void- 
with the drug lords replacing the Soviet evil empire as the "necessary enemy."58 While 
the Cold War was pronounced dead at Malta, the political crisis and violence that 
accompanied it in Colombia, was spiraling out of control. The demise of the drug cartels 
offered Colombians little solace and peace, as insurgents and counterinsurgents, as well 
as other smaller organized criminal gangs, usurped the narcotics business formerly 
managed by the Medellin and Cali cartels. Moreover, while the massive fumigation 
campaigns and crop substitution programs implemented in Bolivia and Peru sponsored by 
the United States in its supply side strategy significantly diminished the cultivation of 
coca, a balloon effect developed and Colombia absorbed the cultivation of the illicit crop. 
58 Ted Galen Capenter, Bad Neighbor Policy. Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin 
America (New York: Palgrave, 2003), 43-44 
Table 6 demonstrates the decrease in coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia and the 
concomitant increase of the crop in Colombia. 





Source: United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime and the State Department 
Less than two years into Pastrana's presidency, Colombia was on the brink of becoming a 
failed state, as illegally armed groups grew, terrorized the population and exercised state 
like military capacity. Plan Colombia, the multibillion dollar peace and economic 
development initiative originally conceived under the administration of Colombian 
President Andrds Pastrana and later modified in the United States to conform to its 
national security prerogatives (specifically, its counternarcotics strategy) has received 
considerable discussion by academics, activists and elected officials. The initial Plan 
conceived by the Colombians was an economic development strategy intended to address 
the myriad of socioeconomic inequalities that gave rise to the peasant self-defense groups 
(and legitimated their activities to some) and initiate a peace process that would serve to 
quell the violence in the conflict ridden country. Livingstone notes: 
The original plan unveiled by President Andrds Pastrana in 1999 has little 
in common with the existing Plan Colombia, drawn up with Washington's 
help over the following year. The US input was so extensive that the first 
draft of Plan Colombia was written in English not Spanish. Pastrana's 
original Plan Colombia published in May 1999 makes no mention of drug 
trafficking, military aid, military action or fumigation.59 
Plan Colombia (P.L. 106-246), as reformulated by the United States government, was 
primarily designed to substantially reduce the cultivation of coca and strengthen the 
police and armed forces while also promoting economic development, human rights and 
strengthening the weakened judiciary. More than five billion dollars have been allocated 
to the Colombian government since the Plan's origination. Table 7 and Figure 3 
demonstrate the increase in U.S. foreign aid to Colombia and the disparate funding for 
military and police aid as opposed to economic development and social aid. 
Table 7. U.S. Foreign Aid to Colombia (2002-2006) 
Andean Counterdrug Initiative 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Military and Police Assistance Programs 253 * 433.5 332.6 336.1 382.7 
Economic and Social Assistance 125.5 136.7 134.5 131.3 129.2 
Programs 
*All aid in the millions 
Source: Data were obtained from the Center for International Policy 
Figure 3. U. S. Aid to Colombia 
Source: Center for International Policy 
Before September 11, U.S. foreign policymakers had been reticent formally to 
permit American military and police aid to be employed in the Colombian intrastate 
conflict, understanding that intervention, aside from providing aid to battle the "war on 
drugs" could potentially further complicate and even aggravate the existing armed 
conflict being waged between the state, paramilitaries and guerillas. However, in 
practice, the Colombian government made no such distinction. Moreover, the principal 
objective in Colombia was not to ameliorate or resolve the Colombian domestic crisis but 
to stem the cultivation, production and transit of illicit crops entering U.S. markets and 
invariably to ensure that U.S. economic interests were not threatened as a consequence of 
the violence. Even before some policymakers in Washington began to refer to the war in 
Iraq as reminiscent of the "quagmire" that manifested itself in Vietnam; skeptics of the 
"war on drugs" in Colombia had consistently made this charge against continued and 
deepening U.S. involvement in the Andean country. After September 1 1, the 
conventional, Cold War like, approach to advancing U.S. political prerogatives in 
Colombia changed. One year after September 1 1, the Government of the United States 
formally permitted past, present and future foreign police and military aid to Colombia to 
be utilized not only to fight the Colombia counterdrug campaign but to address its 
domestic terrorist organizations, as well. Ingrid Vaicius and Adam Isacson retort "H.R. 
4775 changed U.S. law to allow the Colombian government to use all past and present 
counter-drug aid-all the helicopters, weapons, brigades and other initiatives of the past 
several years-against the insurgents."60 New foes or rather old foes, rearticulated anew 
as "terrorist" threats to U.S. national security within the post-911 1 framework like the 
FARC, "the oldest, largest and best equipped and financed guerilla organization in Latin 
~ m e r i c a , " ~ ~  have emerged as one of the principal (Western Hemispheric) nemeses within 
the American national security paradigm. 
60 Ingrid Vaicius and Adam Isacson, "The War on Drugs meet the War on Terror," Center for 
International Policy (February 2003): 13 
6 1 Congressional Research Service, "Colombia: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research 
Service, The Library of Congress, 19 January 2005, available from http://www .fas ,org/sgp/crs/rowl 
RL32250,pdf; Internet; accessed 22 March 2007 
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If the 1990s represented a decade of euphoria for the West with the collapse of the 
"evil empire" and the purported triumph of the liberal democratic capitalist state, the 
attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 1 1,2001 and the birth 
of the global war on terrorism (GWOT) campaign signaled a fundamental shift in the 
scope of American foreign policy. The unconventional attacks which killed thousands of 
people had the effect of sharpening the lens by which Washington perceived its strategic 
threats and enemies and engaged the world. The global anti-terror campaign commenced 
shortly thereafter. No longer were foreign policy makers probing for a post-Cold War 
paradigm to guide its relations with the rest of the world, the attacks perpetrated by Al- 
Qaeda, and the provocations by its leader Osama bin Laden, provided them with the 
perspective they needed. Subsequently, virtually, no region in the world has been unable 
to escape the trajectory of the campaign. From Somalia to Colombia, the GWOT is being 
waged with ferocity. The domestic crises that plague these two countries have become 
intimately interwoven within the new American security existential struggle against 
international terrorism perpetrated by Islamic non-state actors not states. While the U.S. 
ceased promulgating its strategic Cold War political interests in Africa after the end of 
the Cold War, the prosecution of the global war on terror has offered a pretext for 
increased American intervention and presence, particularly in the Horn of Africa were 
real and/or perceived Islamic activism has taken root. The proximity of Horn countries to 
the Middle East, strategic international waters and the intermittent violence that 
percolates in the region along with Islamic activism constitutes an area in which the U.S. 
is becoming increasingly concerned. In fact, in October 2007, U.S. Africa Command 
(AFRICOM) was established in order to address the U.S. national security objectives in 
this volatile and geostrategic region of the world. While, the world watches how the war 
in Iraq, "the central front in the war on terror," unfolds and engage in contentious 
quarrels about the implications for the greater Middle East and U.S. security, another war 
is being waged in the name of the GWOT and it is taking place much closer to home. 
Uribe, Democratic Security and the First Four Years (2002-2006) 
On August 2,2002, as president-elect Alvaro Uribe VClez assumed the reigns of 
the troubled republic, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, popularly known as 
FARC, sought to "welcome" the former Antioquian governor into the ritual of multipolar 
political violence that has been indicative of the Andean nation's intrastate security 
dilemma for the last half of the twentieth century. It was not the first time Uribe and his 
family had been subjected to violence perpetrated by the guerillas; FARC killed his father 
during an attempt to kidnap the elder Uribe. While, FARC mortar attacks failed to 
achieve their objective of assassinating the man who would become known as the "law 
and order president," the acts did manage, as has been indicative of the entrenched 
conflict, to end the lives of innocent Colombians who were caught in the crossfire 
between the state and groups operating on the margins of the law.62 Citing the failure of 
his predecessor, AndrCs ~ a s t r a n a ~ ~  to negotiate a peaceful accord with the FARC, Uribe 
fashioned a campaign that resonated with an electorate wearied by war. Julia E. Sweig 
62 Autthor Unknown, "Uribe Sworn in Amid High Security," BBC News, 7 August 2006, available 
from http://news bbc co.ukl2/hi/americas/525 1392 stm; Internet; accessed 12 December 2006). 
63 While Pastrana's peace process wity guerillas ultimately failed, he was able to negotiate a 
multibillion dollar aid package known as "Plan Colombia" which invariably provided military aid and 
training to Colombian security forces. 
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and Michael M. McCarthy argue that "~ lva ro  Uribe won a resounding first-round victory 
in 2002 with a hard-line platform based explicitly on a security doctrine contradictory to 
~as t rana ' s . "~~    is approach entailed taking the fight to guerillas not engaging in 
conciliatory discourse that had failed to elicit a negotiated peace while simultaneously 
permitting the FARC to strengthen its military capacity, as accomplished under the 
previous administration. The International Crisis Group has argued that "More than any 
of his predecessors, Alvaro Uribe has made combating the insurgents the overriding 
priority and defining objective of the Colombian government."65 
Immediately upon assuming the presidency, Uribe sought to do what his 
predecessors had failed to, consolidate territorial control and assume the state's 
prerogative as the legitimate purveyor of the monopoly of force. University of the Andes 
political scientist, Ann Mason, argues ". . . the country's endemic violence justifies a 
strategy that seeks to rectify the state's failure to meet the basic Weberian test of 
maintaining its monopoly on the legitimate use of force and providing security for its 
citizens." The Colombian national security doctrine known as the "Democratic Security 
and Defense Policy" developed under the aegis of Alvaro Uribe Vklez was designed to 
strengthen state institutions, consolidate territorial control, provide security to the 
64 Julia E,. Sweig and Michael M. McCarthy, "Colombia: Staving Off Partial Collapse" In The 
Andes in Focus: Security, Democracy and Economic Reform, eds. Russell Crandall, Guadalupe Paz and 
Riordan Roett (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005) 
66 International Crisis Group, "Colombia: President Uribe's Democratic Security Policy" Latin 
America Report No 6, (Bogota lBrussels, 2003). 
population, and extinguish threats posed by groups operating on the margins of the law.@ 
Uribe's unrelenting and unapologetic commitment to securing the state is clearly 
delineated in this statement: "Security is not the only concern of the Government, but it is 
the first."67 Article 2 13, Chapter VI of the Colombian Political Constitution of 1991 
provided the justification for the newly inaugurated executive to exercise his 
constitutional prerogative to initiate in "a state of internal commotion" due to the "grave 
disturbances of the public order."68 This declaration was invariably the first indication 
of what some would come to describe as Uribe's "authoritarian impulse." Uribe initiated 
rehabilitation and consolidation zones in the Montes de Maria area and in the department 
of Arauca, as a means to address intense contestation between illegally armed actors in 
strategic, resource rich and historically state neglected areas. These zones, while later 
ruled unconstitutional, empowered state security forces in the regions to "impose curfews 
and restrictions on citizen's movement (such as roadblocks and transit permits), 
accumulate personal information about residents, and detain anyone not carrying proper 
identifi~ation."~~ These geostrategic zones are coveted by all armed actors (legal and 
illegal), private and transnational interests including the United States. The Caiio Limon- 
Covefias pipeline originates in the department of Arauca and has been a principal target 
66 Embassy of Colombia, "The Uribe Administration's Democratic Security and Defense Policy," 
Government of' Colombia, available fiom http://www.colombiaemb. org/opencms/opencms/system/ 
galleries/downloadldefenselColombia~en~cias..doc; Internet; accessed 1 March 2005 
67 Democratic Security and Defense Policy, 2 1 
68 199 1 Political Constitution of the Republic of Colombia. Translation by author 
69 The Center for Internal Policy, "Colombia's Alvaro Uribe-The first 100 days" (1 8 November 
2002) 
by subversive groups, especially the ELN, in an effort to disrupt the oil production 
capacity and profit margin for the state and transnational corporations. The disruption of 
the energy grid that serves the pipeline has also been periodically bombed by insurgents, 
as well. 'O
Figure 4. Map of the Cafio Limon-Covefias Pipeline 
Source: http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0305/csmimg/0305p6b.jpg 
Securing Colombian energy resources (and alternative sources of energy like the plants 
that invariable produce much coveted biofuels) amid the turmoil in the Middle East has 
been a prominent national security priority for the United Making Colombia 
70 U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Efforts To Secure Colombia's Caiio Limon-Coveiias 
Oil Pipeline Have Reduced Attacks But Challenges Remain" United States Government Accountability 
Office, September 2005. 
71 William Aviles, Global Capitalism, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in Colombia 
(Albany: State University of New York, 2006), 132. 
more important, it is also the "fourth largest supplier of petroleum in the Western 
Hemisphere" for the United ~ t a t e s . ' ~  The oil producing region and the corridors of the 
country where the Cafio Lim6n-Coveiias Pipeline traverses provides one of the most 
important revenue sources for the Colombian government.73 According to the 
Congressional Research Service report, in 2001, the Caiio Limon-Coveiias pipeline "was 
bombed 170 times resulting in shutdowns for seven months at a cost of approximately 
$500 million in revenues and royalties to ~ o l o m b i a . " ~ ~  The following table shows the 
marked decrease in attacks on the Caiio Lim6n-Coveiias pipeline since Uribe assumed the 
presidency. 
Table 8. Attacks on Cafio Limon-Coveiias Pipeline (200 1-2004) 
Cafio Limon-Covefias 170 41 3 4 17 
U.S. based Occidental Petroleum, a principal stakeholder in the pipeline, has 
vigorously lobbied the U.S. to provide security related assistance to the 
Government of Colombia to secure their investments and U.S. energy security.75 A 
number of nonpetroleum U.S. based transnational corporations also have substantial 
'72~ulia E .  Sweig and Michael M.  McCarthy, "Colombia: Staving Off Partial Collapse" In The 
Andes in Focus: Security, Democracy and Economic Reform, eds.. Russell Crandall, Guadalupe Paz and 
Riordan Roett (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005): 29. 
73~bid. 
74 Congressional Research Service "Plan Colombia: A Progress Report," 1 1 January 2006. 
75~ i l l i am  AvilCs, 13 1 . 
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financial investments in Colombia and have spent hundreds of millions of dollars on 
lobbying members of Congress to pass legislation which ensures that the conditions for 
the proliferation of capital accumulation and investment are not threatened by illegally 
armed groups.'76 Therefore, not only does the U.S. funded counternarcotics program 
drive U.S.-Colombia bilateral relations but the provision of military and police aid 
(training, purchase of equipment, etc.) in order to secure existing strategic energy 
sources, future oil exploration initiative and critical infrastructure become tantamount 
strategic security prerogatives of the U.S. government. "The Bush administration has 
more overtly than previous U.S. administrations allowed the Colombian government to 
use U.S. military aid in the counterinsurgency struggle and even assisted Occidental 
Petroleum by designating $100 million to finance a special Colombian brigade to protect 
its central oil pipeline."77 The security measures undertaken by the Bush-Uribe in order 
to secure these strategic energy resources, creating the conditions for foreign direct 
investment and protecting transnational corporate interests have elicited considerable 
achievements as illustrated in the steady decline of guerilla instigated attacks on the 
pipeline and the energy grid and renewed interest in exploring other energy deposits. 
Since Uribe assumed the reins of power, the promulgation of the democratic 
security policies have elicited marked decreases in the levels of violence and its attendant 
human rights violations propagated by groups operating on the margins of the law (the 
76 Ibid.. For a detailed chart of these corporations and their. campaign contributions, See: William 
Aviles, Global Capitalism, Democracy and Civil-Military Relations in Colombia (New York: State 
University of'New York Press, 2006): 133 
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guerillas and the paramilitaries) while simultaneously strengthening the capacity of the 
security apparatus of the state and consolidating the national territory. Secretary of State 
under the Bush administration Condoleezza Rice affirms "Colombia's transformation in 
less than a decade from failing state to thriving democracy is one of the greatest victories 
for the cause of human rights in our world today."78 With the support of the United 
States, Uribe orchestrated a successful military campaign designed to capture FARC 
strongholds in the southern region of the country (Meta, Caqueta, Putumayo and 
Guaviare) under a strategy known as "Plan ~atriota."'~ Uribe's commitment to 
narrowing the "security gap" is evident in the policies that his administration has 
championed and executed. From the implementation to a state of siege, to employing 
civilians as actors within the conflict to authorizing repressive state tactics under the 
guise of security a la George Bush, to the expanding and strengthening of the security 
apparatus of the state, Uribe has sought to transform the security landscape in Colombia, 
consolidate state sovereignty and create the conditions for economic development and 
foreign investment. In an effort to generate supplementary defense revenue in order to 
strengthen the capacity of security forces, Uribe instituted a one-time tax on the 
wealthiest Colombians which generated $800 million dollars.80 Another wealth tax to be 
assessed from 2007-201 1 is estimated to produce more than three and half billion 
78~mbassy of Colombia, "Charting Colombia's Progress" 
80 International Crisis Group, "Colombia: President Uribe's Democratic Security Policy" 
ICG Latin America Report No. 6, 13 November 2003.. 
dollars." Furthermore, according to the government's own pronouncement "The Uribe 
Government has committed Colombia to increase defense expenditures from the current 
level of 3.6% of GDP to 6% of GDP by 2006."'~ As of 2006, all mayors were exercising 
their official duties in their respective capacities in the municipalities which they were 
elected, which is a remarkable achievement. In 2002, the year Uribe assumed the 
presidency, more than one hundred mayors were operating outside of their municipalities 
due to the incapacity of the state to ensure their security s3 from illegally armed groups. 
Voter registration and participation in municipal elections has also increased during the 
Uribe admini~tration.'~ This a remarkable indication of the capacity of the state to 
provide protection to municipal executives and the presence of state security forces in all 
1098 municipalities. Moreover, for the first time in the nation's history, the state has 
some level of security presence in all of its municipalities. 
Figure 5 illustrates the dramatic decrease in homicides, kidnappings and terrorist 
attacks as a consequence of territorial consolidation and an increase and strengthening of 
the security apparatus of the state. Moreover, the assassination of members of vulnerable 
groups, including journalists, mayors, indigenous persons and municipal council persons 
8 1 U.S State Department, "Background Note: Colombia" September 2007, accessed 21 January 
2008. 
82 Embassy of Colombia, "Defense and Security," available from http://www colombiaemb.org/ 
opencms/opencms/defense/; Internet; accessed 1 March 2006. 
83~tate  Department, "Charting Colombia's Progress" Available from http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/9376 1 ..pdf'. 
84 Peter DeShazo, Tanya Primiani and Phillip McLean, "Back kom the Brink: Evaluating Progress 
in Colombia, 1999-2007," A Report of'the Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (November 2007). 
fyjOQl 
vi(Oqna 
Momicida dam 40% 1- 
m%o a"""\ 
3 Kidrtappingil dawn 76% 
Figure 5. Dramatic Improvements in Security 
targeted by armed actors has markedly decreased since 2002, according to the Ministry of 
~ e f e n s e . ~ ~  
While, Colombia continues to be one of the most deadly countries for members of 
trade unions, there has been a marked decrease in the number of trade unionists 
assassinated by "terrorist groups." When Uribe came to power in 2002, government 
statistics showed that ninety-nine trade unionists were murdered however by 2006, that 
number had declined substantially to 25.86 Defense spending under Alvaro Uribe's 
85 Ministerio de Defensa, Republica de Colombia, "Logros de la Politica de Consolidacion de la 
Seguridad Democratica," Bogota, Enero 2008; It should be noted that while A~o-Colombian also 
constitute a vulnerable population, disproportionately displaced by the violence and purposefully targeted 
by substate actors for forced evacuation of territory, some of' which is communally owned and recognized 
by the state, are noticeably absent in the data collected by the Ministry of Defense 
86 Embassy of Colombia, "Charting Colombia's Progress ." 
administration has also increased dramatically however it should be noted that this 
increase was initiated under Pastrana's tenure. The Colombian defense budget increased 
from $2.6 billion in 2001 to $3.9 billion in 2005 and was slated to increase to $4.48 
billion in 2006.~" In addition, there has been a 93% increase in the number of guerilla 
fighters killed or captured between 2001 and 2004.~' The Ministry of Defense declares 
that more than 20,000 subversives (ELN, FARC, ERP and ERG) have been captured 
between August 2002 and January 2 0 0 7 . ~ ~  Over the course of four years, the security 
forces have increased nearly 100,000, from 300,000 (military forces and national police) 
in 2002 to nearly 400,000 by 2006.~' Economic and social infrastructure has markedly 
improved and permitted to greater economic development, tourism and population 
mobility. Shazo, Primiani and McLean in a Center for Strategic and International Studies 
report proclaim: 
As a result of Plan Colombia and Uribe's Democratic Security initiative, 
authorities extended greater control over Colombia's road system and 
economic infrastructure. Highway traffic between major cities increased 
by 64 percent between 2003 and 2006, while the number of thefts and 
piracy of transport vehicles nationwide declined by 54 percent during the 
same period.91 
87 U..S. State Department, "Background Note: Colombia," (September 2007); Internet; accessed 21 
January 2008). 
88~inisterio de Defense Nacional, Republica de Colombia "Logos de la Politica de Consolidacion 
de la Seguridad Democratica" 
90 Ministerio de Defense Nacional, Republica de Colombia 
9 1 U .S. State Department, "Background Note: Colombia," (September 2007); Internet; accessed 2 1 
January 2008 
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In light of these marked declines in homicides, kidnapping, and other human security 
indicators, greater population mobility, pronounced increases in defense spending, 
security personnel (military and police) and equipment, and the demobilization of the 
paramilitaries and slow dismantling of the FARC, the "teflon president" has become one 
of the most popular executives in Latin America. 
Uribe has stubbornly committed, both financially and rhetorically, to 
strengthening the "coercive machinery of the state" as the principal means of securing 
state security, the welfare of the population and achieving peace even amid growing 
discontent amongst civil society activists and nongovernmental organizations over the 
continued involvement of the security forces in violations of human rights and 
humanitarian law. Critics of the heightened militarism instigated under the Uribe 
administration argue that democratic security policy is unequivocally committed to 
security while only tacitly dedicated to strengthening democracy and protecting human 
rights. While, remarkable declines in a number of areas have manifested since the 
initiation of the democratic security policy, human rights organizations (national and 
international), civil society groups and some academics have argued that the initiative has 
worsened the humanitarian crisis in differential ways in Colombia. Noticeable increases 
in extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions and a contraction of 
civil liberties (including warrantless searches, illegal wiretapping of journalists and 
politicians, etc.) under Uribe's administration must similarly be taken in account in any 
effort to gauge the performance of his administration and the saliency of security policies. 
For the six years (1996-2002), previous to Uribe occupying Casa de NariAo, extrajudicial 
killings were estimated at 13 1 per year while during Uribe's first term, there were "an 
average of 227 extrajudicial executions per year.. .attributed to State agents."92 There is 
also intense pressure, by the state, to identify non-combatants as guerillas in areas of 
military operations in order to augmentlimprove data favorable to the mandate of the 
democratic security policies. The Colombian Commission of Jurists argue, in their 
analysis of the human rights situation during Uribe's first term, that the increase in 
violations of international humanitarian law ". . . is a direct consequence of the non- 
observance of the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians, derived from 
the government's assertion that a sector of the civilian population is part of the combatant 
groups that it confronts militarily."93 While, the state has increased the security forces, 
the military budget and military offensives against left wing insurgents, these efforts have 
also produced a concomitant increase in human rights violations perpetrated by the state. 
In fact, the greatest perpetrators of rights violations are no longer the paramilitaries, 
which have been demobilized but continue to pose an ominous threat and have begun to 
reconstitute themselves, but the state according to the Center for Research and Popular 
Education. (For graphs and maps illustrating the intensity of the violence, violations of 
international human rights law by all armed actors, etc., see Appendix B). According to 
the International Crisis Group (ICG), the administration's attempt to achieve its 
objectives through strengthening the military capacity of the state, delineated in its 
security policy, is complicated by its incorporation of the civilians into the fray. The ICG 
92 Ministerio de Defense Nacional, Republics de Colombia, "Logros de la Politica de 
Consolidacion de la Seguridad Democratica." 
93 . Ibld., 4 
argues that the informant program, peasant solider initiative and the issuance of executive 
orders threaten to undermine the "democratic" component of the "Democratic Security 
and Defense They declare "These policies create the potential for arbitrary 
action by the security forces that would diminish the credibility of the government's 
appeal for international support and regional cooperation and threaten to cloud the 
somewhat legitimacy of its action against the illegal armed groups."95 Furthermore, the 
explicit incorporation of civilians into the armed conflict insinuates that citizens are 
legitimate military targets for not all armed actors. Moreover, employing civilians in 
intelligence gathering operations and incorporating them as purveyors of security under 
such hostile realities violates international human rights law. Within the Colombian 
context, while all armed actors are responsible for compliance with international 
humanitarian law, the Uribe administration, through the promulgation of the democratic 
security policy, has created an environment which fosters the perception amongst all 
actors that civilians are reasonable and customary targets within the armed conflict. 
According to Geneva Protocol, Part IV (Civilian Population), Article 13 (Protection of 
the Civilian Population) states: 
1. The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general 
protection against the dangers arising from military operations. To give 
effect to this protection, the following rules shall be observed in all 
circumstances; 
2. The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not 
be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose 
94~nternational Crisis Group, "Colombia: Towards Peace and Justice?'Lutin America Report, 
no. 16 BogotdBrussels (14 March 2006). 
95 International Crisis Group, "Colombia: President Uribe's Democratic Security Policy." 
of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are 
prohibited; 
3. Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded this part, unless and for 
such time as they take a direct part in h~s t i l i t i e s .~~  
Moreover, Uribe and members of his administration's explicit antagonism and 
remarkable contempt towards human rights defenders (NGOs, academics and journalists) 
and the implication that they are instruments of guerilla propaganda fundamentally 
undermines their capacity to advocate for the dispossessed and makes them vulnerable to 
state or parastate retribution. 
In 2005, after considerable domestic and international debate, the government 
adopted a politically divisive demobilization statute, Ley de Justicia y Paz (Justice and 
Peace Law), which sought to facilitate the demobilization of the paramilitaries. Estimates 
indicate that approximately 30,000 fighters have officially demobilized under the statute. 
The law continues to remain a source of international and domestic discourse as 
opponents argue that the statute affords neither justice nor peace. The ICG declares: 
The many critics in and outside Colombia complain that it does not 
guarantee victims rights to reparations and truth and opens the door for 
demobilised paramilitaries who committed grave crimes to enjoy 
impunity, while throwing up obstacles to the destruction of their powerful 
criminal networks.97 
The intrastate security crisis in Colombia is exceedingly complex, the illegally armed 
actors demonstrate a remarkable ability to transform, anticipate and adapt to the security 
96~nternational Committee of the Red Cross, "Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of'Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
II), 8 June 1977. 
97 Ibid. 
prerogatives of the state, even as they demobilize. While the AUC has disintegrated as 
an umbrella organization for self-defense groups, smaller decentralized units have 
emerged which may become even more difficult, for the state, to manage than the initial 
cancer that bore them. According to Amnesty International ". . . there is strong evidence 
that paramilitary groups continue to operate and have been responsible for human rights 
violations including threats, killings, and enforced disappearances, sometimes committed 
with the acquiescence of or in collusion with the security forces.98 Furthermore, high 
levels of impunity continue to operate within the Colombian legal system and serves to 
further confound victim's rights for redress and reparation and impair the legitimacy of 
government institutions. Uribe has also demonstrated little tolerance for popular dissent, 
particularly against the execution of his neoliberal agenda, maintaining what Aviles 
describes as "low-intensity democracy."99 
Robert Rotberg in his analysis of weak, failing and failed states explains "Nation- 
states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver 
positive political goods to their inhabitants."loO Rotberg goes on to further explain that 
the extension of security to citizens of the state is the most important "political good" a 
state is obligated to provide. In fact, he argues that "There is a hierarchy of political 
98 Amnesty International, "Killings, arbitrary detentions, and death threats--the reality of trade 
unionism in Colombia," July 2007. 
99 Aviles, 139 
100 Robert I .  Rotberg, "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators" in 
State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of'Terror," ed. Robert I .  Rotberg (Washington D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2003): I .  
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goods. None is as critical as the supply of security, especially human security."101 By 
contrast weak, failing or failed states do not possess the capacity or will, institutional or 
otherwise, to serve the security interests of its constituents thereby destabilizing the 
regime and creating the environment for substate actors to evolve, proliferate and 
challenge the legitimacy and security of the state and its citizens. The Republic of 
Colombia, an embattled state, on the "brink of failure" has managed to reconstitute itself 
by engaging in a process, promulgated through the democratic security policy, of 
usurping its sovereignty and its monopoly on the use of force and creating the conditions 
for pronounced economic development. The U.S. has made considerable financial 
contributions to this process. The Democratic Security and Defense Policy, an initiative 
which some argue is heavy on security and light on the fundamental tenets of democracy 
particularly respect for civil liberties, has been the framework for the extension and 
strengthening of the state, the demobilization and destruction of the subversive groups 
and the provision of security to its citizens.lo2 The myriad of human and state security 
indicators demonstrating the residual efficacy of this largely militaristic policy are 
seemingly remarkable. However, Colombia is a country of extreme paradoxes and 
always has been. Touted as the oldest democracy in Latin America, the Colombian 
political system has also been referred to as an "exclusionary democracy," prior to the 
promulgation of the 1991 Constitution, while at the same time holding the unfortunate 
distinction of being a party to the longest intrastate conflict in the hemisphere. While, the 
101 Ibid., 3 
102 Michael Shifter and Vinay Singh, "State Building in Colombia: Getting Priorities Straight" 
Journal ojInternational Affairs 58  (2004). 
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legitimate monopolization of force originates from the state, security in Colombia has 
historically been commodified and parceled to those who could afford it or could provide 
it for themselves and largely sanctioned by the state. In light of this reality, illegally 
armed groups claiming to represent the legitimate interests of the people, through their 
capacity to protect people, property and territory have emerged and littered the landscape 
of the country, leaving virtually no geographical space untouched. 
Uribe, declares "If the State protects all its citizens equally and without 
discrimination, all Colombians will be able hl ly to enjoy their rights."lo3 However, the 
efficacy of the democratic security policies still requires unpacking, particularly as it 
relates to the human security of the Colombia's Afro-descendant population. While, 
human and state security indicators have improved markedly since Uribe assumed the 
presidency of the republic, human security data are not disaggregated by racelethicity 
except for the data on internal displacement. This lack of disaggregated data challenges 
our capacity to determine whether there is a differential impact of these security policies 
on the state of human security on raciallethic minorities. Moreover, numbers, in and of 
themselves fail to provide a holistic understanding of the changing nature of the security 
environment since Uribe assumed the presidency, particularly the disparate impact of the 
intrastate conflict on national minorities. Intrastate violence, as many have argued, tends 
to impact marginalized groups differently, for a number of reasons including prevailing 
social exclusion, historic patterns of discrimination, low levels of human development, 
inhabit areas where the state has largely failed to adequately and equitably distribute 




goods and services and are geographically located near natural resources abound and 
corridors of geostrategic significance to all armed actors (legal and illegal). Moreover, 
evidence suggests that while security has improved in some areas, the security forces 
have become the principal violators of human rights since Uribe assumed the presidency. 
This data, along with other disturbing indications, presents an inimical, paradoxical 
situation for Colombians. This study is interested in how the promulgation of these 
security policies and the subsequent strengthening of state security and consolidation of 
national territories have affected the human security of Afro-descendant Colombians. 
The following chapters unravel the state of human security for Afro-Colombians and 
ascertain whether strengthening of state security has concomitantly translated into greater 
human security of one of the most affected groups by the conflict. 
CHAPTER V 
CONTESTED HUMANITY: SITUATING THE AFRO-DESCENDANT WITHIN 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE POST-COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN 
NATION-STATE 
Any discourse on the prevailing socioeconomic exclusion and political 
marginality of the vast majority of Afro-descendants in the northern South American 
country of Colombia, requires a broader historical analysis of the myriad of racialized 
and discriminatory practices, customs and policies traversing the landscape of colonial 
and post-colonial Ibero-America. These practices initiated with the capture, 
commodification of human bodies, forced transit and subsequent enslavement of Africans 
in the "New World" established the foundation for the contemporary "accumulated 
disadvantages" of Afro-descendants. The concomitant income inequality and grinding 
poverty, deplorable health, educational and housing indicators that have characterized the 
plight of African descendant peoples in the post-colonial states of the Americas is 
reflective of that reality. Herbert S. Klein in African Slavery in Latin America and the 
Caribbean estimates that between ten and fifteen million Africans survived the 
transatlantic trade in African bodies and were subsequently enslaved in the ~mericas. '  
1 Herbert S Klein, African Slavery in Latin America and the Caribbean. (Oxford: University Press, 
1988).. 
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Millions of Africans perished during transit. Portuguese Brazil was the 
principal beneficiary of enslaved African bodies. Today, this massive forced transfer is 
reflected in a African descendant population that rivals any African nation outside of 
Nigeria. Pedro Perez Sarduy and Jean Stubbs conclude that, "Essential to a 
contemporary understanding of the Afro-Latin American reality is the legacy of almost 
400 years of plantation slavery and what is today recognized to have been the largest 
forced migration in modern history."2 The capture, confinement, transfer and 
enslavement of millions of humans from the African continent to the Americas, in 
addition to the ethnocide perpetrated against the indigenous population, constitutes one of 
the most horrible periods in the history of humanity. PCrez and Stubbs opine "The vast 
and tortured movement of African peoples across the Atlantic was a major turning point 
in world history, facilitating the beginnings of the modern world capitalist economy and 
the emergence of empires spanning  ocean^."^ Emancipation hardly meant liberation and 
full integration into the nation-building projects for the descendants of enslaved Africans 
in the Americas nor did it lead to the alleviation of their poor material conditions and 
marginalization based on these historic racialized inequalities. The legacy of 
enslavement, white domination, and the concomitant subordination, physical exploitation 
and repression of subaltern groups such as indigenous and African descendant peoples 
has become entrenched within the social, cultural, political and economic landscapes of 
2 Pedro PCrez Sarduy and Jean Stubbs, "Introduction" in No Longer Invzsible Afro-Latm 
Amerzcans Today (London: Minority Rights Publications, 1995): 4 
the contemporary states of the Americas. Afro-Colombian scholar-activist and 
founder of Afro-Colombian human rights organization Cimarron, Juan de Dios Mosquera 
reveals: 
Ethno-cultural discrimination and ethnocentrism, economic exploitation 
and social inequality in all areas of social life have characterized the 
relations between the dominant white communities through to their ruling 
classes and dominated ethnic minorities. Race and class combine as two 
elements of the same social contradiction that is impossible to separate in 
the analysis of the social and ethnic problems of the Latin American 
population, because they are a special product of the development of 
capitalism.4 
While, enslavement was by no historical measure a unique or geographically distinct 
phenomenon, Robert Conrad notes, ". . . the form of slavery depicted here [in the 
Americas], based as it was on tropical agriculture and explicit racial distinctions, was 
something quite different from ancient slavery."5 Characterized as antithetical to 
progress and modernity, stereotyped as lazy, backward and hedonistic, African 
descendants were seen as a problem or scourge that needed to be remedied, eliminated, 
marginalized, suppressed andlor physically assimilated within the cultural tapestry of the 
republics of Central and South America. Laureano Gomez, president of Colombia in the 
early 1950s declared "The black is a plague. In countries where he has disappeared, as in 
Argentina, Chile and Paraguay, it has been possible to establish an economic and political 
4 Juan de Dios Mosquera Mosquera, Las comunzdades negras de Colombza pasado, presente y 
futuro (Pereira, Colombia: Movimiento Nacional por los Derechos Humanos de las Comunidades Negas 
de Colombia, 1985): 17. 
5~obe r t  Conrad, Chlldren of God's Fire A Documentary History of Black Slavery m Brazzl 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983): xv 
organization on a strong and stable ba~ i s . "~  This statement is indicative of the larger 
elite consensus on what has been considered the regressive and corrosive effect of the 
African descendant within the construction of the national self-imagination in Latin 
America. However, it is important to note in the formation and political configuration of 
the post-colonial nation-states, the political class sought to simultaneously manage the 
size of their African population while presenting themselves as transcending and 
transforming their African (and indigenous) populations into contemporary 
manifestations of a multiracial democracies devoid of raciallethnic cleavages, that 
characterized the United ~ t a t e s . ~  Evoking a nationalist discourse, Latin American elites 
exalted the synthesis of European and indigenous (and to a lesser degree African) peoples 
in the construction of the republican nation-state. Simultaneously, elites promoted a 
discursive framework privileging mestizaje or racial mixture and blanqueamiento, or 
progressive whitening, of the darker races. Thus, modernity and progress were 
determined by a sort of raciallethnic calculation, the whiter the region, nation or 
geographical space within the nation, the more enlightened, and developed and advanced 
the population and the state. Applebaum et al. explain: 
Regional differences, Latin American scholarship has shown, were 
racialized. Those regions that have been marked off as black and Indian 
(such as northeastern Brazil, highland Peru, or southern Mexico) have 
been labeled backward in relation to more modem, whiter regions (such as 
southern Brazil, coastal Peru or northern Mexico. Regions identified as 
6 As cited in Nina S.  de Friedmann and Jaime Arocha, "Colombia" in No Longer Invisible: Afio- 
Latin Americans today, eds. Minority Rights Group, (London: Minority Rights Group, 199.5): 47 
7 The size, spatial distribution and percentage of'the Afiican descendant populations in the Central 
and South America varies considerably from country to country. 
black or Indian, such as the Caribbean coast of Central America, have not 
been considered fully part of the nation.' 
African humanity was constantly contested in custom and practice and challenged 
conceptually by Creole elites while the Church provided the moral authority and 
justification for Europeans to legitimate the pilfering of the African continent for not only 
its natural but human resources, as well. Peter Wade notes that: 
Africa was infidel territory and the Portuguese had papal authority to wage 
a 'just war' there; slavery was legitimated as a positive good for infidel 
Afi-icans; and much of the enslaving was done by Africans themselves, 
thus masking the question of its legitimacy. Once the slave trade was well 
under way and the mines and plantations of the colonies so dependent on 
it, there was little incentive to question such a central instit~tion.~ 
The "boundaries of blackness" (and invariably "whiteness") codified by states, 
such as the United States and apartheid South Africa, legitimated by white supremacist 
doctrines within the public sphere and tacitly while unambiguously condoning it in the 
private, explicitly distinguished who was black and concomitantly who was not. State 
and non-state sponsored violence and terror as a mechanism of population control of the 
subaltern masses was employed to enforce these race based measures premised on white 
hegemony. While, a strict racial classification and explicit oppressive state sanctioned 
political terror campaign based on this premise was codified and articulated in these two 
countries, the post-colonial Latin American republics requires a differential analysis. 
Anthony Marx provides one of the most skillful expressions of these circumstances in his 
' ~ a n c ~  P Applebaum, Anne S Macpherson and Karin Alejandra Rosernblatt, Race andNation in 
Modern Latin Amerzca (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003): 10 
9 Peter Wade, Race and Ethnicity in Latin America (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 1997): 27. 
analysis of race in the nation-building process in South Africa, the United States and 
Brazil. He argues: 
State actions were highly consequential in shaping the template of modem 
race relations. Where and when states enacted formal rules of domination 
according to racial distinctions, racism was reinforced, whites were 
unified as whites, challenges from those subordinated eventually emerged, 
and major racial conflict ensued. Where racial domination was not 
encoded by the state, issues and conflicts over race were diluted. These 
dynamics were central to the very different experiences of South Africa, 
the United States, and Brazil during the century.'' 
However, racial domination and the subsequent hierarchy that prevailed privileging 
white(r) skin (and European phenotypic physical attributes) in Central and South 
America was no less efficacious in subordinating darker skinned people even absent 
explicit codification of raciallethnic oppression as in the case of the U.S. and South 
Africa. Richard Graham explains "Latin Americans faced a difficult intellectual dilemma 
regarding race. On the one hand, racial heterogeneity characterized most of their 
societies. On the other, many Latin Americans aspired to an ever closer connection to 
Europe and sought to follow its leadership in every realm."ll Racial ideologies of 
biological determinism explicitly characterized African descendant people as inherently 
inferior proliferated and became institutionalized features of private and public discourse 
providing fodder and justification for practices which marginalized these subaltern 
10 Anthony Marx, Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of'the United States, South Aeica, and 
Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998): 267 
1 1  Richard Graham, ed., The Idea oJRace in Latin America, 1870-1940 (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1990): 2 .  
populations.12 Visualizing the post-colonial republics in the image of Europe 
necessarily meant, for the Creole republicans, devising policies which reflected their 
commitment towards limiting the full inclusion and integration of Afro-descendants 
within the national ethos. Applebaum et al., however, explicitly note that while Latin 
American elites, in part, imported their "racialist" discourse from their European elite 
counterparts, reconceptualized these policies to suit their "local racial ideo~o~ies ." '~  
Wade similarly opines "the racial determinism of European theories was often avoided 
and emphasis placed instead on the possibility of improving the population through 
programmes of 'social hygiene."'14 At the same time, Latin American elites have sought 
to distinguish themselves from the explicit white supremacist thinking and policies and 
practices exemplified within the United States and South Africa. While, it is widely 
acknowledged that the overtly racially discriminatory legal barriers erected in South 
Africa and the United States that strictly delineated racial boundaries in the public and 
private spheres are not identical to those articulated in the former within the construction 
of nations of post-colonial Spanish and Portuguese America, the techniques and 
strategies employed to erase the "stain of blackness" or at the very least, minimize the 
influence and visible presence of the African in the modernization project of the country, 
were no less efficacious than the legal initiatives undertaken in South Africa and the 
12 Peter Wade, Race and Ethnzcity in Latin America (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 1997) 
I 3~ancy  P Applebaum et a1 , 13 
14 Wade, Race and Ethnicity m Latin Amerzca, 3 1 
United states.'' African descendants in Latin America continue to toil at the bottom 
of the socioeconomic hierarchy. Surely, living in the region with one of the greatest 
disparities in wealth and land distribution, serves to constrict political opportunities while 
maintaining the precarious material conditions of the darker skinned populations of the 
Americas. 
The systematic dehumanization and enslavement of the African body in the 
American colonies provided the labor necessary to spurn the growth of the satellite 
colonial political economies of the Americas while enriching the colonial metropolises in 
Europe. The doctrine of white superiority and concomitant black inferiority in Latin 
America continues to manifest itself in the socioeconomic inequality and racialized 
hierarchies (privileging whiteness) of the contemporary post-colonial republics.16 
Nonetheless, Afro-descendants toiling under such adverse conditions have consistently 
engaged in various forms of protest, resistance and struggles for self-preservation and 
self-determination throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods against racial 
oppression. These self-determinative processes and strategies which include, but are by 
no means limited to, violent confrontation, flight, liberation and reconstruction of 
independent and (semi-) autonomous African republics within colonial states; were 
accompanied by varying degrees of estrangement, accommodation and assimilation in the 
15 For a discussion concerning comparative examinations on race and ethnicity in the United 
States, South Africa and Latin America, See: Anthony Marx, Making race and nation a comparison oJ 
South Africa, the United States and Brazil. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998; 
and Beyond Racism race and znequality in Brazil, South Afrzca and the United States, eds Hamilton et a1 , 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Publishers, 2001 
16 George Reid Andrews, Afro-Latin America, 1800-2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2004). 
republican era. Juan de Dios Mosquera notes the myriad of alternative means of 
resistance undertaken by enslaved Africans "were suicide, abortion, poisoning of slave 
masters, the destruction of work instruments, setting fire to plantations, slowness in the 
rhythm of work, killing superintendents and foremen, individuals escapes and on a 
cultural level religious syncretism.' Perhaps, the greatest manifestations of black 
protest against colonial rule, enslavement and the oppressive nature of colonial society 
was the flight and construction of "free republics" independent of the repressive 
apparatus of the colonial states. Palenque de San Basilio situated on the Caribbean coast 
of Colombia, formed by cimarrones or escaped slaves, as a sanctuary for self- 
emancipated Africans, continues to be recognized as one of the most prominent examples 
of black resistance, self-determination and autonomy of enslaved Africans during and 
after the colonial period in Colombia. While, "blackness" has historically been 
considered the antithesis of progress and modernity in Latin America, raciallethnic 
solidarity against oppressive regimes and practices have become a principal organizing 
referent for Afro-descendant population in countries like Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, 
Venezuela, and Nicaragua in the latter decades of the 20& century. 
In the initial decade of the 21St century, the countries of Central and South 
American continue to bear the legacies of slavery and racial discrimination perpetrated, 
in overt and clandestine ways, against raciallethnic minorities as evidenced by the 
abysmal socioeconomic indicators and disparate lack of political representation of these 
raciallethnic minorities at all levels of the political establishment. From inter- 
17 Mosquesa, 1 10- 1 1 1. 
governmental organization such as the United Nations to civil society groups, to 
academics and activists, racial inequality in Latin America has been a well documented 
phenomenon.18 In Latin American countries, where the gap between the rich and the 
poor is profound, the plight of Afi-ican descendants is made even worse. The revelation 
of such extreme inequalities premised upon race and ethnicity creates profound 
challenges for liberal democratic states that promote racial egalitarianism and democracy 
yet fail to realize the basic tenets of their political values. Nevertheless, the weight of 
substantial body of evidence, political elites in Latin Americans have reveled in the 
illusion that unlike the United States where the white supremacist system of oppression 
was until recently enshrined in law as well as in custom the absence of formalized racial 
discriminatory structures in Latin America and the fuzziness of racial boundaries south of 
the Rio Grande demonstrated the triumph of the racial amalgamation and tolerance which 
they championed. Perhaps, the most noted example of this elite self-congratulation is 
Brazilian Gilberto Freyre's assertion that miscegenation has produced an extraordinary 
co-mingling of European, indigenous and African peoples leading to the development of 
a society strengthened by the amalgamation of the races not burdened by it. Moreover, 
the social hierarchies and maldistribution of political goods were not reflective of a 
 or a comprehensive historical study of. race, class and the construction post-colonial republics 
in Latin America, from the 1 9 ' ~  century to the contemporary period, See George Reid Andrews, Afro-Latin 
America, 1800-2000. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); For other comprehensive edited volumes 
on Afro-Latinos, See: Minority Rights Group, ed., No Longer Invisible. Afro-Latin America Today 
(London: Minority Rights Publications, 1995), Norman E. Whitten, Jr. and Arlene Torres, eds., Blackness 
in Latin America and the Caribbean (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998) and 
Nancy P .  Appelbaum, Anne S,. Macpherson and Karin Alejandra Rosemblatt, eds.., Race and Nation in 
Modem Latin America (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press), 2003 
racialized system that privileged mestizos over negros, but the consequence of class 
inequalities absolute and independent of race. Freyre declares: 
Brazil stands today as a community from whose experiment in 
miscegenation other communities may profit. Probably in no other 
complex modem community are problems of race relations being solved 
in a more democratic or Christian way than in Portuguese America. And 
Brazil's experiment does not indicate that miscegenation leads to 
degeneration. l9 
Providing the intellectual fodder for political elites in the middle of the 2oth century, 
racial democracy continues to insidiously pervade social, political and intellectual spaces 
throughout the Americas. Today, however, Gilberto Freyre's mythologizing of race 
relations in Brazil has now become the object of critique and rebuke.20 However, the 
idea of racial democracy provided the theoretical adhesive to cement the theory of 
multiracial harmony and the absence of overt racism and state sponsored violence that 
characterized the landscape of their North American neighbors. Anthropologist Jog0 
Costa Vargas goes further still and affirms: 
Still reverberating today, the myth thus constituted an impressive 
ideological tool that was extremely useful to Brazilian elites: by 
emphasizing harmony and racelessness, inequalities that were, at base, 
derived not only from class, but also from race and gender, among others, 
were silenced and replaced with a sense of national pride and moral 
superiority. Pride and superiority resulted from the comparison between 
Brazil's "racial paradise" and the racism of Germany and the 
United 
19 As cited in Peter Wade, Blackness and Race Mzxture The Dynamics ojRacial Identzty zn 
Colombza (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993): 34 
20 Jo%o H Costa Vargas, "Hyperconsciousness of'Race and Its Negation: The Dialectic of' White 
Supremacy in Brazil" Identities Global Studies in Culture and Power, 11 (2004): 443-470. 
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While, this mythologizing about racial egalitarianism in many Latin American 
countries, particularly Brazil, Venezuela and Colombia has been discredited, the idea 
resonated with political elites (and to a degree, still does), particularly those committed to 
defusing black political consciousness and capacity to organize collectively, as a group 
based on shared experiences of discrimination, origin and heritage. Further consolidating 
elite disillusion concerning racial inequality and its manifestations in all areas of public 
and private regard and treatment of their darker citizens, was their claim that these 
profound disparities in the material conditions of its Afro-descendant populations were 
seen as reflective of class disparity rather than produced by a racial hierarchy that 
privileged whiteness. Whitten and Torres explain, "Almost everywhere, serious research 
turns up a pyramidal class structure, cut variously by ethnic lines, but with a local, 
regional, and nation-state elite characterized as 'white.' And white rules over color 
within the same class."22 While, academics have repeatedly demonstrated over the last 
three decades that the evidence contradicts the mythic construction of the racial 
democratic state, political elites in Latin America have managed, to promote mestizaje 
and blaquimiento, while also claiming to triumph over the racist practices and cleavages 
that characterized the society of their North American neighbor. Ariel Dulitzky offers 
this analysis of Latin American elite's perceptions on their differential racialist thinking, 
when he affirms: 
A kind of presumption of moral superiority vis-a-vis the United States of 
America is quite widespread throughout our region [Latin America]. 
Rarely does a conversation on this issue among Latin Americans take 
22 Whitten and Torres, 23 
place without mentioning the serious incidence of racism and racial 
discrimination that exists in the land of our neighbors to the north, a claim 
that is altogether true.. . Nothing epitomizes Latin Americans' view on this 
issue as well as the declaration of the presidents and heads of state of 
South America that was issued in 2000 at a meeting in Brasilia. This 
statement reads: The Presidents [of South America] view with concern the 
resurgence of racism and of discriminatory manifestations and expressions 
in other parts oj'the world and state their commitment to preserve South 
America from the propagation of said phenomenon.23 
Constituting nearly one-third of the more than five hundred million persons of Central 
and South ~ m e r i c a , ~ ~  Afro-descendants with few exceptions occupy the lowest rungs of 
an intersectional race, gender and class based hierarchy and concomitantly possess the 
lowest indices of human development indicators in the areas of literacy rate, health, 
education, infant and mother mortality, life expectancy and access to essential services 
like potable water. From near numerical majority Afro-descendant populations in Brazil, 
to sparsely populated Afro-descendant populations in countries like Uruguay, Paraguay, 
Argentina and Chile, Afro-descendants are an integral part of the Latin American 
ethnicIracia1 composition. Ollie A. Johnson I11 explains that the transformation of 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America into democratic states has elicited an 
unprecedented political opening and opportunity for subaltern groups like Afro-Latinos to 
23 Ariel Dulitzky, "A Region in Denial: Racial Discrimination and Racism in Latln" 
America" n Neither Enemies nor Friends. Latinos, Blacks, Afro-Latinos, eds. Anani 
Dzidzienyo and Susan Obeler (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004): 39. 
24 Juliet Hooker "Indigenous Inclusion/Black Exclusion: Race, Ethnicity and Multicultural 
Citizenship in Latin America" Journal ofLatin American Studies, no.. 37 (2005): 3. 
constructively engage the state and demand concessions from it.25 Burgeoning 
collective raciallethic consciousness, mobilization and coordinated domestic and 
international advocacy campaigns amongst African descendant populations in countries 
like Brazil and Colombia have produced a number of constitutional and statutory 
guarantees from their respective governments over the last twenty years. From the 
installing of cabinet level functionaries and administrative departments concerned with 
Afro-descendant issues, to the institutionalization of affirmative action initiatives, to state 
parceling of collective land titles to black communities, considerable changes are taking 
place in Latin America spurned by activism from below and in partnership with NGOs, 
IGOs and other allied actors abroad.26 Specifically, there has been a general trend 
toward developing sustainable transnational relationships and alliances between 
historically marginalized groups, such as African descendants and indigenous peoples, in 
North and South America. (The development of these transnational racelethicity based 
mobilizing efforts is not an unprecedented phenomenon.) An indication of these 
increased hemispheric alliances between Afro-descendants and Afro-descendant elected 
officials are the historic meetings of Afro-Latino Legislators of the Americas in 2003 in 
Brazil and in 2004 in Colombia, the formation of an Afro-descendant Congressional 
25 Ollie A.  Johnson 111, "Black Politics in Latin America: An Analysis of National and 
Transnational Politics" in African American Perspectives on Political Science, edited by Wilbur C.  Rich 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007) 
caucus in the Colombia in 2006,~' and U.S. Congressional legislation introduced 
concerning a myriad of issues affecting the descendants of enslaved Africans throughout 
the Americas. There has been particular interest, from members of the Congressional 
Black Caucus and the Democratic Party, in developing and passing legislation concerning 
the plight of Afro-Colombians confronting not only the violence perpetrated against their 
communities by all armed actors but the deterioration of their socioeconomic conditions 
as a consequence of national and transnational development projects undertaken in their 
collectively held territories with little consideration or consultation from them.28 From 
Nicaragua, to Colombia, to Brazil, Afro-descendants have increasingly gained access to 
political institutions as witnessed by the growing number of Afro-descendant elected and 
appointed officials in Central and South America. In addition, the governments of Brazil, 
Nicaragua and Colombia have also granted territorial rights to specific sub groups within 
their respective Afro-descendant populations. Undoubtedly, the Colombian Constitution 
of 1991 and subsequent decrees concerning black communities, provide some of the most 
27 This body consisting of2  senators and 7 representatives was developed in partnership with the 
International Republican Institute (IRI) in order to advance the social, economic and political prerogatives 
of African descendant populations in Colombia 
28 H..Res. 426 "Recognizing 2007 as the Year of the Rights of Internally Displaced Persons in 
Colombia, and offering supp0r.t for efforts to ensure that the internally displaced people of Colombia 
receive the assistance and protection they need to rebuild their lives successfully" was sponsored by ardent 
critic of U.S. foreign policy in Colombia, Congressman Jim McGovern and 42 other members and was 
passed in July 2007. While, the bill did not explicitly focus on Afro-Colombians, it did recognize the 
disparate impact of'the conflict on their. communities. On August 7, 2007, H.R. 6 18: Recognizing the 
importance of addressing the plight of Afro-Colombians" sponsored by U.S Representative Donald Pawe 
(D-NJ) was introduced.. Prior to both of these resolutions, Representative Charles Range1 (D-NY) (and 53 
other co-sponsors) introduced H.Con.Res 47 "Acknowledging African descendants of'the transatlantic 
slave trade in all of'the Americas with an emphasis on those descendants in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, recognizing the injustices suffered by these African descendants, and recommending that the 
United States and the international community work to improve the situation of' Afro-descendant 
communities in Latin America and the Caribbean." 
progressive protections and promotion of individual and collective rights afforded to 
Afro-descendant peoples in the Americas. Mark Q. Sawyer notes the evolving saliency 
of a racialized discourse as an essential vehicle for mobilization within Afro-Latin 
American social movements for a 2 1 century audience. Sawyer reconceptualizes 
DuBois' indelible proclamation in The Souls oJBlack Folk when he proffers "'The 
problem of the twentieth century will be the problem of the color line,' applies to Latin 
America in the twenty-first century."29 The purpose of the following chapter is to situate 
Afro-Colombians within the nexus of the violence that has ravaged the nation for decades 
while undertaking an examination of the human security implications of the security 
policies implemented under the administration of ~ l v a r o  Uribe. 
29 Mark Sawyer, "Race to the Future: Racial Politics in Latin America 2015 " Perspectives on 
Politics. 3 ,  no. 3 (September 05): ,561 .. 
CHAPTER VI 
NEGOTIATING THE SECURITY PARADOX, PART 11: 
HUMAN SECURITY AND AFRO-COLOMBIANS 
In this chapter, three principal tasks are carried out. First, there is a brief 
historical analysis of the socioeconomic and political circumstances that situate Afro- 
descendant Colombians at the bottom of a hierarchy that privileges whiteness and 
concomitant manifestations of privilege associated with it, with special attention reserved 
for the contemporary period. Secondly, this chapter considers Afro-Colombians as 
victims, survivors and agents of change, within the context of the endemic intrastate 
conflict that has engulfed Colombia for more than four decades. Finally, the chapter 
offers a brief analysis of the secondary literature on the state of human security of Afro- 
Colombians since the adoption of Uribe's democratic security policies. The security 
doctrine initiated under the Uribe administration is chiefly concerned with neutralizing 
groups operating on the margins of the law, the monopolization of the use of force, and 
expanding and strengthening the security apparatus of the state. There are a number of 
aspects of this explicitly militaristic security initiative which has been a cause of great 
consternation amongst civil society and inter and non-governmental organizations. The 
most explicit examples are the informant program, the peasant soldier's initiative and the 
disparate state orientation towards consolidating the militarization of the state as opposed 
to strengthening the democratic process and reconciling the conflict through political 
methods. The state has sought to "democratize" security by tasking civilians with the 
responsibility of ensuring their own physical security and that of the communities where 
they live. In a society where multiple (legal and illegal) armed actors operate and 
forcibly compel non-combatants to comply with their political objectives and economic 
prerogatives, intimidate and murder political opponents, forcibly evacuate strategic 
zones, incorporating citizens as legitimate actorsltargets in the conflict has profound 
human rights implications and violates the basic tenets of international humanitarian law, 
specifically the Geneva Conventions and its additional protocols. The author's intention 
in this chapter is to provide an inclusive examination of the security crisis confronted by 
black communities on the peripheral regions of the country (with heavy concentrations of 
Afro-descendants), the Pacific basin and on the Caribbean littoral. Scholars have penned 
a number of studies concerning the infiltration of the conflict in black communities in the 
Pacific, the conflict between the state's neoliberal economic development projects and 
statutory and constitutional guarantees afforded to 'black communities' particularly 
collective land titling, paramilitary and state collusion, and the devastation wrought 
against black communities by all armed actors. However, this study attempts to broaden 
the scope by initiating an exploratory yet complementary assessment of the situation of 
Afro-descendents inhabiting the Caribbean. This chapter serves as the foundation for the 
study's primary research undertaken and discussed in Chapter VII. 
The Plight of Afro-Descendants within the Social, Economic, and 
Political Landscape of Colombia 
Situating the violence perpetrated against Afro-descendant communities in 
Colombia must necessarily be grounded in a fundamental appreciation for its varied and 
difficult physical landscape wherein race, region and subsequently resources oftentimes 
correspond.' Wade explains "Different regions thus emerged with varying proportions 
of each racial group. In general terms, the Andean highlands held the majority of whites 
and Indians, the Amazon plains and jungles were dominated by Indians, and the coasts 
had a strong black element with not inconsiderable numbers of ~ndians."~ Subsequently, 
in Colombia, as in many other Latin American countries, Afro-descendants have 
historically been located in particular geographical spaces that largely conform to the 
economic necessities and access to strategic routes and ports of the colonial state which 
their ancestors were enslaved. The Afro-descendant population in Colombia constitutes 
between 10-26% (depending upon which source is consulted) of a nation of 
approximately forty-three million. As in any effort to enumerate Afro-descendants in 
Central and South America, considerable methodological difficulties arise in attempting 
to determine the size of black populations within Central and South American countries 
due to various institutional factors such as states' historical unwillingness to include a 
raciallethnic question in their respective censuses, different methodological approaches to 
enumerating the populations, the existence of a range of intermediate raciallcolor 
1 Peter Wade, Blackness and Race Mixture The Dynamzcs of Racial Identity in Colombza See also 
Aviva Chomsky, "The Logic of Displacement: Afro-Colombians and the War in Colombia" in Beyond 
Slavery The Multzlayered Legacy ojAfrzcans m Latin America and the Caribbean, ed. Darien Davis 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.), 2007 and Nancy Applebaum, Muddled Waters Race, 
Region and Local History m Colombia, 1846-1948 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003) 
categories, and the lack of self-identification amongst Afro-descendant populations as 
such. Afro-Colombians represent the third largest Afro-American population in the 
Western Hemisphere after the Brazil and the United States and consequently the largest 
Spanish speaking Afro-Latino population in the Americas. While, Colombia is largely 
understudied country in Latin America, Afro-Colombians, too, have largely been 
marginal relative to studies, in a number of disciplines, conducted on Afro-descendants in 
Brazil. Colombia's varied geographical landscape also enables one to garner a greater 
understanding of the diverse realities of the nation's Afro-descendant population, their 
numerical presence and presence of other ethniclracial groups, distinctive patterns of 
cultural production consistent with their historical and geographic sense of place, regional 
economies, raciallethnic identity formation processes, cultural practices and social 
mobilization, psychological and historical impact of mestizaje and more recently, the 
impact of the armed conflict on their communities. Furthermore, blackness in Colombia, 
as in other parts of Ibero-America, is an exceedingly complex racial algorithm that must 
consider these dynamic and competing factors in any effort to assess the saliency of a 
pronounced blacldAfrican consciousness movement or mobilization. Wade examines the 
convergence of race and region, when he affirms, "Colombia is a highly regionalized 
country, and for historical reasons race also has a regional dimension . . . More pertinent, 
in some contexts, such as that of the Pacific coast, social relations that involve racial 
identities operate through regional structures, an in this sense race relations are regional 
 relation^."^ Thus, distinct Afro-descendant populations have emerged: the Raizales of 
San Andres and Providencia, the de San Basilio, those rural Afro-descendant populations 
3 Peter Wade, Blackness and Race Mixture The Dynamzcs oJRacial Identity In Colombia, 54-55 
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identified in Law 70 as "black communities" occupying rural areas of the Pacific basin 
who have been afforded collective property titles, and a broader category of Afro- 
Colombians who fall outside the scope of the aforementioned sub-populations who 
inhabit urban spaces where greater racial intermixture has taken place or are independent 
peasants. Consequently, palenqueros and Chocdanos unequivocally identify as black 
communities with explicit African origins that are reflected, today, in their distinct 
cultural manifestations and organizational patterns; however Afro-descendants in 
Cartagena, for example, have a much more "ambiguous" relationship with blackness. 
Wade explains "Costeiios themselves while alive to the presence of blackness in their 
region, or in some cases identifying themselves as negros, do not see la Costa, a black 
region in the same way as they do the Pacific zone, home of 10s verdaderos negros, the 
real  black^."^ Therefore, any analysis of the Afro-Colombian population requires a 
differential analysis that takes into consideration these particularities. These racialized 
geographical configurations to a large extent continue to characterize the distribution of a 
significant proportion of the Afro-Colombian population. However, a great migration of 
the black population is taking place, transforming a historically racialized landscape. A 
number of factors have instigated the forced migration of black populations including 
rural to urban migration pursuing economic opportunities, abandonment of territory as a 
consequence of U.S. backed fumigation campaigns, environmental deterioration of land 
due to licit crop cultivation and the intrusion of illegally armed groups, expelling them 
from individual and collective territories in order to secure resources and usurpation of 
land for resource exploitation, cultivation of licit crops and foreign investment. Thus, the 
4 Ibid., 92. 
raciallethnic demographic landscape of Colombia is in flux. Nonetheless, the Afro- 
descendant population is regionally concentrated in the departments in the Pacific 
(specifically the Choc6 and the Caucas, Valle del Cauca and Cauca), and Caribbean 
coasts and are heavily represented in major urban municipalities like Quibd6, Bogota, 
Cali, Barranquilla and ~ a r t a ~ e n a . ~  Sixty-nine percent of the Afro-Colombian population 
inhabit urban m~nic i~a l i t i e s .~  Afro-descendants comprise a numerical majority in 107 
municipalities according to the Presidential Agency for Social Action and International 
Cooperation (Agencia Presidential para la Accidn Social y la Cooperacidn 
~nternacinnal).~ DANE estimates that the departments with the highest percentage Afro- 
descendants are Choc6 (82%), the Archipelago of San Andres, Providencia and Catalina 
(57%), Bolivar (28%), Valle del Cauca (27%) and Cauca ~ 2 2 % ) . ~  See Figure 6 (map of 
the spatial distribution of Afro-Colombians). 
5 Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE), "Colombia una nacion 
multicultural: su diversidad etnica;" available fkom http://www..dane.gov.co/files/ censo2005/ 
tniaslpresent-etnicos..pdf); Internet; accessed 2 January 07. 
6 ~ a w i c i o  Pardo Rojas, "Hitos de la investigation social, histbrica y territorial en el Pacifico 
afkocolombiano" in Panorhmica Afro Colombians: Estudios sociales en el PaciJico, eds. Mauricio Pardo 
Rojas, Claudia Mosquera, Maria Clemencia Ramirez, eds.. (Afio-Colombian Panoramic: Social Studies in 
the PaclJic) Institute Colombiano de Antropologia e Historia.. Bogota: Universidad de Colombia, 2004. 
'presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation, "Actions and advances by 
Social Action in attention to the Colombian Afio-descendant Population." 
'~epartamento Adrninistrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE), "Colombia una nacion 
multicultural: su diversidad etnica;" available fkom http://www .dane.gov.co/files/censo200S/etnias/ 
present-etnicos.pdf'.; Internet; accessed 2 January 07 
Figure 6: Map of Spatial Distribution of African Descendants in Colombia 
Source: Official map of territorial entities IGAC Geographic Information System for the 
Black Community Lands. Technical Commission Law 70, 1993 National Development 
Plan for the Afro-Colombian population - DNP, 1998 
While 82 percent of the populations of Choc6 are identified as Afro-descendants, Afro- 
Chocoanos constitute less than 7 percent of the national black population. Table 9 
illustrates the varied raciallethnic demographic distribution of the Colombian black 
population by department. 
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Table 9. Distribution of Afro-Colombian as the Percentage of the National Population 
Departments Percentage of the National Population 










Rest of the Departments 
Total 
Source: Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE) 
What one tends to find in Colombia is the tendency of Colombians to strongly 
identify themselves according to their geographical sense of place, El CosteHo (from the 
Coast), El Cachaco (from Bogotq, El Paisano (coffee producing region), e t ~ . ~  This 
regionalization of race is also manifested in the production of knowledge concerning 
Afro-descendant subgroups within Colombia, as demonstrated in Chapter I1 (Literature 
Review). 
9 Wade, 1993 
The formal declaration of the abolition of slavery in Colombia in 185 1 lo  had a 
nominal impact on the material conditions and political reality of the majority of African 
descendant Colombians. The "accumulated disadvantages" experienced by Afro- 
descendants and their concomitant assignment to the margins of society as a consequence 
of their ancestry and status explains, in part, their lack of access to certain spheres within 
the labor market, education, health, and essential services like the provision of potable 
water and even security. In fact, according to acclaimed Colombian anthropologists, 
Nina de Friedmann and Jaime Arocha, in fact "It is widely believed that conditions 
worsened when slavery was abolished in 1 85 1 ."I The African descendant population,12 
regardless of whether they inhabit, urban or rural spaces, live in San Onofre or Quibd6, 
are disproportionately represented amongst the poorest, least educated, possess the 
highest indices of infant and mother mortality, along with other dismal indicators in the 
areas of life expectancy, employment, health, housing and access to basic services 
including potable water. l3 According to the Government of Colombia: 
. . . 82 percent of Afro-Colombians continue to live in conditions where 
basic needs (running water, electricity, sanitation and so on) were not met; 
and that the literacy rate among the Afro-Colombian population is three 
times lower than of the rest of the population (43 per cent in rural areas 
and 20 percent in urban areas opposed to 23.4 per cent and 7.3 per cent, 
10 However, abolition did not take effect until January 1, 18 52. 
11 Nina S.. de Friedmann and Jaime Arocha, "Colombia" in No Longer Invisible: Afro-Latin 
Americans today, eds.. Minority Rights Group, (London: Minority Rights Group, 1995): 64. 
12 While, only little more than a half-million African descendant Colombians identified themselves 
as such in the 1993 Colombian census and only 10.6% proclaimed to be Afrocolombiano (raizales, 
palenquero, negro, mulato, AfroColombiano, Afrodescendiente) in the 2005 census, the population is 
considered significantly higher. The 2003 Inter-American Dialogue's Race Report: "Afro-Descendants in 
Latin America: How Many?" estimates the population is 26% of the population 
13 World Bank, "The Gap Matters: Poverty and Well-Being of' Afro-Colombians and Indigenous 
Peoples," World Bank (20 July 2005).. 
respectively, for the rest of the population); out of 100 Afro-Colombian 
young people, only 2 go on to higher studies.. .and 76 percent of Afro- 
Colombians live in conditions of extreme poverty and 42 percent are 
unemployed. l4 
There is considerable evidence to support the fact that the region euphemistically referred 
to as the "blackest" region of the country is also the most underdeveloped, in terms of 
human development indicators and the state has neglected to invest and equitably deliver 
public goods and services. "Choc6, the department with the highest percentage of Afro- 
Colombians, has the lowest per-capita level of government investment in health, 
education, and infrastr~cture."'~ Adding to the well-documented socioeconomic 
disparities and marginalization confronting the inhabitants of the department is the 
convergence of intensive capital investment and land acquisition by national and 
transnational (land speculation, mining, logging, agro-business including the cultivation 
of African palm) corporate interests alongside and in conjunction with the proliferation of 
the armed conflict and the explicit and implicit coordination between state and 
paramilitaries forces. In the Pacific basin, this mutually reinforcing perilous situation is 
threatening the traditional cultural practices of the indigenous and Afro-Colombian 
populations, instigating displacement, disruption from sources of income, dislocation 
from familial networks with deleterious environmental effects on their ancestral 
territories. Making matters worse, once displaced and upon arrival in urban centers, their 
material conditions worsen considerably particularly as it concerns housing, employment 
14 United Nations Economic and Social Council, "Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophonia and 
All Forms of Discrimination: Report by Mr.. Doudou Diene, Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of 
racism, racial discrimination, xenophia and related intolerance." 
'klare Ribando Seelke, ''Afto-Latinos in Latin America and Considerations for U.S,. Policy" CRS 
Report for Congress. January 14,2008; available from www .fas orglsgp/crslrowl RL327 13 pdf. 
in the formal sector, food security, and access to basic services including healthcare. 
They continue to be vulnerable to organized and common violence, as they exist, literally 
as well as figuratively, on the margins of society. Some have been displaced on multiple 
occasions. Moreover, upon fleeing their communities, as with internally displaced 
persons or refugees, in general, often identity documents are lost, left behind or 
destroyed, which creates enumerable problems, from limiting formal participation in the 
labor market to inhibiting participation in the electoral process. Racism and 
discrimination levied against displaced Afro-descendants also serves to compound their 
social reality once they arrive in receptor communities. 
Nearly a century and half after the abolition of slavery, Afro-Colombians, 
following considerable political mobilization, domestic and transnational advocacy and 
coalition building achieved unprecedented concessions by the Colombian state. Prior to 
the adoption of the 1991 Constitution and the preliminary consultations that preceded it; 
Afro-Colombians were not considered an essential racial or ethnic constituent, by 
custom, constitution or statute, within the Colombian national self-imagination. Elite 
construction of the mestizo facade within the Colombian national landscape, 
institutionalized within the fabric of the 1886 constitution, systematically relegated the 
African descendant population to the periphery, fundamentally initiating and 
institutionalizing their "invisibility." Friedmann and Arocha declare: 
The essence of Colombia's 1886 constitution was an 'eitherlor' 
proposition in which 'people' equaled mestizos, and 'not people' equaled 
indigenous people. The constitution glorified as the goal of progress the 
conversion of Colombians into a single 'race,' speaking one language and 
believing in a single God. Using binary acrobatics, the elite sought to 
negate the existence of geographic isolation or political resistance, did not 
have children with white or indigenous partners-just as they denied the 
identities of other Colombians of Afro-American culture.16 
Thus, the Colombian national identity was constructed in such a way which summarily 
excluded a significant proportion of their population due to their perceived unsuitable 
genealogical stock. The 199 1 Political Constitution, chartered in response to a nation 
beleaguered by an inept and oligarchic political class, socioeconomic instability and 
unrelenting violence, deviated considerably from the preceding constitution. For the first 
time, the state acknowledged its "multicultural and pluriethnic" composition in its 
constitution, in statute and in practice. Moreover, according to Bettina Ng'weno in Turf 
Wars "The constitution provides a space in which, for the first time, Afro-Colombians 
could organize and claim land as ethnic groups."17 However, before the passage of the 
constitution and the realization of statutes conferring special group rights accorded to 
blacks, Donna Lee Van Cott notes a fundamental transformation had emerged in the 
black political process. She concedes ". . . the constituent assembly process enabled a 
sector of the black rights movement to shift the center of gravity of black politics from 
the traditional black politicians' equal opportunity agenda toward ethnocultural claims 
reminiscent of the indigenous movement's ethnicity based collective-rights agenda."18 
The 1991 Political Constitution also gave birth to a non-liberal form of land tenure, as it 
relates to rural "black communities," (analogous to the land rights accorded to the 
1 bNina S.. de Friedmann and Jaime Arocha, "Colombia" in No Longer Invisible. Afro-Latin 
Americans today, eds. Minority Rights Group, (1,ondon: Minority Rights Group, 1995): 65. 
"~ettina Ng'weno, Turj Wars Territory and Citizenship in the Contemporary State (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2007): 84. 
18 Donna Lee Van Cott, The Friendly Liquidatzon o j  the Past The Polztzcs ojDiversity m Latzn 
Amerzca (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press): 47 
indigenous population) where collective, ancestral territories were to be identified, 
defined and allocated to sub-groups within the Afro-Colombian population that met 
certain state defined ethnic (cultural), historical and geospatial characteristics. l9  The 
new charter delineated specific guarantees accorded to Afio-descendants articulated 
through the passage of Transitory Article 55 (AT-55). The article lays the groundwork 
for the promulgation of Law 70. AT-55 affirms: 
During the two years subsequent to the date on which the Constitution 
enters into force, the Congress will issue, after study by a special 
commission to be created by the government a law which grants to the 
black communities that have occupied undeveloped lands in the rural 
riparian areas alongside the rivers of the Cuenca and Pacific, in conformity 
with their traditional systems for production, the right to own as collective 
property those areas which the law designates.20 
On August 27, 1993, the president of the Republic of Colombia, signed "Ley 70" (Law 
70). Two years later, Decree 1745 was conferred which delineated and provided title to 
ancestral territories to black communities in the Pacific basin. As of 2003, the 
Colombian Government had conceded more than 4.5 million hectares of the national 
territory to black communities in the Pacific, encompassing more than a quarter million 
21 people. See Figure 7 that illustrates the spatial distribution of collective land titles 
afforded to black communities. 
20~nter-~mer.ican Commission on Human Rights, "The Rights of. Black Communities" 
Organization of American States (26 February 1999), available fkom http://www.cidh org/countryrep/ 
Colom99enlchapter-11 .htm; Internet; accessed 2 January 07 
2 1 Bettina Ng'weno, Turf Wars Terrztory and Citizenshzp zn the Contemporary State 
Figure 7. Spatial Distribution of Land Titles Provided to Afro-Colombians 
Under Law 70 
Source: Official map of territorial entities IGAC Geographic Information System for the 
Black Community Lands. Technical Commission Law 70, 1993, http://www. 
derechoshumanos.gov.co/observatorio/04~licaciones/O40 l-boletines/O4-boletin_221 
cifra22i.htm 
However, these considerable constitutional and statutory guarantees did not come 
without concessions by the Afio-Colombian population. The reorientation of "black" 
identity or indigenization of "blackness" by the state has served to both expand and 
constrict the rights of Afro-Colombians with profound implications for blacks who "fit" 
within the boundaries prescribed by the state (by statute) and those who do not. Aline 
Helg provides what may be one of the most astute articulations of this oftentimes 
marginalized aspect of the discourse on constitutional and statutory guarantees accorded 
to Afro-descendant communities. She notes: 
Law 70 resulted in few changes for most Colombians of mixed and "full" 
African ancestry. In addition to the riverine dwellers of the Pacific Basin, 
who gained an avenue to communal land ownership, in Caribbean 
Colombia the descendants of Palenque de San Basilio, a former 
community near Cartagena, have secured the exclusivity of the region's 
negritude But at the same time the vast majority of blacks in Caribbean 
Colombia have been excluded from palenquero "ethnic" blackness and 
from the benefits of Law 70, and they continue to face racial 
discrimination without legal protection. Arguably, the Law of Negritudes' 
principal achievement has been to bring some Colombian blacks out of the 
"invisibility" . . . to which they had been confined and, by doing so, to 
initiate a national debate on issues of race.22 
This reality has also created formidable difficulties in the acquisition of knowledge on 
Afro-Colombians occupying territorial spaces that do not fall within the purview of the 
state defined concept of "black communities." While, the Choco has become an area of 
heightened concern by academics and a disparate amount of literature has been produced 
researching a myriad of issues relating to the conflict, development, biodiversity, and the 
identity processes of the inhabitants of area, this department constitutes less than 7% of 
the black population in Colombia. Aviva Chomsky in "The Logic of Displacement" 
astutely concedes that two major issues have manifested for Afro-Colombians since the 
passage of the 1991 Constitution. First, the state has engaged in a contradictory political 
project with perilous consequences for Law 70 affected black communities. The state has 
defined "black communities" as rural based collectives, occupying the Pacific basin with 
a measure of political autonomy reflected in the community councils yet has pursued a 
neoliberal development agenda that is fundamentally antithetical to black communities' 
demands of autonomy and consultation, abdicating the collective groups rights afforded 
to this population. Second, Chomsky concedes that this state defined conceptualization 
22 Helg, 2. 
of "black communities" is exclusive rather inclusive of the wide range of Afro- 
descendant sub-groups that exist in Colombia and coupled with the vociferous organizing 
of black communities in the Pacific in the wake of the constitutional and statutory 
reforms, this transformation has fostered the "privileging one aspect of the Afro- 
Colombian experience and neglecting others.23 Thus, blackness becomes centered on 
"black communities" in the Pacific basin (and when the Caribbean is taken into 
c~nsiderat ion).~~ Consequently, the macro-narrative examining the raciallethnic 
dimension of the armed conflict on Afro-Colombian communities has nearly exclusively 
been confined to the study of these manifestations in the Pacific basin and been strongly 
linked to the studies of Afro-descendants that fit within the state defined parameters 
delineated in the constitution and subsequent decrees. 
The Human Security of Afro-Colombians within the Colombian Intrastate Security 
Crisis 
The mass exodus of millions of non-combatants in Colombia is eclipsed only by 
the prevailing violence in the Sudan which claims more than five million internally 
displaced persons (IDPs). Ironically, while Africa has the greatest incidences of 
intrastate conflicts and has instigated the greatest regional displacement of peoples in the 
world, African descendants in Colombia comprise a disproportionate percentage of the 
South American nation's internally displaced population. Forced displacement in 
Colombia initiated by the confluence between political violence and economic interests 
23 Chomsky, 183. 
24~lisabeth Cunin in Identidudes a Flor de Piel, Lo "negro" entre apariencias y pertencias. 
categories raciales y mestizaje en Cartagena, similarly makes this point in her analysis of racial identity in 
~ a r t a ~ e n a . ~ ~  Even when African descendants inhabiting the Caribbean coast are examined by social 
scientists, the body of knowledge focuses dispropor.tionately on the de San Basilio. 
instigated in varying degrees by all armed actors, including (and at times exacerbated by 
and in collusion with) state security forces, is according to Afro-Colombian activists, 
scholars and their allies, a part of a broader geostrategic, neoliberal plan to terrorize, 
intimidate and evacuate Afro-Colombians, co-opt their ancestral, collectively owned 
territories, and has resulted in what some have articulated as coordinated campaign of 
"ethnocide." Chomsky argues that contemporary forced displacement of black 
populations in Colombia is not an exceptional "phenomenon" but a part of a broader 
historical process whereby Afro-descendants have been periodically evacuated from their 
territories as a consequence of their geographic proximity to strategic territories and 
resources and the implementation of the economic prerogatives of state and extrastate 
actors and corporate and private  interest^.^' The Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre estimated in 2005 that the Afro-Colombian and indigenous population 
disproportionately constituted forty percent of the country's populations forcibly 
displaced as result of the intrastate conflict.26 Moreover, CODHES, as cited in the 
World Bank report, explains the disparate ethnicIracia1 impact of the conflict when they 
affirm "the expulsion rate of African-Colombian communities is 20% higher than the rest 
of the country."27 
25 Chomsky. 
26~nternal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Indigenous people and Afro-Colombians represent 
40% of' all IDPs (2005);" available fkom http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/ 
(httpEnvelopes)/A9EEF75 195F58499802570B8005A746C?OpenDocument; Internet; accessed 2 January 
07. 
27~o r . l d  Bank, "The Gap Matters: Poverty and Well-Being of Afko-Colombians and Indigenous 
Peoples," 61 
The deleterious impact of the armed conflict on raciallethnic minorities in 
Colombia becomes more complicated and requires a more sophisticated intersectional 
analysis when gender is wholly integrated. The situation of Afio-Colombian (and 
indigenous) women within the perpetual violence unfolding in Colombia is considerably 
worsened by virtue of their position as members of a marginalized subaltern ethniclracial 
minorities (and as women), their subordinate position within the socioeconomic hierarchy 
and the manifestations of gender based violence that usually tends to accompany conflict. 
Colombia's law concerning the protection and assistance afforded to IDPs specifically 
the development of a "differential approach (taking into account gender, age and ethnic 
differences) is very poorly provided for . . . the only specific mention of women and 
children is made in Article 17 . . . Specific attention to displacement among ethnic 
minorities has only lately become an important issue."28 Under normal circumstances 
women are subjected to multiple forms of state sponsored (and in this case, nonstate 
sponsored), communal and private acts of gender specific violence and oppression. Once 
conflict commences, gender based violence becomes heightened and more brutal. 
Meertens explains "Gender relations and gender roles tend to change in the context of 
conflict, as women and men experience in a different way the traumas of war, the 
violations of their rights and the opportunities for rebuilding the social texture."29 
Consequently, intrastate conflicts have particularly deleterious and profound implications 
for the most vulnerable members of society especially women and children. According 
2 8 ~ o n n y  Meertens, "Forced Displacement in Colombia: Public Policy, Gender and Initiatives for 
Reconstruction." Paper prepared for the Conference on African Migration in Comparative Perspective, 
Johannesburg, South Africa (June 4-7,2003): 9-1 0. 
to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, three quarters of the displaced are 
women and children. Many displaced women have lost their partners as a result of the 
conflict and confront the terrible psychological trauma, are increasingly vulnerable to 
various forms of exploitation, are situated in very precarious socioeconomic conditions, 
have abandoned their homes and communities and must bear the weight as the head of 
the household in their new receptor communities. 
State figures confirm that four out of ten displaced families are headed by 
women. The report of the IACHR [Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights] analyzes the impact of displacement on women in terms of 
the radical, traumatic and sudden change in their family structure and 
roles, geography, culture, community and socio-economic standing, and 
their exposure to threats, violence and discrimination based on their 
gender by either the actors of the conflict that caused the displacement, as 
well as the receiving populations.30 
Moreover, the physical violation of women's bodily integrity, control over her 
reproductive capacity and various other forms of gender specific violence and population 
control are strategies employed by armed actors to emotionally, physically, and 
psychologically terrorize women, their families and communities. As wives, sisters, 
mothers, daughters (and in some instances, armed actors, themselves), women are 
utilized as sexual pawns for the gratification of all armed groups and brutalized as a form 
of collective punishment against political opponents.31 This situation of generalized 
human insecurity becomes more problematic when race and class are integrated into the 
discourse. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights notes, ". . . An Afro- 
Colombian woman, their condition as women adds another factor of discrimination and 
30~nter-~merican Commission on Human Rights, "Violence and Discrimination against Women in 
the Armed Conflict in Colombia," (Washington D.C : Organization of American States, 2006) 
vulnerability to their lives and exposes them to greater abuses by the actors of the 
conflict."" Multiple, and mutually reinforcing systems of oppressions that intersect 
race, gender and their relationship to class within a protracted conflict serves to situate 
Afro-Colombian women living in contested areas requires a differential, analysis, 
coordination and response, by the state, international organizations and civil society 
groups, which considers the circumstances of this intersection and makes policy driven 
by these conditions. 
Forced migration and displacement as a consequence of a coordinated and 
protracted political terror campaign, discriminate acts of intimidation and violence 
propagated by state and non-state actors are integral parts of the collective experiences of 
African descendants throughout the Diaspora for nearly half a millennium. The violent 
forcible removal and transport of African bodies across the Atlantic at the behest of 
European colonizers to the "New World" constitutes the initial process of involuntary 
migration of African descendants. This slave trade and subsequently slavery transformed 
the sociocultural, economic and political landscape of the Americas and continental 
Africa, as well. The contemporary intrastate security crisis and processes associated with 
forced displacement, abandonment of territory and illegal appropriation, migration from 
rural to urban spaces, is once again transforming the raciallethnic demography of 
Colombia. The contemporary model of forced displacement of Afro-descendants in 
Colombia from both communally owned territories as in the Pacific basin and under 
conventional liberal land tenure regimes in other parts of the country, represents the latest 
stage of a violent and forced migratory process that serves to challenge Afro-Colombians 
32 Ibid 
basic fundamental rights to life, human dignity and their collective security. Carlos 
Rosero in opines "Forced internal displacement, growing violations against Afro- 
descendants and their territories, the constant infractions to international human rights 
realized by the army, the paramilitaries and the armed insurgency, are some of the new 
modalities of aggression, marginalization and exploitation."33 William Villa Rivera 
argues that the security deficit and concomitant violence propagated by non-state actors 
undermines the capacity of black community councils to effectively administer its land, 
resources and constituents while simultaneously threatening the agency of the broader 
black movement.34 One of the most widely written about incidents of violent 
confrontations between illegally armed actors in a predominately black community and 
the subsequent byproduct of human suffering as a result of contestation was the "Bojaya 
Massacre" in May 2002. Bojaya, a predominantly black municipality located adjacent 
the Atrato River, in the Pacific Coast department of Choc6, was a site of intense 
contestation between the FARC and right wing paramilitaries. On May 2, more than one 
hundred Afro-Colombians, while huddled in a church seeking sanctuary from the 
violence, were killed and dozens wounded (and displaced) by FARC mortar attacks that 
targeted their paramilitary rivals. This episode which has elicited considerable domestic 
as well as transnational outrage and has become symbolic of the racial dimension of the 
conflict provides just one example of the tremendous destruction wrought and loss of 
3 3  Carlos Rosero, "Los afrodescendientes y el conflict0 armado en Colombia: la insistencia en lo 
propio como alternative," 547. 
34 William Villa Rivera, in "Territory of Black communities, War in the Pacific and the Problems 
of Development" in Afrocolombian Panoramic Social Studies in the Pacij?c, eds. Mauricio Pardo Rojas et 
al. (Bogota: University of Colombia, 2004): 336. 
human life perpetrated by illegally armed groups without consideration for domestic, 
international human rights and humanitarian laws. This intense and violent exchange 
between non-state actors (and under some circumstances, state security forces) is 
indicative of the broader struggle over land, access to strategic natural resources and 
ports, which have permeated Afro-Colombian communities. 
For decades, scholars have mulled over the "security gap" or the deficit in the 
provision of security in Colombia as evidenced by an intransigent internal conflict, the 
incapacity of the state to monopolize force, the wielding of state like violence by illegally 
armed groups, the repression of popular dissent, the infiltration and complicity of state 
security forces, and the failure of the state to extend security to its citizens in an equitable 
fashion. Robert I. Rotberg explains, "There is a hierarchy of political goods. None is as 
critical as the supply of security, especially human security."35 Literature concerning the 
intrastate security crisis that has more or less traversed the history of the post-colonial 
republic refusing any region refuge from cyclical violence, particularly in the post La 
Violencia era, has largely failed to provide similar attention to the human dimension of 
security as its concerns raciallethnic minorities. Over the last decade or so, publications 
concerning the intersection between ethniclracial identity, territory and the conflict have 
begun to occupy considerable space within academic discourse on the intrastate security 
crisis and on the international agendas of intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations. Colombian intellectual Gonzalo Sanchez provides this astute yet 
unsettling analysis of how the intrastate, multipolar violence that ravages some regions of 
35~obert  I. Rotberg, ed., State Failure andstate Weakness in a Time o j  Terror (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2003): 3 .  
the Colombian landscape has uncovered, in a very real and practical way, its 
"multicultural and pluriethnic character." Sanchez extrapolates "What a painful 
experience this is for a nation like Colombia! From time to time (as the Constitution of 
1991), it discovers itself (its borders, it aborigines, its African American communities) 
through the paths of violence."36 
This study, in part, is concerned with examining the plight of Afro-Colombians 
and "the paths of violence" that traverse the landscape of the Caribbean. There is 
evidence to support the supposition that Afro-Colombian communities situated outside 
the Pacific basin and the territorial ordering propagated by Law 70, similarly confront 
situations of generalized and discriminate violence perpetrated by non-state actors 
particularly those concentrated in conflict zones, like the Montes de Maria and some 
areas in the department of Bolivar, particularly in the s o ~ t h . ~ '  Studies concerning Afro- 
descendants and the conflict have tended to be grounded in the examination and 
articulation of the plight of "black communities" in the Pacific, particularly in the 
department of Choco which is reflective of the broader orientation towards that region 
that is apparent in the literature. As previously mentioned, the disparate orientation 
towards examining the region and the Choco, in particular, to the neglect of other heavily 
populated areas inhabited by Afro-Colombians, is part of the rationale for this 
investigation. Therefore, as Bettina Ng'weno explains the Choco is ". . . an unavoidable 
36 Gonzalo Sanchez, "Prospects for Peace" in Violence in Colombia 1990-2000 
Waging War andNegotzatzng Peace, eds. Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Penaranda and Gonzalo Sanchez 
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc): 2003 
37 The Montes de Maria region was classified by the Uribe administration as one of' two 
rehabilitation and consolidation zones of'the public order (ZRD). In the Montes de Maria region, 26 
municipalities, including Marialabaja and Carmen de Bolivar, were identified under the ZRD.. 
referent and interlocutor for anyone studying, or living within, the space of ethnicity 
outside the Pacific basin."38 Therefore, much of the evidence secured for this 
exploratory study simultaneously reflects the inclination of scholars to develop literature 
concerning the conflict centered on the context of the black communities in this region 
and the author's preliminary efforts to understand the proliferation of the conflict in the 
Caribbean and the implications for black communities situated there. These 
circumstances serve to make invisible (or at the very least, marginal) the plight of Afro- 
Colombians, outside the Pacific lowlands, who similarly confront the destructive forces 
of an intransigent armed conflict. This void in the literature invariably impedes our 
capacity to understand the geographical manifestations and historical origins of the 
actors, their strategic objectives and the implications for predominately African 
descendant communities occupying resource rich and strategically relevant territorial 
spaces outside the Pacific basin. The investigator also consulted literature published by 
the Government of Colombia concerning the eruption of the conflict and implications for 
the civilian population in departments on the Caribbean coast. However, it should be 
noted, that the Government of Colombia does not disaggregate their data on human 
security indicators such as homicides, kidnappings, massacres, etc., by race or ethnicity. 
Therefore, the author has extrapolated from the evidence provided by the government and 
other secondary sources as to the origins and implications of the security crisis which has 
unfolded in regions of strategic concern to all armed actors the Caribbean in order to 
reconstruct the security landscape and affix race to it, in order to deduce a more clear 
"~ettina  we we no, TurJ Wars Terrltory and Citizenship in the Contemporary State (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2007): 88 
interpretation of the affect on Afro-descendants. This information provides the backdrop 
for an evaluation of the security environment which Afro-descendant Colombians 
inhabiting the department along the Caribbean coast live. 
Why the Caribbean Coast Matters? 
Comprising more than one tenth of the present day nation-state of Colombia, the 
Caribbean coast includes the departments of are Sucre, Atlantico, Cordoba, Cesar, La 
Guajira, Magdalena, the archipelago of San Andrks y Providencia, and Bolivar. "The 
racial characteristics of the Caribbean region are varied, but most notable is the strong 
influence of black slaves who were brought to this part of Colombia for plantation 
agriculture, predominantly sugar."39 The Caribbean region, historically significant and 
an inextricable appendage to the Andean core due to its position "as a corridor for 
contraband and transit of slaves, gold, and mer~handise,"~' continues to be vital to the 
economic development of the nation. Tourism, mineral resource extraction and export, 
the expanding energy industry, coffee, agribusiness, trade and access to strategic 
waterways and ports, are just a few of the important economic activities that serve to 
make the region important. These strategic resources and corridors also entices and 
attracts the presence of illegally armed groups, traffickers and other criminal 
organizations hoping to reap the benefits of the region. Since the late 1960s and 1970s, 
the cultivation of first, marijuana and then coca has instigated the growth of criminal 
39 Harvey F Kline, Colornbla Portralt o j  Unlty and Diverszty (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1983): 12 
40 Richani, 93., 
activity along the coast engaged in the drug trade and illegally armed groups.41 More 
recently, the contestation between illegally armed groups over territory, the cultivation of 
illicit crops, processing and transit has engendered disputes as new groups have moved in 
to dispute control and usurp the resources secured from these illegal activities. Richani 
explains "The steep and almost uninterrupted decline of the agricultural economy since 
the 1960s encouraged the development of alternative economic activity such as illicit 
drug plantations and contrabanding."" According to the Government of Colombia, the 
civilian population of the department of Bolivar has been subjected to considerable levels 
of violence propagated by the conflict over strategic resources like gold, contestation 
over territories habitable for coca cultivation and processing, access to important strategic 
corridors and ports coveted by groups operating on the margins of the law since mid- 
1990s. Bolivar, one of the departments' "with the highest coca production concentration" 
and with "a very weak state presence" (in 1999) is also home to nearly 12% of the Afro- 
Colombian (national) population.43 Today, the cultivation of African palm on the 
Caribbean coast, along with the Pacific region and the llanos, is one of the major 
economic development projects undertaken by the state in their efforts to capitalize on 
the increase in global demands for biodiesel products.44 The infiltration of the AUC and 
struggle over resources and territory in the region in 1997 instigated the perpetration of 
42 . Ibld., 94. 
43 Richani. 95 
44~atiana Roa Avendaiio, "Colombia's Palm Oil Biodiesel Push" (2 February 2007), Center for 
International Policy; available &om http:/lamericas.irc-online.org/pdf/reports/O702Biodiesel.pdf Internet. 
grave human rights violations against the civilian population as the paras sought to 
challenge the hegemony of the guerillas and wrestle away control through the use of 
violence and terror. In the late 1990s, the paramilitaries (specifically, the Northern Bloc, 
BN) subjugated the guerillas to become the dominant armed group operating on the 
margins of the law, thus securing strategically important, resource rich areas like southern 
Bolivar, the highly coveted Montes de Maria and exercising influence in the industrial 
capital of the country, ~ a r r a n ~ u i l l a ~ ~  (see Figure 8). 
Figure 8. Map of Colombia in South America and Bolivar and Sucre in Colombia 
Source: The Network for Development and Peace Foundation of the Montes de Maria 
http://www.fmontesdemaria.org/nregion.asp 
The Caribbean coast has been the epicenter of paramilitary power, capital 
accumulation and land concentration, money laundering and other illicit activities in 
concert with the infiltration of state institutions. In fact, the department of "Cordoba . . . 
was the birthplace of 'Colombia Viva,' a political movement designed to rally support for 
45 International Crisis Group, "Colombia's New Armed Groups," Latin America Report 20 (10 
May 2007) 
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the incorporation of the AUC into state inst i t~tions"~~ (see Figure 9 for an illustration of 
the geographical position of the region). 
Figure 9. Map of the Montes de Maria Area 
Source: The Network for Development and Peace Foundation of the Montes de Maria 
http://www.fmontesdemaria.org/nregion.asp 
The Government of Colombia states "The situation of displacement, economic 
paralysis, and administrative chaos and governability crisis generated pressure and 
aggression by armed groups was the predominant characteristic in this moment."" The 
46 Hylton, 1 10. 
470bservatorio del Programa Presidential de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional 
Humanitario, "Consequencias Humanitarias del Accionar de 10s Grupos Irregulares" (22 January 2007); 
presence of all armed groups, the state, paramilitaries, and the guerillas (both the FARC 
and the ELN) confound the human security crisis for the inhabitants of the region, 
particularly Afro-Colombians which comprise considerable numerical majorities in a 
number of municipalities (in the Montes), as these groups attempt to consolidate their 
authority, territorial control and the revenue secured through various licit and illicit 
activities. According to the Fundaci6n Red Desarrollo y Paz de 10s Montes de Maria, 
The Network for Development and Peace Foundation of the Montes de Maria, 
municipalities of Carmen de Bolivar, San Jacinto, Zambrano y Maria la baja are the most 
conflicted municipalities in the region and paradoxically represent both areas of 
expulsion and reception48 (see Figures 10 and 1 I). 
Figure 10. Municipalities of Reception 
Source: The Network for Development and Peace Foundation of the Montes de Maria 
http://www.fmontesdemaria.org/proyectos.asp 
available kom http://www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/observatorio~deeDDHH/O4~ublicaciones/ 
bolivar05 .pdf ; Internet. 
48~undacion Red Desarrollo y Paz de 10s Montes de Maria; available from http://www 
finontesdemaria.org/proyectos..asp 
Figure 1 1. Municipalities of Expulsion 
Source: The Network for Development and Peace Foundation of the Montes de Maria 
http://www.fmontesdemaria.org/proyectos.asp 
Figures 12, 13, and 14 elucidate the oscillation of violence and the attendant 
fluctuation in human security indicators like homicides, terrorist acts and kidnappings in 
the region from 1990-2002. The end of the nineties and the initial years of the 21St 
century demonstrate an intensification of tensions between all armed actors, state and 
nonstate. According to the following figures, there seems to be an initial indication that 
diminutions in homicides, terrorism and kidnappings have been realized since 2001 
however it is difficult to ascertain whether these are short term, episodic declines or more 
long term trends. 
Figure 12. Homicides in the Montes de Maria 
Source: The Network for Development and Peace Foundation of the Montes de Maria 
http://www. fmontesdemaria.org/nregion.asp 
I I 
Figure 13. Terrorism in the Montes de Maria 
Source: The Network for Development and Peace Foundation of the Montes de Maria 
http://www. fmontesdemaria.org/problematicas.asp 
EIEO&UC~~)FI SEGUESTRQS WE@#@ MONTES BE MAR& 
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Figure 14. Evolution of Kidnapping in the Montes de Maria Area 
Source: The Network for Development and Peace Foundation of the Montes de Maria 
http://www.fmontesdemaria.org/prob1ematicas.asp 
In an investigation undertaken by Mauricio Esquivia, principal investigator for 
Red Asvidas Montes de Maria y Sincelejo, the author examines the affect of the armed 
conflict on indigenous, Afro-Colombian and peasant communities in the Montes de 
Maria, an area of geostrategic important and contested by all armed groups (legal and 
Esquivia, in his research on conflict, displacement and ethnic groups in San 
Onofre, a community which is 80% black according to DANE, provides this 
characterization of the municipality and its strategic importance: 
The strategic position of the municipality of San Onofre, with beaches on 
the Gulf of Morrosquillo and the Caribbean Sea, a rich hydrography with 
many rivers and streams, crossed by the western highway which connects 
Sincelejo with Cartagena; it is a region with many possibilities of 
territorial control, latifundism, clientelism, illegal trafficking of drugs and 
49~aur ic io  Esquivia Zapata, "Final Report: Experiences of learnings of' survival and solidarity of 
campesino, indigenas and Afrodescendiente communities in the Montes de Maria, Caribbean region." 
(Colombia. December 2005). Sincelejo, Sucre. 
contraband by the group of armed persons present there (be they legal or 
illegal).50 
Three of the fifteen municipalities in the Montes de Maria region, possess' Afro- 
Colombian populations of at least 80% or more.51 According to Esquivia's 
investigation, multiple armed actors are operating in the area including: the sole legal 
armed actor, the Marine Infantry, and several illegal armed actors are operating in the 
regions including the FARC (Frentes 35 & 37), the ELN (Bloque Jaime Bateman 
Canon), the Ejkrcito Revolucionario del Pueblo, ERP or the People's Revolutionary 
Army (Compania Ernesto Che Guevara) and the AUC (Bloque Rodrigo Cadena and 
Grupo Bolivar Esquivia's study also reveals that racism against indigenous 
groups, campesinos and blacks, administrative corruption, poverty, environmental 
devastation further compound the problematic of multiple armed actors in this area 
contesting access to geostrategic routes, land and natural resources.53 The Uribe 
administration classified the Montes de Maria area and in the department of Arauca, as a 
rehabilitation and consolidation zone, as a means to address the low intensity "resource 
wars" between illegally armed actors fighting over strategic corridors for illicit drug 
trafficking, land for cultivation of licit and illicit crops and other resources. Furthermore, 
Uribe sought to protect the energy infrastructure of the country and the pipeline. These 
l~e~a r t amen to  Administrative Nacional de Estadistica (DANE), "Colombia una nacion 
multicultural: su diversidad etnica;" available from http://www.dane.gov.co/files/censo2005/etnias/ 
present-etnicos.pdf; Internet; accessed 2 January 07. 
52~auricio Esquivia Zapata, "Final Report: Experiences of Learnings of' survival and solidarity of' 
campesino communities, indigenas and Afrodescendientes in the Montes de Maria, Caribbean region." 
5 3  Ibid 
zones, while ruled unconstitutional, empowered state security forces in the regions to 
"impose curfews and restrictions on citizen's movement (such as roadblocks and transit 
permits), accumulate personal information about residents, and detain anyone not 
carrying proper identifi~ation."~~ The plight of Afro-Colombians on the Caribbean coast 
trapped within the nexus of the political terror campaigns propagated by illegally armed 
actors made worse by a political system corrupted and security forces compromised by 
the infiltration of its institutions by groups operating on the margins of the law, 
particularly the paramilitaries, has engendered an environment of generalized insecurity. 
The secondary literature on the topic that is available is not as sophisticated or expansive 
as the literature that has been produced on the Pacific basin. Consequently, the regional 
security dilemma and the ethnicIracia1 dimension of the armed conflict require further 
investigation. 
Today, the low intensity civil war that has marred the landscape of Colombia has 
penetrated areas historically considered 'refuges of peace' or areas beyond the historical 
scope of the violence perpetrated against non-combatants by groups operating on the 
margins of the law and in some instances, in connivance state security forces. Studies 
concerning the impact of the armed conflict on Afro-Colombian communities in the 
Pacific have been explored by anthropologists, geographers, historians, 
environmentalists, inter and nongovernmental organizations in Colombia, the United 
States and Europe. The convergence of economic and political projects propagated by 
the state, substate and transnational actors in areas inhabited by black communities in one 
5 4 ~ h e  Center. for Internal Policy, "Colombia's Alvaro Uribe-The first 100 days" (1 8 November 
2002) 
of the most biodiverse regions in the world, the department of Choco have become a 
central arena of scholarly investigation. While, the Choc6 is one of the most 
underdeveloped regions in the country, its tremendous biodiversity and abundance of 
natural resources, has been considered by political elites as frontier to be exploited, a 
veritable "rn~ne~-box."~' The PCN argues "For them, [the government] the lands 
occupied by black communities are a simple depository of resources, an open bank from 
which resources are taken indi~criminatel~."~~ The persistent struggle over land 
constitutes one of the definitive characteristics of armed struggle in Colombia and 
continues to be a central characteristic of the contemporary intrastate conflict. 
Subsequently, for the state and right wing armed groups, populations like black 
communities who inhabit strategically important, resource rich regions must be evacuated 
in order to secure private, governmental and transnational economic development 
projects. Black's disproportionate representation amongst the displaced is a reflection of 
this coordinated policy. While Afro-Colombians only comprise between 10-26% of the 
population, the foremost Colombian nongovernmental organization concerning 
displacement, the Consultoria para 10s Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento, 
(Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement) CODHES, estimates that "Afro- 
Colombians accounted for at least 33% of total IDPs [internally displaced persons] in 
55 Lucy Alexander, "Colombia's Pacific Plan: Indigenous and Afi-o-Colombian 
communities challenge the developers" in Green Guerrillas environmental conflicts and initzatives in 
Latzn America and the Carzbbean, a reader (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1996): 75 
56 Black Communities Process in Colombia, PCN, "On paths of freedom " 
2002."~' The intensification of the conflict, terrorizing of the population, evacuation of 
collectively owned territory by Afro-Colombians and indigenous groups, in the Pacific, 
are not ~oincidental .~~ The contemporary manifestation of the struggle is an existential 
one for black communities, threatening not only their traditional cultural practices, land 
titles, traditional patterns of subsistence, social networks but their very existence. Afro- 
Colombian civil society groups such as the PCN affirm the centrality of land to their 
cultural integrity and capacity to realize their individual and collective rights: ". . . for 
Afrocolombians there is an inseparable relation between the concepts of land, 
environment, natural resources, ethnic identity, participation and development."j9 While 
the intrusion of "speculators"60 is not a new phenomenon in the underdeveloped Pacific 
basin, the threat instigated against Afro-Colombians (and the indigenous communities) 
by the multiple competing armed actors and expulsion from territories they have 
occupied for centuries present a new impasse in the struggle over rights and resources. 
Mieke Wouters, in an article entitled "Ethnic Rights Under Threat: The Black Peasant 
Movement Against Armed Groups Pressure" proffers this paradoxical conclusion in 
order to illustrate the unfortunate conspiracy between territory, resources and war, "Just 
when the black communities had become the legitimate owners of their lands, an 
57 U.S. Office on Colombia, "Understanding Colombia Series: Afro-Colombians under 
Fire" June 2004; available from http:l/usofficeoncolombia.org/insidecolombia/afcol.htm; Internet; 
accessed 3 1 October 2005 
58 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Indigenous people and Afko-Colombians represent 
40% of all IDPs (2005)." 
59 Black Communities Process in Colombia, PCN, "On paths of'fkeedom," 235 
illegitimate war placed the newly acquired rights in jeopardy."61 The government has 
largely failed to protect and ensure the constitutional guarantees to the inalienable and 
non-mortgageable collective land titles afforded to black communities displaced by the 
violence. Moreover, the implementation of the law which provides support and 
protection to the displaced is poorly executed and has been condemned by the Colombian 
Constitutional Court. The plight of displaced Afro-Colombians must be situated not only 
in the contemporary manifestations of the complex emergency by which they were 
displaced but within a history and a society that situates them at the bottom of racialized 
social hierarchy. According to a report released by The Bernard and Audre Rapoport 
Center for Human Rights and Justice at the University of Texas "In reality, it is of little 
use to talk of state support for displaced Afro-Colombians, since the government has 
neither produced disaggregated data on nor formulated policies specific to this minority 
group. This deficiency is both cause and effect of the continued invisibilization of Afro- 
Colombians-displaced or o therwi~e."~~   he forced evacuation of the black population 
and usurpation of collectively held territories has led to an even greater concentration of 
land in Colombia, a phenomenal counter land reform largely undertaken by the 
paramilitaries (in collusion with the state). However, displacement is not the only tactical 
mechanism by which illegally armed groups employ to terrorize populations in strategic 
regions, economic blockades and "trapping" communities so that their mobility is 
61 Mieke Wouters, "Ethnic Rights Under Threat: The Black Peasant Movement Against 
Armed Groups Pressure in the Choco, Colombia" Bulletin oj Latzn American Research 4, no 4 (October 
2001): 517 
62 The Bernard and Audre Rapoport Center for Human Rights and Justice, "Unhlfilled Promises 
and Persistent ObstacIes to the Realization of the Rights of Afro-Colombians." 
restricted, as an exercise in population control, further erodes human rights and 
undermines the realization of individual and collective rights of black cornmunit ie~.~~ 
Further complicating the human security crisis in Colombia is the introduction of 
illicit crop cultivation in their ancestral territories, particularly in the Choco. The 
cultivation of coca in black communities necessarily attracts two divergent but equally 
destructive forces, illegally armed groups and other decentralized groups of drug 
traffickers and subsequently, the attention of the United States in their efforts to eradicate 
the cultivation of illicit crops in source countries. Former governor of the department of 
Choco, Luis Gilberto Murillo, in testimony delivered to the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere on April 24,2007, provides this 
definitive declaration "The regional focus of Plan Colombia in the South of the country, 
created a "balloon effect" that affects Afro-Colombian rural communities. The pressure 
of U.S.-funded aerial spraying on the Putumayo Department, moved coca crops further 
west and north to Afro-Colombian and indigenous territorie~."~~ The United States' 
counternarcotics strategy that privileges a supply side approach to eradicating the 
cultivation, production and transit of illicit crops and the revenue generated by these 
activities by illegally armed groups, places the burden of the "drug war" on vulnerable 
local communities in source countries like Colombia. Aerial fumigation of coca crops is 
the preferred method of eradication of illicit crops that litter the terrain of Andean 
countries. U.S. backed Plan Colombia's push into the southern region of Colombia has 
6 3 ~ l a c k  Communities Process in Colombia, PCN, "A forgotten world: Rights of Afro-Colombian 
Communities." 
64 Luis Gilberto Murillo-Urrutia U S. Congress House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere "US  -Colombian Relations 1 10' Cong , 1 St Sess., 24 April 
2007. 
concomitantly pushed coca cultivation into other regions of the country, specifically the 
Pacific basin. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, in 2005, "Ten 
new municipalities of the department of Choco have been included in fumigation 
plans."65 Uribe has employed the aerial eradication strategy to the satisfaction of the 
United States government. A Congressional Research Service Report notes "With regard 
to ending narcotics trafficking, President Uribe substantially increased resources for the 
aerial fumigation program, vowing to spray all coca crops by the end of his term in 
2006 ."~~  The supply side strategy that privileges eradication at its source and 
interdiction presents profound implications for rural Afro-Colombian communities' food 
security due to the adverse effect of the toxins in the fumigation campaign. Moreover, 
the government of Colombia does not recognize persons displaced by fumigation 
campaigns as IDPs under Law 387 of 1997, therefore those displaced are not entitled to 
state protection and assistance. However, CODHES affirms that "zones of aerial 
fumigation and manual eradication" constitute one of the "main settings of forced 
displacement in the first semester of 2006."~' Afro-Colombian expulsions from their 
land, traditional subsistence practices, social networks and sources of revenue further 
exacerbate the prevailing socioeconomic condition of an already vulnerable population, 
65 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Indigenous People and Afro-Colombians worst 
affected by fumigation-induced displacements" (2005); available from http:llwww.internal-displacement.. 
org/idmc/website/countries.nsf~(httpEnvelopes)ll9EB7ACO6 1 lE4080257OB8OOSA747 ?Open 
Document; Internet; accessed 11 January 2007 
66~ongressional Research Service Report for Congress, "Colombia: Issues for Congress" 
January 19,2005. The Library of Congress, Washington D.C.. 
67 CODHES, "Mas or menos desplazados " Codhes Informa. 12 September. 2006. Boletin de la 
Consultoria para 10s Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento, No.. 69. Bogota: Colombia. Translation by 
author. 
plunging them further into miserable poverty once displaced. The United States 
sponsored aerial fumigation program has also instigated environmental degradation and 
corrupted the cultivation of licit crops which presents not only considerable challenges 
for black communities but undermines the biodiversity of the world's richest 
en~i ronment .~~  
Afro-Colombian civil society groups have argued that the Uribe administration, in 
collusion with paramilitaries, have conspired to illegally appropriate their lands in order 
to cultivate African palm oil in what amounts to "illegal plantations."69 Former 
paramilitary leader Jose Vicente Castai'io, according to Forrest Hylton, "Took personal 
credit for the rise of the African palm and agribusiness in Uraba. Castano had invested, 
convinced others to invest, and gone in search of new regions for in~estrnent."'~ 
Fostering the cultivation of African palm, as a part of a broader neoliberal economic 
development strategy by the Government of Colombia, is reflective of global trend 
towards increasing the production of biofuels in order to serve the international 
community's thirst for alternative energy sources. Moreover, the cultivation of African 
palm is considered by the Colombian government as a viable economic development 
alternative for undeveloped, rural areas, particularly those where coca has been 
cultivated. Unfortunately, according to the Minority Rights Group, "Throughout 2007, 
mineral resource extraction and monoculture plantation development remained the main 
6 8 ~ w l o s  Rosero, "Los afrodescendientes y el conflict armado en Colombia: La insistencia en lo 
propio como alternativa." 
69"~olombia: Ethnic Groups Demand Respect for their neutrality in conflict" Inter Press News 
Agency, 17 November 2005 
70 Hylton, 124. 
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causes of dispossession of indigenous and minority population territ~ries.""~ The U.S. 
government has also signaled its support for the cultivation of African palm as an 
alternative energy source and development strategy. The international demand for energy 
alternatives has spurned an increase in the production of biofuels and concomitantly the 
cultivation of African palm in Colombia. The International Displacement Monitoring 
Centre notes "The government plans to dedicate six hundred thousand hectares of land to 
increase the production of African palm oil and export of biodiesel. Thus biodiesel 
projects have attracted considerable private investment as well as support from 
international donors for regional development and the eradication of illicit crops."72 
The cultivation of the crop, without consideration and consultation with "black 
communities," and many times on land which has been illegally appropriated or vacated 
because of a coordinated campaign of terror, is fundamentally antithetical to the 
government's statutory commitments. The National Rural Development Institute 
"INCODER has awarded more than four million hectares of land to Afro-Colombian 
communities within the last four years, but their rights and semi-autonomy granted by the 
law are rarely respected by armed actors or by commercial undertakings." 73 A 
proponent of African palm cultivation and expansion, President Uribe continues to 
dismiss the claims fi-om black communities and their allies that the cultivation of African 
palm degrades the environment, undermines food security, was implemented without 
7 1 Minority Rights Group, "The State of'the World's Minorities." 
72~nternal Displacement Monitoring Centre, ''African palm plantations and forced displacement" 
November 2007 (22 January 2007).. 
73 Ibid. 
their consultation and entices paramilitary actors (and the next generation of 
paramilitaries, in the aftermath of their demobilization) to terrorize and evacuate black 
populations in order to illegally appropriate their territories for financial benefit. One 
report explains the extent of the African palm cultivation crisis, the complicity of the 
state and the role of private actors: 
The Colombian government has provided political and financial support to 
the development of African palm plantations as part of its effort to 
eradicate illicit crops, promote regional development and, reportedly, to 
provide economic incentives for paramilitary combatants to demobilize in 
line with the country's legal 'Justice and Peace' framework. However, 
according to the Ombudsman's office in Colombia, the African palm 
companies have commissioned paramilitary groups to forcibly displace the 
original Afro-Colombian and indigenous owners of the land who have 
since returned.74 
Thus, the cultivation of biofuels, along with the concomitant environmental degradation 
associated with monoculture and the instigation of "environmental refugees," further 
situates black communities in situations of generalized insecurity. Subsequently, Afro- 
Colombians are struggling against a myriad of legal (state and transnational corporate 
interests) and illegal actors (paramilitaries), vying for territory, financial gain and thus 
structural power that accompanies the usurpation and consolidation in Colombia. The 
Caribbean coast, while outside the scope of most literature on the implication of African 
palm cultivation on Afro-descendant communities and the sustainable development of the 
environment, is also a major region where African palm is being ~ultivated."~ 
74 Author Unknown, "Resisting Displacement: IDPs in Colombia" Forced Migration Review 
75 Maria M. Aguilera Diaz, "Palma Afiicana en la Costa Caribe: Un Semillero de Empresas 
Solidarias" Banco de la Reptiblica, Cartagena de Indias (July 2002); available fiom http://www .banrep.gov 
co/docum/Pdf-econom-region/Documentos/DTSER 0-Palma-Afr.icana.pdf (22 January 2007). 

and ethnically conscious, and class consc i~us . "~~  The violent struggle over access to 
strategic waterways and ports, land and natural resources combined with aerial 
fumigation campaigns have conspired to instigate the expulsion of the black communities 
from their territories and initiated their disproportionate representation amongst the 
country's internally displaced population. Moreover, Afro-Colombian IDPs are more 
likely to be expelled from their communities of origin than the rest of the population. 
Subsequently, displacement constitutes one of the gravest threats to the human security of 
poor black communities. The loss of territory necessarily implicates the abrupt 
disruption of traditional cultural practices and subsistence patterns, loss of sources of 
income, destabilizes housing arrangements, increases one's vulnerability to multiple 
forms of violence and generally instigates greater insecurity. Thus, not only are the 
displaced black and poor, but their plight is compounded because they are black, poor and 
displaced. The perilous socioeconomic realities and violence suffered by the displaced 
rarely improves upon arrival in a major urban center. Refugees International provides 
this grim assessment "The humanitarian situation for displaced Afro-Colombians and 
other displaced in the cities of Colombia is poor . . . Eighty percent of the displaced live 
in extreme poverty; two thirds live in inadequate housing; 78 percent lack access to 
medical care."79 Exacerbating the humanitarian crisis, the displaced are rarely 
compensated for the loss of their territories. 
78~iedad Cordoba Ruiz, "Development, Conflict and Territory" in "Race and Poverty: Interagency 
Consultation on Afro-Latin Americans." Inter-American Dialogue, Inter-American Development Bank and 
World Bank (Washington DC: 19 July 2000). 
79~efugees International, "Forgotten People: The Afro-Colombians;" (21 October 2004); available 
from http://www refintl.org/content/article/detai1/4223/; Internet; accessed 1 1 January 2007. 
Human Security, AAfro-Colombians & Uribe 's "Democratic Security" Policies 
The "Democratic Security and Defense Policy" has elicited ambiguous results at 
best and at worst paradoxical consequences as it relates to the provision of human 
security for Afro-Colombians according to the secondary data consulted. Colombian 
NGO, CODHES, vehemently contends that Uribe's "Democratic Defense and Security 
Policy" has paradoxically "generated conditions that aggravate, expand, and prolong the 
humanitarian crisis in the country."80 The Special Rapporteur on Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Forms of Discrimination, Doudou Diene claims in his 
2004 mission to Colombia, "The Government's 'democratic security' strategy is 
determined more by security consideration than by a concern for democracy."" While 
there have been marked declines in massacres, murders and kidnapping, Afro- 
Colombian communities continue to bear disproportionate levels of violence, if internal 
displacement is considered a key indication of the intensification of violence. Moreover, 
these human security indicators are not disaggregated by racelethnicity thereby 
undermining one's capacity to understand how vulnerable populations like Afro- 
Colombians have been affected by the strengthening of the state particularly since drastic 
declines in displacement have yet to manifest. Moreover, while the Ministry of Defense 
has collected data on vulnerable populations, Afro-Colombians have not been 
incorporated into their analysis. Afro-Colombian civil society organizations concur with 
several international human rights organizations' contention that the policy has invariably 
worsened the humanitarian crisis by involving civilians within the war making apparatus 
80 CODHES, "Desplazados: Ni Segwidad Ni Democracia" Boletin No. 47. 1 April 2004. Bogota. 
8 1 United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, "Mission to Colombia," (24 February 2004). 
of the state. The PCN argues "The Democratic security policy constitutes a serious 
limitation on the right to autonomy of Afro-Colombian communities. The relation 
between war and racism is accented within the framework of this policy, a fact which 
explains the growing involvement of Afro-Colombians in the armed conflict on both 
sides of the spectrum."82 Afro-Colombians, representing one of the poorest and most 
vulnerable populations in the country, many times exist and operate at the dangerous 
crossroads of a state plagued by conflict. Two of the most controversial elements of the 
"Democratic Security and Defense Policy" are the civilian informant and the peasant 
soldier programs which employ civilians as active contributors and legitimate military 
targets of non-states actors. Uribe's contention that the provision of security is a national 
endeavor and duty of all citizens and should not solely be undertaken by the state but in 
close collaboration with private citizens is problematic and antithetical to international 
humanitarian law. These programs, the researchers suggests, as do several human rights 
and civil society groups, threaten not only the neutrality of the civilian population within 
the multipolar violence waged between the state and groups operating on the margins of 
the law, but also serves to maintain the commodification of security, a practice which 
sanctioned the origins of the self-defense groups that have served to undermined the state, 
its institutions, its authority and legitimacy and justifies terrorizing the population by all 
armed actors. The PCN maintain Uribe's security policy intensifies, rather than 
diminishes, the human security crisis faced by black communities within conflict zones. 
It places already vulnerable communities in a precarious nexus whereby they are 
82 Black Communities Process in Colombia, PCN, "A forgotten world: Rights of Afro-Colombian 
Communities ." 
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considered guerilla sympathizers by the state (and pararnilitaries) for not cooperating or 
seen by the guerillas as "cogs in the wheels" of state sponsored coercion and terror as 
witnessed by the collusion between state security and paramilitary forces in the 
abdication of territories. In a more recent contribution, the PCN explains that while the 
implementation of Uribe's democratic security policies has been hailed for its 
diminutions in human and state security indicators, most analyses fail to situate the 
unique geographies in which Afro-Colombians inhabit within their examir~ation.~~ The 
authors note that while the capacity to travel by road has been hailed, by some, as a 
triumphant indication of greater population mobility and thus proof of the efficacy of the 
administration's security policy, the geography and underdevelopment in the Pacific 
where rivers not roads are the principal modes of transportation and transit requires a 
differential interpretation. Control over collectively owned territories is hndamental to 
ensuring the cultural integrity and political autonomy of black communities in the Pacific 
basin. Forced displacement and the state's incapacity andlor absence of institutional will 
to create the conditions for the return of the black population in dignity and security and 
restoration of their territories presents considerable challenges to the realization of their 
basic human rights. 
The nation's past cannot be divorced from its current political realities. Any 
program that effectively "outsources" security from the state apparatus should cause 
anxiety and alarm particularly as Colombian history dictates that the privatization of 
security has served to instigate grave human rights abuses, one that centers on the 
vacillation in the state of human security. While, Uribe is only beginning to embark upon 
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his second term and it may still be too early to assess the long term implications of the 
"Democratic Security & Defense Policy" propagated under his administration, the 
consequences of the conflict on the human security of Afro-Colombians continue to elicit 




The purpose of this chapter is to reveal the findings gleaned from the survey 
instrument and a reexamination of the methodology employed in the investigation. This 
analysis focused on region that has received scant attention by scholars, the Caribbean 
Coast. The principal instrument for this assessment, the "Afi-o-Colombian Perceptions 
Concerning the State of Security and the Armed Conflict," is an eleven-item, self- 
administered, two page survey. The instrument was designed to capture Afro-caribefios ' 
perceptions and exposure to various levels of violence within this complex intrastate 
conflict and an understanding of their individual and collective sense of their human 
security under the administration of Alvaro Uribe and the execution of the democratic 
security policies. A question concerning displacement was also incorporated. Seventy- 
nine surveys were administered; thirty-two in Membrillal, a settlement on the periphery 
of the municipality of Cartagena (Bolivar), thirteen in Barranquilla (Atlhntico), twenty- 
one in Monteria (Cordoba) and thirteen in an undisclosed municipality in the Montes de 
Maria region.' The instrument contained seven items utilizing dichotomous (yes or no) 
1 Due to the absence of a statistically significant, random sampling of'the black population, one 
cannot generalize this study beyond the particularities of the geographical space under which the study was 
taken or the particular character or motivations of'the informants employed. However, this was the best 




and tripartite (yes, no or no response) scales, a raciallethnic demographic question, and 
three open-ended questions with contingency questions were included. In addition to the 
survey, interviews and focus groups were also conducted. 
Inclusion Criteria for the Survey 
Afro-descendant communities in municipalities with significant minority or 
majority Afro-descendant populations inhabiting the Caribbean Coast of Colombia were 
chosen for this i n~es t i~a t i on .~  Participants for the study were recruited based on the 
following criteria: (1) Participants were willing to participate in a study concerning the 
nature of security in Colombia and (2) Participants displayed some measure of civil 
activism, as evidenced in their participation in Afro-Colombian based civil society 
groups. 
Sample 
The non-random sample population was determined utilizing an expert choice 
sample. The participant population was selected employing a non-probability sampling 
technique due to the fact that (1) there was no capacity to generate a random list of 
potential participants and query them and (2) the delicate nature of study (discourse on 
security in Colombia) required a level of discretion that necessitated the use of this 
particular method of participant selection. Expert choice sampling, a type of purposive 
sample, was employed in this study because the investigator considered indigenous 
2 For the purposes of this investigation, majority Afro-descendant populations will be defined as 
municipalities with populations with 50% or more persons self-identified as Afio-descendants 
Furthermore, significant minority Affo-descendant population will be identified as a municipality where at 
least 10% ofthe population self-identified as Afro-descendants. While, the census data is problematic, for 
a number of reasons discussed in a later chapter, demographic statistics ftom the raciauethnic data iYom the 
2005 census will be employed. 
activists engaged in social justice activism in the Afro-caribefio community best qualified 
and the most appropriate informantls in collecting data and identifying potential 
participants. Participants also identified other potential informants to participate in the 
investigation. This was the best available sample under the circumstances. It should be 
noted, the distribution of the sample population was imbalanced with the greatest 
representation from Membrillal, a small, underdeveloped settlement on the periphery of 
Cartagena. Thirty two people participated in the study from Membrillal while only 
thirteen took part in the survey from the undisclosed municipality in the Montes region. 
Survey Results 
The "Afro-Colombian Perceptions Concerning the State of Security and the 
Armed Conflict," was administered to informants in four municipalities in three 
Caribbean coastal departments. Ninety-six percent of the sample population self- 
identified as Afro-Colombian (76). The author was particularly attentive to the data 
which was collected from the Montes de Maria region for several reasons: 
1. The vast majority of the literature on the impact of the intrastate 
conflict on black communities is only available for the Pacific Coast 
region of the Colombia; 
2. There are a number of municipalities in the Montes de Maria with 
high population densities of Afro-Colombians. In fact, the population 
investigated was more than 80% Afro-Colombian; 
3. The region was identified by informants as one of the contested and 
volatile regions on the Caribbean coast; 
4. The secondary literature that was collected by governmental and 
nongovernmental identify the region as a geostrategic zone of 
importance to all armed actors for a myriad of different reasons 
including the cultivation of coca and African palm, it's a strategic 
corridor for the Caribbean, the mountain range has attracted and 
provided a haven for left wing armed actors, the region was classified 
as a rehabilitation and consolidation zone and all actors are present and 
contesting space and resources in the region.3 
Table 10 illustrates the raciallethnic make-up of the informants that participated in the 
investigation by municipality. 
Table 10. Informants' Perception of Their RaceIEthnicity 
Municipality/Locality Afro+ Indigena Blanco Mestizo *NIA 
Membrillal 29 0 0 2 1 
Monteria 
Barranquilla 
**Undisclosed Municipality in the 13 0 0 0 0 
Montes de Maria Region 
+Afro-Colombian includes those respondents who broadly identify themselves as 
negrola, mulatola, Palenquerola, Raizal or Afro-descendant. 
*N/A = The informants did not answer the question 
**In order to ensure anonymity of respondents and confidentiality of responses, the name 
of the municipality in the conflict-ridden area of the Montes de Maria was withheld. 
The pervasive intrastate violence that has infiltrated all areas of public and private 
life, affected urban and rural areas and touched the lives of many Colombians has been 
particularly harmful towards vulnerable populations. The survey revealed that 43% of 
the informants admitted that they have been exposed to some level of violence produced 
by the armed conflict. An indication of the disparate levels of exposure to the conflict 
3~ much broader discussion of. the Montes de Maria's strategic impor.tance is carried out in the 
previous chapter (VI) 
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experienced by Afro-Colombians as opposed to the general population can be found in 
data on internal displacement which is a valuable indicator particularly since data 
disaggregated by ethnicitylrace is available. The following table confirms that more than 
three quarters of the respondents who reside in the municipality in the former 
rehabilitation and consolidation zone claimed that they were exposed to violence 
propagated by armed actors. It is important to note that this municipality is a 
predominately Afro-descendant community located in an economically strategic area: 
drug trafficking and cultivation of oil and African palm are all important activities in the 
zone, and all armed actors in Colombia's low-intensity civil conflict are present in the 
region. 
Table 11. Informants' Response to Whether They Have Been Exposed to Violence 
Propagated by the Armed Conflict 
Municipality N Yes No 
Membrillal 3 2 6 26 
Monteria 2 1 5 7 
Barranquilla 13 5 8 
**Undisclosed Municipality in the 13 10 3 
Montes de Maria Region 
Concomitantly, as Table 12 illustrates, all the informants that participated in the 
study from the municipality in the Montes responded that they knew someone that had 
been threatened by armed groups operating on the margins of the law. 
Table 12. Informants' Response to Whether They or Someone They Know Have Been 
Threatened by Illegally Armed Groups 
Municipality/Locality N Yes No 
Membrillal 
Monteria 2 1 14 6 
Barranquilla 
**Undisclosed Municipality in the 13 13 0 
Montes de Maria Region 
Table 13 was devised in order to identify the illegally armed groups operating in 
the communities investigated. The informants report that the FARC and the AUC were 
the principal IAGs in their areas. Eighty percent of the violence exacted against the 
informants in the Montes was perpetrated by either the AUC or the FARC or some 
combination of both. 
Table 13. Groups Implicated in the Actions Against the Respondents or Someone That 
They Knew 
FARC ELN AUC Other 
Membrillal 13 6 11 0 
Monteria 
Barranquilla 
**Undisclosed Municipality in the 10 4 10 0 
Montes de Maria Region 
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One of the principal achievements of the Uribe administration's democratic 
security policy has been the demobilization of illegally armed groups, particularly the 
paramilitaries. The Justice and Peace Law, criticized by human rights groups, provided 
the statutory framework for the demobilization process. Thirty percent of informants 
confessed that new armed groups have emerged since the paramilitaries were 
demobilized. The vast majority of respondents (83%) in the Montes de Maria 
municipality claim that new paramilitary groups have emerged in the aftermath of the 
demobilization. (see Table 14). 
Table 14. Informants' Response to Whether New Armed Groups Wave Developed Since 
the Demobilization of Paramilitaries in their Communities, if their Community Was 
Under the Influence of Paramilitaries at Some Point 
- 




**Undisclosed Municipality in the 10 2 0 
Montes de Maria Region 
Hailed as the "most popular president Colombia has ever had" by Angus Reid 
Global Monitor, hilvaro Uribe Velez has consistently registered high (between the mid- 
sixty and even into the eighties) approval ratings most likely predicated on the 
respondent's perceived increase in state capacity to close the "security gap," a capacity 
which has created conditions for increased mobility of the civilian population, foreign 
investment and tourism in a country that has been under a state of siege and renowned for 
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its endemic violence. In December 2006, the president had an approval rating of 7 0 % . ~  
Since the sample population was not disaggregated by ethnicitylrace, it does not permit 
one to analyze national minorities' perspective on Uribe's performance which is a critical 
assessment tool particularly since Afro-descendants and indigenous peoples have been 
disparately affected by conflict and disproportionately represented amongst the displaced. 
Afro-Colombians participating in this study were considerably less supportive of the 
administration than the general population sampled. While, the methodology may have 
differed from the agency performing the poll and the question may be slightly different, 
the findings in this survey may still be instructive. Of those who responded yes or no to 
the question concerning the president's approach to armed conflict, only fifty-one percent 
(32) of Afro-Colombian informants participating in the survey agreed with the approach 
employed by Uribe to confront the armed conflict. However, it should be noted that three 
out of the four communities generally did not agree with Uribe's approach to confronting 
the conflict. It should be noted that there was not uniform participation in the different 
community's surveyed. A disproportionate number of surveys (40%) were undertaken in 
Membrillal relative to the other participating communities which may confound some of 
the findings (see Table 15). 
4 Angus Reid, "Uribe unaffected by Setbacks in Colombia;" available from www.angus- 
reid.com/polls/view/ 15007. 
Table 15. Informants' Response to Whether they Agree with Uribe's Approach to 
Confronting the Armed Conflict 




**Undisclosed Municipality in the 4 7 1 
Montes de Maria Region 
The strategic objectives of Uribe's democratic security policy in narrowing the 
"security gap" was an in increase in the capacity, size and presence of the state security 
forces, consolidation and control of national territorial and the institutionalization of the 
state's capacity to legitimately monopolize force. The majority of respondents from all 
participating municipalities surveyed overwhelming agree that a substantial increase in 
military presence has occurred since Uribe assumed power (see Table 16). 
Table 16. Informants' Response to Whether there is a Greater Presence of Public Forces 
Now Than Under the Administration of Andres Pastrana 




**Undisclosed Municipality in the 10 1 0 
Montes de Maria Region 
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While only 22% of respondents were displaced as a result of the armed conflict, 
this figure is much higher than the displacement data attributed to the general population. 
The majority of the IDPs were located in the settlement of Membrillal which is located 
on the periphery of Cartagena. Cartagena is considered a receptor community therefore it 
is not surprising that the disparate representation of the displaced are located on the 
margins of this municipality. A quarter of the population surveyed in Membrillal 
admitted that they had been displaced from their communities of origin as a consequence 
of the armed conflict. While, only one participant in the undisclosed municipality 
divulged that they had been displaced as a consequence of the violence, the municipality 
is one of the larger receptor communities in the Montes de Maria according to a regional 
f~undation.~ However, the foundation also noted that one of the municipalities that is 
most contested is also a municipality that is one of the largest receptor cornmunitie~.~ 
This situation exemplifies the extremely complex and paradoxical nature of the security 
dilemma in Colombia and the region, in particular. The World Bank acknowledge 
"Different sources affirm that the Afi-ican-Colombian population has been one of the 
human groups most affected by the phenomenon of forced displacement in Colombia, 
principally by being located in the zones of major armed confrontation of the country."7 
Moreover, the disparate level of displacement amongst this overwhelmingly black sample 
population is consistent with the literature which maintains that Afro-descendants have 
5 Fundacion Red Desarrollo y Paz de 10s Montes de Maria; available from http://www 
fmontesdemaria .org/proyectos .asp 
6 Ibid. 
7 The World Bank, "The Gap Matters: Poverty and Well-Being of Afro-Colombians and 
Indigenous Peoples," 61. 
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been disproportionately displaced by the violence instigated by the armed conflict (see 
Table 1 7). 
Table 17. Informants' Response to Whether they Have Been Displaced fiom Their 
Community of Origin 
Municipality/Locality Yes No 
Membrillal 8 
Monteria 3 17 
Barranquilla 1 10 
**Undisclosed Municipality in the 
Montes de Maria Region 
The final question in the survey was designed to elicit respondents' perceptions of 
their security under the administration of Alvaro Uribe as opposed to former President 
Andres Pastrana. While, the majority of the population (58%) surveyed believed that 
they feel more secure under the Uribe administration than Pastrana, only 27% of 
respondents in the municipality in the Montes de Maria believe that they are more secure. 
In fact, the majority in that area admitted that they felt less secure or there was no 
difference in the state of the security under the policies of the Uribe administration.' The 
disparity in responses may be attributed to the fact that the level of exposure to violence 
in the Montes is significantly higher than in other regions and requires an analysis which 
considers the geographical significance of territory, resource (both human and natural) 
and the existing preponderance of violence in those communities (see Table 18). 
8 Fifteen percent (12) failed to answer the question. 
Table 18. Informants' Response to Whether they Feel More Secure Under the Policies of 
Uribe Than Under Pastrana 
MunicipalityILocality Yes No There Is No Difference 
Membrillal 
Monteria 7 1 12 
Barranquilla 5 2 1 
**Undisclosed Municipality in the 3 4 4 
Montes de Maria Region 
The absence of public opinion data concerning the efficacy of Uribe's security 
policies by Afro-Colombians is a problematic omission -From the discourse and public 
opinion polling data. While, the Government of Colombia points to the enumerable 
diminutions in the levels of violence and human security indicators such as kidnappings, 
political murders, threats, etc., coupled with public opinion extolling Uribe as the most 
popular president in Latin America, the absence of disaggregated data by racelethnicity 
obstructs stakeholders, affected communities, governments and social scientists capacity 
to engage in a differential analysis and policies that considers the relevancy of this 
important attribute. This survey is an effort to fill the gap that exists concerning the 
perspectives of Afro-Colombians on the security dilemma that exists in Colombia and the 
I 
Uribe administration's efforts to ameliorate the crisis. 
The final chapter that follows discusses the implications of the findings, 
implications for future study and engage in a broader analysis of the impact of the 
democratic security policies on the human security of Afro-Colombians. 
CHAPTER VIII 
FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this investigation is to determine the extent to which the 
propagation of President Alvaro Uribe's "Democratic Security and Defense Policy," 
coupled with the provision of U.S. foreign aid, has affected the human security of Afro- 
Colombians and more specifically AJFo-caribeAos. As the state becomes theoretically 
more secure as it consolidates control over the national landscape, strengthens the 
security apparatus of the state of the country and aggressively seeks to neutralize illegally 
armed groups, have Afro-Colombians, paradoxically, become less secure? The country 
Uribe inherited has been ravaged by organized, well-armed and financed groups 
operating on the margins of the law, from the right and the left, competing for territory, 
natural resources, access to structural power and to a lesser degree political legitimacy. 
The armed conflict that at times percolates beneath the surface and at others erupts 
furiously in Colombia designates the Andean country as one of the most violent in the 
Hemisphere and serves as the backdrop for this investigation. 
Afro-Colombians are subjected to multiple and mutually reinforcing forms of 
oppression and protracted violence exacted by state and non-state actors that sene to 
situate them as one of the country's most vulnerable populations. The United States' 
varied national security interests exacerbate their already precarious condition. From the 
Cold War to the war on drugs to the war on terror, the execution of United States' foreign 
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policy objectives in Colombia has had profound implications for not only the Colombian 
state, its economy, security environment but the local population, as well. Ulrich 
Oslender postulates "It seems ironic, to say the least, that the "war on terror," led by the 
United States and its changing allies, actually helps to produce and sustain landscapes of 
fear and regimes of terror in regions where the West intervenes."' Colombia is one of 
the few countries and the only Latin American country that has weathered the Cold War, 
war on drugs and now the war on terror. The incorporation of Colombia into the global 
war on terror, securing its energy security prerogatives through its support for the 
cultivation and production of bio-fuels (sometimes referred to as agro-fuels), provision of 
funding for the protection of critical energy infrastructure including the highly coveted 
CaCo Limbn-Covefias pipeline, strengthening of the security forces, the execution of a 
coordinated coca eradication and interdiction campaign and the elimination of groups 
operating on the margins of the law (also regarded as foreign terrorist organizations by 
the State Department) comprise the assorted economic and political foreign policy 
prerogatives of the U.S. government. The execution of these policies invariably 
complicates the precarious socioeconomic conditions, collective land tenure systems, 
social networks, cultural continuity and security of the African descendant population, 
particularly as interests diverge. Thus, often contradictory and antagonistic U.S. foreign 
policy prerogatives are executed in countries of strategic importance, like Colombia, with 
unfortunate and paradoxical consequences for local populations. For example, while, the 
United States government provides millions in economic and social development aid to 
Colombia and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
I Oslender, Spaces of Terror and Fear on Colombia's Pacific Coast, 127. 
Internally Displaced Person (IDP) humanitarian assistance program has conferred 
substantial resources for the provision of trainings, social services and other social 
development programs to meet the needs of IDPs, including Afro-Colombians, the U.S. 
sponsored aerial fumigation program presents extremely complex social, economic and 
political challenges for Afro-Colombian (and indigenous) communities in target areas. 
Some would argue the herbicides (Glyphosate, N-phosphonomethyl) imperil Afro- 
Colombians, particularly Law 70 affected communities, capacity to cultivate the terrain 
consistent with their traditional cultural practices, undermines food security, engenders 
health problems, threaten the integrity of the soil to cultivate licit crops (particularly for 
subsistence) and under certain circumstances force vulnerable populations to migrate due 
to fumigation induced environmental degradation. According to the Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre, "In 2002, of the 64 total municipalities that underwent 
aerial fumigation aerial eradication, 30 were home to minority communities with 
collective titles to the Complicating the prevailing catastrophe, the government 
does not classify those displaced by aerial fumigation as internally displaced persons. 
Consequently, Afro-Colombian and indigenous IDPs, displaced by the U.S. sponsored 
fumigation campaigns, do not qualify for the limited assistance and protection provided 
under the internal displacement statute, Law 387. 
This study collected primary data and consulted secondary sources in order to 
satisfy the research question while pursuing the study's objective. Data were collected in 
both Spanish and English. Interviews, focus groups and surveys, in combination with 
2 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Indigenous people and Afio-Colombians represent 
40% of all IDPs;" available from http:llwww.internal-displacement.org/idmc/ website/countries.nsf;/ 
(httpEnvelopes)/A9EEF75 195F58499802570B8005A746C?OpenDocument; Internet. 
participant observations, were the principal qualitative methodological tools used. 
Secondary data were collected from books, peer-reviewed journals, magazines, 
newspaper articles, government and intergovernmental documents and literature 
published by nongovernmental organizations. Fieldwork was undertaken in Colombia 
and the United States. Triangulation method was employed by consulting secondary 
research available in English and Spanish and by collecting primary data - surveys and 
interviews and original documents - in order to produce the findings for this 
investigation. These varied and mutually complementary techniques and approaches 
were particularly significant and essential since there are very few studies that have 
attempted to analyze the impact of Uribe's security policies on Afro-Colombians while 
situating that analysis outside the Pacific region. Interviews with informants (members 
of black civil society groups in Colombia, Congressional staffers of strategic members of 
the Congressional Black Caucus and representatives of nongovernmental organizations in 
Washington DC and Colombia) were instructive and provided considerable insight in 
understanding the prevailing ethniclracial dimension of the armed conflict as its has 
unfolded during Uribe's tenure (2002-2006) and the efficacy of the democratic security 
policies. 
Qualitative secondary data extracted from academic, popular, intergovernmental 
and nongovernmental publications were consulted in an effort to determine the extent to 
which the state of human security of Afro-Colombians has been transformed as the state 
has become, according to its own measures, more secure through the consolidation and 
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strengthening of its security apparatus.3 Colombian government data on vulnerable 
populations fails to acknowledge Afro-Colombians as members of this distinct category 
of citizens and have failed to disaggregate data based on racelethicity to determine the 
extent to which the promulgation of the democratic security policies has affected Afro- 
descendants, making analyses very difficult. However, data concerning internal 
displacement were employed as a variable indicator of the presence or absence of human 
security for the Afro-Colombian population. The World Bank notes, statistics on internal 
displacement are indispensable indications of the perpetuation of violence because they 
". . . quantify the reality of the forced displacement in communities of African-descent 
explain the growing social and cultural impact that this sector of the population is 
currently dealing with."4 Data pertaining to internal displacement are also valuable for 
two particular reasons: (1) they serve as an indication of armed conflict and the changing 
geographical spatial distribution of the population commensurate with the evolving 
topography of violence and (2) they are among the few indicators that have been 
systematically disaggregated by racelethicity, one of the clearest indications of the 
specificity and targeting of certain vulnerable populations with particular attributes. The 
geospatial distribution of the Afro-descendant population in areas of strategic 
consequence to all armed actors constitutes an imminent, in fact, existential threat to the 
human security of Afro-Colombian community. Moreover, the burgeoning raciallethic 
3~olombian Government sources consulted were the Ministry of Defense, the Observatory on 
Human Rights of'the Vice-President's Office of the Republic of' Colombia, the Administrative Department 
of' Security (DAS) and the National Administrative Department of' Statistics (DANE). 
4 ~ o r l d  Bank, "The Gap Matters: Poverty and Well-Being of Afro-Colombians and Indigenous 
Peoples," 77. 
dimension of the intrastate security crisis is also an indication of the state's incapacity to 
extend to security to its most vulnerable populations. The World Bank confirms: 
There does not appear to be a satisfactory response from the public 
considering that special programs with a differential focus have neither 
been planned nor implemented. Moreover, there has not been a precise 
study that characterizes the situation o f the forced displacement of 
African-Colombian communities, their different dynamics and the status 
of their ~ettlement.~ 
The expulsion of black communities from collectively held territories is not coincidental 
but a calculated strategy by the state, corporations and paramilitaries and other armed 
groups. A concerted and coordinated effort by groups operating on the margins of the 
law consists of terrorizing the population, instigating inhabitants flight from strategically 
valuable land and resources, and the concomitant illegal appropriation of Law 70 affected 
territories, in order to cultivate the land for illicit and licit crops and other capitalist 
ventures. The cultivation of African palm, as a part of national and international 
strategies to secure alternative energy sources, alternative development projects and 
efforts to capitalize on international demands, has instigated the evacuation of black 
communities by paramilitaries and at times in collusion and/or implicit consent of the 
state. Furthermore, there has been a concomitant environmental degradation associated 
with monoculture cultivation which has triggered the surfacing of "environmental 
refugees." This precarious predicament positions vulnerable communities in situations of 
generalized insecurity and exacerbates the prevailing raciallethnic dimension of the 
5 Ibid. 
displacement ~ r i s i s . ~  All of these dynamics converge and conspire to serve the interests 
of irregular armed forces, speculators, landed elites, state and or transnational 
corporations, largely to the detriment of Afro-Colombian (and indigenous) groups. 
According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Afi-o-Colombians, as of 
2005, comprise 18% of the IDP population and possess higher levels of expulsion from 
their communities of origin than the general population.' This situation is an indication 
of the disparate levels of violence experienced by black communities. Moreover, since 
territory has historically been tied to power in ~olombia,' the author suggests that black 
communities and their much coveted territories provided through the execution of Law 
70 and under traditional forms of land tenure, will continue to be targeted by state, 
transnational and elites and groups operating on the margins of the law. Historically 
entrenched racism and discrimination, isolation from economic opportunities, the 
maldistribution of resources and asymmetrical power structures, operating alongside the 
armed conflict and its attendant consequences, all combine, to complicate and confound 
the plight of black communities. 
The survey instrument devised and distributed by the author to the 
predominately, Afro-Colombian sample population inhabiting four municipalities on the 
Caribbean coast of Colombia, was the principal primary data examined in this study. The 
'while African palm is also cultivated on the Caribbean coast, the literature consulted largely falls 
silent on the implication of'the cultivation of the crop on Afro-Colombians inhabiting that region of the 
country.. 
7~nternal Displacement Monitoring Centre; available from http://www internal-displacement. 
org/idmc/website/countries.nsfi(httpEnvelopes)/A9EEF75 195F58499802,570B8005A746C?Open 
Document; Internet 
author divulges that while the sample population does not constitute a random sample 
with commensurate population size, purposive sampling was employed due to the 
delicate nature of the discourse and difficulty in securing participants with the desired 
attributes. Furthermore, there was disparate and uneven representation in the sample 
population. The author acknowledges that the findings cannot be extrapolated beyond 
this study due to the small non-random sample size. Nonetheless, this investigation adds 
value to the existing discourse as it is instructive and innovates by examining the 
perceptions of Afro-descendants in an understudied region during an historic period in 
Colombian history, where for the first time; the sovereignty of the state is being 
consolidated. The survey findings revealed that: 
Security has improved since the propagation of Uribe's democratic security 
policy and there is a noticeable increase in the number of security forces in 
their communities; 
More than 115~~ of the respondents divulged that they had been displaced from 
their communities of origin as a result of the armed conflict; 
0 Respondents feel more secure under Uribe than under former President 
Pastrana; 
Since the demobilization of paramilitary groups, new illegally armed groups 
have developed and; 
The participants in the Montes de Maria, home to one of the most conflict 
prone regions in the country, were more likely to be: (1) exposed to violence 
propagated by illegally armed groups, (2) know someone that has been 
threatened by illegally armed groups, and (3) felt no more secure or felt no 
difference in security since Uribe assumed power, in stark contrast to the other 
communities 
The undisclosed municipality in the Montes de Maria is unique relative to 
the three other sites of investigation because it is predominately Afro- 
Colombian, a municipality with high rates of both expulsion and reception 
of internally displaced persons and is an underdeveloped, small town 
located near a strategic mountain range. The other municipalities were 
major urban centers or located on the periphery of the municipality 
(Membrillal). 
Focus group and individual interviews were also undertaken in order to gamer a better 
understanding of the real and or perceived implications of Uribe's security policy from a 
myriad of perspectives. Interviewees included a Colombian reporter with a local 
newspaper, Afro-Colombian members of civil society, NGO workers in the United States 
and Colombia, a former guerilla with the demobilized M-19, the Defensoria del Pueblo 
(people's defender) of Cartagena and Congressional staffers (United States).. An El 
Universal reporter interviewed explains that by all accounts security in the region (and 
country) has improved. People feel more secure, are able to travel on roads, more police 
stations and security posts have been erected according to the reporter. Furthermore, he 
affirms that security is the "door for development." However, the Defensoria del Pueblo 
in Cartagena de Indias elucidates that while a noticeable shift in security has taken place 
since Uribe came to power, security forces have increased and there is greater mobility, 
however, the state is in tran~ition.~ A black campesino, from the Montes de Maria 
region, tentatively explains that while the security environment has seemingly improved 
and violence has decreased, he is very concerned that the demobilization of paramilitary 
groups continues to create a sense of insecurity because while they may have 
theoretically laid down their arms yet they still maintain control of the political 
institutions and local economy. Moreover, new groups have emerged in the aftermath of 
the demobilization according to the informant. Senior Associate for Colombia and Haiti 
'~ r tu ro  Zea, Defensoria del Pueblo (Cartagena). Interview by author, 1 August 
2006, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia. 
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at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) Gimena Garzoli, when interviewed 
by the author in Washington, D.C., explains that while the security measures 
implemented by the Uribe government have elicited an augmentation of security, a more 
sophisticated analysis must be undertaken in order to engage in a thoughtful critique of 
the practical reality of the security policies. She noted that while there may be better 
access to different parts of the country and an increased military presence in the 
municipalities, these changes also necessarily indicate a concomitant escalation in 
collusion between state security forces and paramilitaries.10 Moreover, this situation 
presents considerable challenges for Afro-Colombians particularly in light of a security 
policy that democratizes security and places civilians at the hub of the crisis and where 
statelparamilitary collusion is endemic. Former Governor of Choco Luis Gilberto 
Murillo explained that the security situation in Colombia continues to present 
considerable challenges to Afro-Colombian communities specifically since violence in 
Colombia is executed in a selective manner which targets groups that threaten the status 
quo or challenge the political and/or economic projects of armed actors.'' 
Recommendations for Future Investigations and Development 
This investigation has elicited a number of revealing and troubling findings 
regarding the human security of Afro-Colombians within the nexus of the security 
prerogatives of the Government of Colombia and subsequently the United States. This 
investigation endeavored to make a contribution to the existing scholarship by providing 
10 Gimena Garzoli, Washington Office on Latin America Interview by author, 9 November 2006, 
Washington D.C 
" ~ u i s  Murillo, Phone interview with the author. 2 March 2007. Original Interview in English.. 
a micro-level analysis of the phenomenon as it concerns Afro-descendants on the 
Caribbean coast, a neglected subject of analysis by many academics conducting research 
on conflict-affected national raciallethnic minorities in Colombia. The vast majority of 
the publications produced probing the conflict examine the proliferation of the armed 
conflict in the country's Pacific basin and the (social, cultural, economic and political) 
implications of the perpetuation of violence and systemic terror exacted against Afro- 
descendants inhabiting that region. The primary data collected and the secondary 
literature examined suggests that considerable research needs to be conducted concerning 
state and nonstate sponsored violence and the implications for Afro-Colombian 
populations inhabiting strategic regions outside the Pacific region with. In light of the 
effort undertaken in this study, a number of recommendations are suggested in order to 
add value and complement the prevailing literature. The researcher suggests: 
1. More comprehensive investigations be undertaken concerning the 
proliferation of the armed conflict on the Caribbean coast, the different armed 
actors, their history in the regions, relationship with the African descendant 
and indigenous populations, the role of coca, opium and African palm 
cultivation in exacerbating the conflict and the implications for ecological 
health of the regions, other strategic indigenous resources and corridors of the 
region that are of consequence to all armed actors and the implications on 
black communities that inhabit those territories be undertaken. 
A. A more comprehensive survey instrument should be devised to include 
socio-demographic data, similar to household surveys undertaken by 
DANE, including indicators such as gender, employment data (formal or 
informal, occupation status, etc), marital status, education, household size, 
etc. 
B. A study dedicated to assessing the situation of internally displaced Afro- 
descendant women in conflict zones (much like the studies undertaken by 
Donny Meertens) should also be explored, particularly since conflict has 
differential and deleterious effects on women (and children), they bear the 
weight of the ensuring the welfare of the family once displaced and are 
exposed to particular forms of gender based violence exacted during 
conflict. 
C. The survey instrument should offer participants a more sophisticated set of 
potential responses (e.g. Likert scale) in order to capture the breadth of 
their perceptions concerning the state of security instead of offering strict 
binary or tripartite potential responses 
2. The Colombian Ministry of Defense should include Afro-Colombians to their 
list of vulnerable populations in their assessments of the achievements of the 
democratic security policies and disaggregate data by racelethnicity. In the 
January 2008 report, the list of vulnerable groups included trade unionists, 
indigenous population, municipal councilpersons, mayors and ex-mayors, 
professors and journalists. Territories collectively owned by Afro- 
Colombians and the indigenous groups have and will continue to be targeted 
by illegally armed groups because they tend to inhabit mineral rich regions of 
strategic concern to armed actors and national and transnational corporations, 
therefore the state must take proactive, consultative and context specific 
measures to protect these populations. 
A. Data disaggregated by racelethnicity should be undertaken when 
conducting presidential performance polling data in order to determine 
Afro-Colombian's (and indigenous persons) perceptions of the efficacy of 
Uribe's policies, particularly his security initiatives, since they are 
disparately impacted by the violence by illegally armed groups. 
B. The development of a human security index that would engender a more 
precise quantitative assessment of the state of human security of 
populations exposed to intrastate violence propagated by the state and 
non-state actors. In 1990, the United Nations Development Programme 
devised a measure concerned with measuring human development. "The 
Human Development Index (HDI) measures the average achievements in 
a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and 
healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living." l2 Theoretically, 
a "human security index" would measure the presence or absence of 
security of vulnerable populations. Key tenets in human security discourse 
could potentially be sociopolitical homicides, threats, massacres, conflict 
induced internal displacement and kidnapping, all disaggregated by 
racelethnicity. This effort would better inform interested parties and 
stakeholders about the implications of the conflict on particular 
raciallethic minorities. 
12 United Nations Development Programme, "Beyond Scarcity: Power, poverty and the global 
water crisis" New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2006; available from http://hdr..undp 
org/hdr2006/statistics/indices/default , c h  Internet; accessed 22 December 2007 
Conclusion 
"Security for Worn  " The Paradox Revealed? 
Stephen J. Del Rosso Jr. maintains security as conceptualized for the bulk of the 
Westphalian era "simply meant what the rulers said it meant.13 For Uribe and his 
adherents in the Colombian government (and in many circles in Washington), security is 
measured by the increased consolidation of territorial control, strengthening of security 
forces, the usurpation of the legitimate monopoly of the use of force resulting in a decline 
in terrorist attacks and the demobilization, capture or killing of (counter) insurgent forces 
and subsequently by the dramatic decline in "human security" indicators like homicides, 
kidnapping, and massacres. For the first time in the nation's history, public security 
forces are present in all the country's municipalities, 40,000 "terrorists" have been 
demobilized, kidnappings have decreased by 83%, attacks instigated by illegally armed 
groups have plummeted by 76% and there has been a 40% decline in homicides since 
Uribe came to power in 2002, further consolidating his popularity.14  oreo over, the 
country's economic growth has improved markedly since Uribe assumed the reins of 
power in 2002. "The country's $130-billion economy grew at 6.8 percent in 2006, the 
highest rate in 28 years and two points faster than the Latin American average. Colombia 
has reduced its inflation rate from 16.7 percent in 1998 to 4.5 in 2006."15 As of 2007, 
the Andean country is no longer ranked as one the world's most fragile countries as 
13stephen J Del Rosso Jr , "The Insecure State," Daedalus 124, 1995 
14 State Department, "Charting Colombia's Progress;" available fkom http://www .state..gov/ 
documents/organization/93761 .pdf.; Internet; accessed 12 January 2008. 
15 Peter DeShazo, Tanya Primiani and Phillip McLean, "Back eom the Brink: Evaluating Progress 
in Colombia, 1999-2007" Center for Strategic and International Studies (November 2007) 
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defined by the Failed State Index. Furthermore, these seemingly significant diminutions 
in violence, strengthening of the security apparatus of the state, demobilization of 
paramilitaries and the state's unrelenting efforts to create the conditions for economic, 
particularly export oriented development and capacity for greater resource extraction and 
production have made Uribe exceedingly popular throughout Colombia, Washington 
D.C. and amongst U.S. transnational corporations with interests in Colombia. However, 
noticeably inconsistent with other marked diminutions in security indicators, data on 
internal displacement have not registered similar declines. The government's own data 
on internal displacement shows that instead of a decrease, an increase in the number of 
new displacements has surfaced. In 2003,215,782 new displacements were registered by 
the state agency responsible for monitoring displacement, La Agencia Presidencial para 
la Accion Social y la Cooperacion Internacional, (207, 607 by CODHES) and by 2006, 
that figure had increased to 260,207 (219, 866 by CODHES). The author postulates that 
this data may reflect the continued saliency of the security dilemma in Colombia since 
displacement reflects forced migrations of populations as a result of conflict and the 
reallor perceived threats to one's bodily integrity or life.16 In addition, there is evidence 
that suggests that Afro-Colombians continue to be disproportionately represented 
amongst the displaced since Uribe assumed power. The U.S. government even 
acknowledges that "Nationally, Afro-Colombians compose roughly 22% of the total 
16 State Department, "Charting Colombia's Progress." 
displaced population."17 Making matters worse and more complicated to ascertain a 
more conclusive understanding of the efficacy of the security policies on racial 
minorities, data on homicides, kidnappings and other relevant indicators, of Afro- 
descendants perpetrated by terrorist groups are glaring omissions in the Ministry of 
Defense's classification of vulnerable groups in their 2008 report on the state of security. 
Moreover, Colombian non-governmental organizations like the Colombian Commission 
of Jurists and other international NGO partners have acknowledged that while there have 
been declines in "human security indicators," there has also been a concomitant increase 
in extrajudicial killings and disappearances perpetrated by state security forces.18 In fact, 
the greatest perpetrators of rights violations are no longer the paramilitaries, which have 
been demobilized but continue to pose an ominous threat as they have begun to 
reconstitute themselves, but the state security forces. There is also intense pressure by 
the state to classify civilians as combatants in order to demonstrate the subordination of 
illegally armed groups. Furthermore, the explicit incorporation of civilians into the 
armed conflict, as peasant soldiers and civilian informants, insinuates that citizens are 
legitimate military targets for not all armed actors. Employing civilians in intelligence 
gathering operations and incorporating them as purveyors of security under such hostile 
realities violates international human rights law. Moreover, as Adam Isacson with the 
Center for International Policy reminds us, the government touted decreases in security 
1'7 Clare Ribando Seelke, "Afro-Latinos in Latin America and Considerations for U..S Policy" CRS 
Report for Congress. January 14,2008; available from www..fas .org/sgp/crs/row/RL327 13 .pdf'.; Internet. 
accessed 12 January 2008 
18 United States, Europe, Colombia Coordination, "U.S. groups alarmed by increase in extrajudicial 
executions in Colombia, urge stricter enforcement of U.S human rights conditions." 
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indicators, reflecting the supposed the necessity and success of the democratic security 
policies, requires additional analysis. He maintains "This decline [in combat incidents] 
only brought the intensity of the fighting back to levels seen in the late 1990s, not exactly 
a golden age of peace and security in ~olombia ." '~  Thus, a more sophisticated, thorough 
and measured scrutiny must be undertaken to understand the nuisances of the security 
situation in Colombia and in order to properly gauge the efficacy of the security policies. 
While, Uribe is only beginning to embark upon his second term and it may still be too 
early to assess the long term implications of the "Democratic Security & Defense Policy" 
propagated under his administration, the consequences of the conflict on the human 
security of Afro-Colombians as thus far elicited ambiguous, paradoxical results, at best. 
The promulgation of Uribe's national doctrine begs the question: "Security for whom?" 
Centering Afro-Colombians/Incorporating Afro-caribeiios. 
This study sought to determine the extent to which the promulgation of the 
democratic security initiatives has affected the state of human security of Afro- 
Colombians. First, as mentioned throughout the study, the vast body of literature on 
Afro-Colombians and the armed conflict has been confined to examining the situation of 
black communities inhabiting the Pacific basin, particularly in the Department of Choco. 
Yet, even within the Pacific basin, how the conflict manifests itself and the implications 
on black communities has differential affects depending upon a myriad of different 
spatial, economic, political and other relevant attributes. Eduardo Restrepo exemplifies 
'"dam Isacson, "CINEP: Colombia's Conflict is Far f?om Over," Center for International Policy, 
10 April 2008. 
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these nuisances in his examination of the Pacific nari~ense.~' While, there has been a 
cursory acknowledgement of the proliferation of the conflict in the Caribbean, few 
studies have undertaken the task of unpacking the manifestations of the armed conflict 
and the implications for Afro-descendants in strategic zones outside the Pacific basin. 
This deficiency in the literature presented significant difficulties in this the study however 
it did not confound the analysis but brought to bear the reasons why a more 
comprehensive examination of the Caribbean coast should be undertaken. Bettina 
Ng'weno reminds us that, in general, "the vocal organization of community groups in the 
department of the Choc6 make the Pacific basin an unavoidable referent and interlocutor 
for anyone studying, or living within, the space of ethnicity outside the Pacific basin."21 
Thus, any study attempting to understand the phenomenon in different locales must 
necessarily employ the discourse published on the topic in the Pacific as a guiding 
"referent." Therefore, themes that have emerged and literature derived about the 
Caribbean were largely predicated on the examination of statistics on displacement, 
identifying zones of contestation, geostrategic resources and corridors that coincide with 
the Afro-descendant settlement patterns, forced evacuation from territory and the 
cultivation of African palm and illicit crops and similar patterns and/or characteristics 
that manifested in the analysis of the Pacific. Consulting the secondary literature and 
through the collection of primary data, there is indication that the Montes de Maria area is 
a strategically important conflict ridden zone with a high population density of Afro- 
20~duardo Restrepo in "De 'refugio de paz' a la pesadilla de la guerra: implicaciones del conflict0 
armado en el proceso organizativo de 'comunidades negras' del Pacifico narifiense " 
2 1 Ng'weno, 88 
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descendants that are experiencing various levels of violence propagated by all armed 
actors. The survey data supported this supposition. An interview with a human rights 
worker with a French NGO confirms the relative importance of this particular geographic 
region in the ~ a r i b b e a n . ~ ~  She explains that the presence of coca cultivation in the south 
of Bolivar, the historic paramilitary stronghold on the Caribbean and the presence of the 
gas pipeline (Caiio Lim6n-Coveiias) and critical energy infrastructure in the region 
creates makes the region very dangerous as all armed actors vie for strategic position and 
monopolization of resources and territories. In relation to security since the Uribe 
assumed the presidency, she does note security has improved and the state is present in 
areas where it had formerly not been. In an interview with a black campesino from the 
undisclosed municipality in the Montes, (a region classified by the Uribe government as a 
rehabilitation and consolidation zone) the informant recounts the many complex ways in 
which the conflict has impacted his life, that of his family and the municipality which he 
lives. He discusses the infiltration and influence of local government by the 
paramilitaries and how demobilization has not meant a diminution in the power exercised 
by former right wing groups since they represent the economic elite of the municipality.23 
In the undisclosed municipality of the Montes de Maria investigated, not one person 
queried (whether personally, their family or people they knew) in the survey, was able to 
escape the terror and/or violence perpetrated by illegally armed groups, according to the 
22 Veronique Henry, Representative, Terre des hommes. Interview by author, 10 August 2006, 
Cartegena de Indias, Colombia.. Original interview in English.. 
23 The black campesino also engaged in a prolonged dialogue about the cultivation of African palm 
and the deterioration of the environment. He argues that the cultivation harms the traditional ways of' 
community and the sustainability of the environment. 
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study. While, the informant does admit that more police, a police station and peasant 
soldiers are present in the municipality and some people feel the sensation of greater 
security, he is skeptical. In the survey, more than 80% of the informants in this 
municipality also divulge that new armed actors have emerged since the demobilization 
of the paramilitary groups reflecting a trend that human rights defenders and their allies 
have confirmed. Moreover, three of the four communities surveyed revealed that they 
did not agree with Uribe's approach to confronting the armed conflict. While 
respondents in the undisclosed municipality overwhelming agree that there is a noticeable 
increase in security forces, the majority (72%) of the respondents believed that they were 
either no more secure or there was no difference in their security since Alvaro Uribe 
assumed the presidency. In addition, this study revealed that while the Government of 
Colombia has made considerable claims as to the improvement in the nature of security 
in Colombia as it relates to sociopolitical, homicides, kidnappings, displacement, etc, and 
the strengthening of the coercive machinery of the state, the evidence collected 
concerning the human security of Afro-Colombians does not wholly support the state's 
supposition. Have Afi-o-descendants been less likely to be exposed to "critical and 
pervasive threats" perpetrated by all armed actors since Uribe came to power? If this 
study is any indication, particularly the primary data gleaned from the Montes region of 
the Caribbean, Afro-Colombians continue to be exposed to "critical and pervasive" 
threats depending upon a myriad of geographic, cultural, political, social and economic 
factors including the zones of inhabitation and their proximity to strategic resources. As 
a Center for Strategic and International Studies report explains "Colombia is a complex 
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country that defies facile explanations and tired stereotypes." While their report entitled 
"Back from the Brink" touts the achievements in security elicited under the 
administration of Uribe, they recognize like countless other scholars, governments and 
interested parties, Colombia is not a country which can be casually analyzed. 
Subsequently, nor can the human security of Afro-descendants under his tenure be solely 
accessed through diminution in various security indicators that have not disaggregated by 
racelethicity. Data collected from primary (interviews, focus groups and surveys) and 
secondary sources (publications from Afro-Colombian civil society groups, 
nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and academic literature) reveal 
that while there may have been a "qualitative and quantitative" improvement in the 
security and welfare of the state and the general population, Afro-Colombians continued 
to be systematically dispossessed from their territories, displaced, threatened, terrorized 
and targeted for violence by all armed actors in the conflict and require an analysis which 
takes into consideration their position within a racialized socioeconomic hierarchy and 
their demographic concentration in geographically strategic and contested zones laden 
with abundant natural resources and where licit and illicit crops have proliferated that are 
coveted by all armed actors and national and transnational corporations. The results of 
the study indicate that continued exposure to the violence is relative to a number of 
factors, including racelethicity, that have been previously discussed even amidst a 
policy that has considerably improved the security of the state and the welfare of the 
population, according to some sources. Considerably more work must be undertaken by 
all stakeholders in order to ensure that the security is in fact democratized and equitably 
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distributed throughout the population, regardless of racelethnicity and/or region. The 
study suggests that it is important to center the plight of Afro-Colombians and 
incorporate the experience of Afro-Colombian sub-groups, into the broader analysis of 
the efficacy of the democratic security policies, as a barometer of the state of human 
security in Colombia. Finally, this study has demonstrated that the Afro-Caribefios 
experience various provocative acts of violence and terror propagated by all armed actors 
and require increased consideration by scholars that take into account their differential 
experiences, culture, regional history, social groupings and other relevant characteristics 
that relate to race, region and development. 
APPENDIX A 
Survey Instrument - English Version 
Afro-Colombian Perceptions Concerning the State of Security 
and the Armed Conflict 
Respond anonymously to the following questions in the questionnaire. Thank you for 
taking part in this investigation. 




Afro-Colombian0 (Negro, Moreno, Mulato, Palenquero, Raizal, 
Afrodescendiente) 
2. Have you been exposed to the armed conflict in Colombia? 
Yes 
3. Have you, someone in your family or known, been threatened by groups on the 





Appendix A (continued) 
4. Do you know anyone who has been threatened, assaulted or abducted by a group 
on the margins of the law? 
Yes 
No Response 




6. If your community was under the influence of paramilitary groups, have there 
been the changes in your communities since demobilization? 
Yes 
No Response 
7. Are there new armed groups that have been created since the paramilitaries 
demobilized in your community? 
Yes 
No Response 




Appendix A (continued) 
9. Do you believe that now there is a greater presence of public forces (army, police, 




10. Are you displaced from your community of the origin? 
Yes 
No 
Note: If your answer is Yes, answer the following questions. If you answer is No, 
proceed to question 1 1. 
A. Which community reside you in now? 
B. Of which community was displaced you? 
C. Have received you help of some governmental or international agency? 
Yes 
No 
D. How long have you been displaced from your community of the origin? 
E. Do you want to return to its community of the origin? 
Yes 
F. Do you know you if you can return safely to your community of the origin? 
Yes 
227 
Appendix A (continued) 
1 1. Do you feel more secure under the policies of President Uribe than Pastrana? 
Yes 
No 
There is no difference 
APPENDIX B 
Graphs and Maps 
INTENSITY OF ARMED CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA 
Municipalities with IHL Violations and Combats 
1990 - 2007 
Appendix B (continued) 
INTENSITY OF ARMED CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA 
Municipalities with IHL Violations of Combats 
1990 - 2007 
Appendix B (continued) 
INTENSITY OF THE ARMED CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA 
IHL VIOLATIONS BY ARMED ACTORS 
1990 - 2006 
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Appendix B (continued) 
APPENDIX C 
Letter of Invitation to Participate in the Research (English Version) 
CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY 
Office of the Dean 
Graduate Stud~cdResearch and 
Sponsored Programs 
October 30, 2006 
To Whom It May Concern: 
1 am a doctoral candidate at Clmk Atlanta University in the Department of Political Science 1 am 
currently gathering data for my dissertation, entitled "Negotiating thc Security Paradox: American 
National Security, Colombian Intrastate Security and the Human Security of Afro-Colombians" which is 
a case study investigating the extent to which the Colombian government's "'gradual consolidation of state 
conttol" under President Alvaro Uribe's "Democratic Security and Defense Policy," coupled with the 
provision of US aid to fight a "unified campaign" against domestic terrorism and drugs has affected the 
human security of Afro-Colombians Given your prominent position within this area of investigation, I 
would like to extend an invitation to participate in this study 
This study will consist of interviews and focus groups with individuals from non-governmental 
organizations, grassroots organizations and activists, governmental officials, and scholars concerned with 
the condition of African descendant peoples in Colombia andlor (the impact on) the armed conflict and 
wars on drugs and terror on these communities. Additional data collection of relevant documents fiom 
participating organizations in the United States and Colombia will also take place 
I would like to invite you to participate in this study by either providing your time for an interview and/or 
providing access to informational literature I would also appreciate refer~als to individuals or agencies 
involved in working with Afro-Colombians or engaged in research and/or policy relevant to US- 
Colombian bilateral relations whom I could contact regarding participation in this study The initial 
interview will take from 30-60 minutes with the possibility for follow up interviews At your discretion, 
the intetview can take place via phone or in person 
If you agree to participate in the study, I can provide, at your request, a transcript of the interview If you 
are unable to participate in the investigation, please notify me at your earliest convenience. 
Thank you f o ~  your time and consideration I look forward to your response If you should have any 
questions, you can contact me via email at tonvamwilliarns@~naiI.co~n or by phone at 916-212-9568 
Furthermore, if you have any concerns about the scope or manner in which the study is conducted, you 
may also contact my dissertation committee chair, Dr Fragano Ledgister at ~ledaister(@cat~.edu or 404- 
880-8734 
Sincerely, 
LaTonya M.. Williams, Ph.D. Candidate 
Clark Atlanta University 
Department of' Political Science 
223 James P Brawley Dr SW 
Atlanta, GA 303 12 
223 JAMES P. BRAWLEY DRIVES W. * A'IZAPSTA, GEORGIA 30314 
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